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Non-lethal weapons, like police batons, rubber bullets and tear gas, are increasingly deployed in 
interventions against a rising number of bodies in contested spaces. They are formed through notions of 
(in)security and an ethos of the use of force that makes such interventions appear to be ethical and 
humane. Yet, what is considered ethical or humane about weapons that are used with possible violent and 
injurious effects is bound to security discourses and practices in an interlocking globalized police-
military-network. Transformations in security techniques and technologies engenders a subtle, yet vastly 
nefarious, “mission creep” where technologies of war are depoliticized as a sensationalization of 
(in)security drives a robust use of force continuum weaponizing the politics of non-lethality. Shifting 
articulations and practices of non-lethality in security underpins the increasing militarization and 
colonization of everyday life by security logics and norms broadening the social utility of disciplinary 
power. Geographic literature on the logics of security is vigorous, but less attention has been paid to the 
politics of non-lethality and its operation within contested spaces, contentious politics, and exercises of 
state disciplinary power. Acknowledgement and better understanding that non-lethality operates at 
different socio-spatial scales from orbital space right down to the individual body is crucial. Investigating 
non-lethal state interventionary power recognizes the reinvention of citizens as subjects, as potential sites 
of political violence and domination in contested spaces. Non-lethal weapons have transformative effects 
on spaces of governance within the growing international security environment as well as on bodies and 
the use of force. This project confronts wider programs of state security regarding the use of force, 
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 Introduction: Making the Case for Critical Geographies of Non-Lethal Weapons  
 
Setting the Stage 
The thunderous sound of footsteps sojourn, thousands of voices pierce the air, a collection of 
deafening battle cries.  The waves of exhilaration and purpose that motivated you forward shifts as fear 
and anxiety emerge in your mirrored reflection on tactical control body shields.  The horizon is obscured 
as the armored bodies of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) and High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) tower over the front-line security personnel blocking your 
way forward.  They stand anonymously concealed behind layers of their protective suits, a living 
caricature of a mechanized humanity, disciplined and ordered.  Where human ends and weapons begin is 
unclear.  
Pandemonium reigns.   
Your eyes snap shut, darkness and blurred vision mitigates your ability to bear witness to the 
chaos around you as your eyes blink furiously to combat the severe burning as the aerosolized crystals of 
OC-spray (o-chlorobenyzlidene malononitrile aka tear gas) adhere to the wet surface of your eyes.  You 
start to cough violently, involuntarily choking, as your body’s defense mechanisms fail against the 
bombardment of irritating chemicals whose effects strengthen in reaction to your body’s defenses.  Your 
breathing passages become overwhelmed.  Gasping pulls the chemicals into your chest cavity.  Your skin 
crawls as the feeling of flames lick exposed areas. You become disoriented.  The combination of these 
physiological reactions and the psychological manifestations of fear, panic, and pain are close to 
incapacitating you. 
Around you, cries fill the air as flesh tears and bones collapse under the strength of impact or 
blunt projectiles, such as rubber/plastic bullets and bean bags fired from 12 gauge shotguns, multi-shot 
40mm launchers, capable of firing 5-6 shots per minute, and semi-automatic modular launchers capable 
of continuous feed rates of up to 15 rounds per second (SDI 2017).  The whistling resonances of the 
impact projectiles and their blows, the direct compression of tissues and ensuing shockwaves on bone, of 
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their strikes prompts you to cover your vulnerable anatomic sites.  Biomechanically, a blunt force trauma 
acts on the bone in predictable ways, first stressing the bone as the initial force is applied, straining occurs 
as the force passes through the bending bone culminating in its ultimate failure, the fracture of the bone 
(Passalacqua & Fenton 2012).  The minimum energy it takes to cause ballistic injury is 79 Joules, and on 
average, impact or blunt projectiles can impart energies on the order of 100-200 Joules (Fink 1965; Di 
Miao 2015; Vilke & Chan 2007).  Bodies around you fold onto the ground as the fragility of their flesh 
and bones befalls.   
You stand frozen in the chaos of the scene; the disorientation is too much to bear; you are in 
retreat.   While others move forward to face the onslaught of physical and psychological stresses and 
violence you endured you move out of range with strain, your body is weakened.  The immutable power 
of these weapon systems overwhelms.  The autonomous body suits reform their line moving forward, 
seizing contested space, step by step. 
The screams and injuries around you are indicative of the extension of weapon technologies in 
everyday life.  It is a reminder that human bodies are subject to violations of their flesh, blood and bones 
by actual practices of security and ordering by the state (Tyner 2009; Hurd 2017).  The state—partial and 
becoming as it is—embraces a tenuous legal monopoly on exercising violence as part of its portfolio of 
legitimacy (Weber 1965).  How life and death are regulated, and by whom, is a fundamental question in 
the state’s capacity to make and take life.  This research project identifies a gap in scholarship on the 
state’s sovereign right to exercise violence and take life, highlighting the ways the state regulates life and 
death by making life, albeit through violence.  It asserts that scholarship on geographies of security and 
violence must recognize non-lethality and recognize that non-lethality in state security agendas has a 
geography. A false binary between non-lethality and lethality—the non-lethal/lethal distinction (referred 
to as [non-]lethality throughout)—has become stabilized within modern security frameworks through the 
state’s claim to a monopoly of exercising violence as well as its monopoly on the decisions of what 




In our day and age, the revolution and advancement of weapon technologies allow states to 
manage, direct, and enact violence gradually dismantling traditional ethico-political ranges from ‘targeted 
killing’ using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs aka drones) to so-called ‘non-lethal’ munitions, like 
‘bean-bags’.  Transformations in ‘security mechanisms’ (such as regimes, frameworks, technologies, 
techniques, and materialities) engender a subtle, yet nefarious, “mission creep” where weapon 
technologies are depoliticized in geopolitical discourse as a sensationalization of (in)security drives robust 
use of force options in everyday life.     
Introduction: Security and Contested Space  
Across the world today from Caracas, Venezuela, to Moscow, Russia, from St. Louis, Missouri, 
to Bangkok, Thailand, the use of force against civilians is increasingly permeating the everyday, 
everywhere, and the overlap between weapons technology and everyday life is a distinct feature of 
contemporary society (Tyner & Henkin 2015; Gregory 2011).  The all-too-familiar images of security 
forces facing off against protestors in the streets and plazas across the world echo battlefields of war.  As 
the boundaries between military and civilian, state and war machine blur, the discourses and exercises of 
state power, operating within a militarized grid of interpretation, manifest as daily practice (Herbert 1997; 
Deer 2007).  This shift in civil-military relations underpins the increasing militarization and colonization 
of everyday life by security logics and norms that offer technological innovations and structures, 
broadening state disciplinary power (Bachmann et al., 2014).  As Coaffee and Wood (2006) argue, 
“Security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home” (p. 503, 
emphasis added).   
The competing demands of the modern state pivot around the (re)production of social and spatial 
order –certain ways of being, thinking, and doing.  Progressively, the (re)production of social and spatial 
order is centered around the often-amorphous idea of ‘security’.  Security has remarkably woven itself 
into the fabric of everyday life—perpetrated upon bodies and enacted in spaces—inundating political, 
social, and spatial relations and arrangements.  Even more remarkable, security is so pervasive that it has 
been widely accepted as a legitimate hegemony in articulating and producing our world(s) (Anaïs, 2015). 
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Nevertheless, an emergent body of critical scholarship has brought security increasingly into focus; 
security is contested and contingent.  Moreover, security cannot be understood without engaging its echo: 
insecurity.  Thus, the paradigm of (in)security, as a geostrategic construction and hegemonic ideology 
obsessed with social (dis)order, utilizes apparatuses of justification, legitimizing narratives, and state 
policies and practices to shape everyday life (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011).    
State-sanctioned policies and practices of (in)security are underpinned by a vast array of 
intelligibilities, techniques, and technologies designed to observe, measure, and value bodies as well as 
order their conduct (Foucault 1977, 1991).  It is my belief that state techniques and technologies of 
valuing bodies and ordering their conduct have three defining characteristics in contemporary society: 1) 
they are progressively technology-based, methodical, automatic, and often indiscriminately applied; 2) 
they target and consider the body as an object that can be observed, measured, valued, and consequently 
ordered through militarized lenses and 3) they operate increasingly in our everyday lives.  This security 
infrastructure is malleable and ubiquitous in its ability to create securitized spaces and societies through a 
militarized sense-making of everyday life (Åhäll 2016).  (In)security has become a common sense and 
normalized part of everyday life through self and state ordering, policing, and disciplining.  It obfuscates 
the security realities whereby state policies and practices of security are increasingly used to “legitimate 
unequal access to life and death” (Tyner 2012, p. 25).   
Geographic literature on the logics of (in)security is vigorous, but less attention has been paid to 
(non-)lethality and its operation within contested spaces, contentious politics, and exercises of state 
disciplinary power.  Where the thresholds of accountability, acceptability, and legitimacy of the use of 
force and violence against civilians are becoming increasingly contested is the extension of the battlefield 
and all its relations into everyday life by “organizing social relations into security relations” (Huysmans 
1998, p. 232; Mustapha 2011; Blackmore 2011).  As the everydayness and familiarity of security 
continue to penetrate all aspects of life the boundaries between non-lethal and lethal have stabilized 
within modern security frameworks, instituting a materialized (non-)lethality that is a weaponized (non-
)lethality.   
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Central Objectives and Research Questions 
The practice of political protest across the world has drawn considerable attention to the political 
and spatial dynamics of global movements, revolts and demonstrations whereby public spaces—streets, 
plazas and squares—become ‘spaces of contestation’ (Bosco 2001; Kaika & Karaliotas 2014; Uitermark 
& Nicholls 2014; Eder & Öz 2017; Daphi 2017).  As these active space-taking forms of political action—
however fragile and contingent—emerge within and alter these contested spaces, states intervene to 
dislocate citizens and “secure” space (Sewell 2001; Leitner et. al, 2008; Arampatzi 2017).  To secure 
space implies new forms of interventionary power that forge novel forms of military and civilian 
engagement, often, violently dislocating bodies (Bachmann et al., 2014). The forms of dislocation and 
securitization are often beholden to use of force options that range from security presence and tactical 
communication to crowd control and lethal force.  However, securing space is increasingly understood 
through the lens of non-lethality (Anaïs, 2015).  As such, this research engages state interventionary and 
disciplinary power that connects violence to order, coercion to (non-)lethality and state security power to 
civilian spaces.  It addresses the paucity in geographic literature on the politics of non-lethality and its 
materializations, through non-lethal weaponry, that proliferate across the world changing the dynamics of 
policing contested spaces and bodies.   
Non-lethal weapons are increasingly deployed in interventions against a rising number of bodies 
in contested spaces.  They are formed through notions of (in)security and an ethos of the use of force that 
makes such interventions appear to be ethical and humane (Anaïs 2015).  Yet, what is considered ethical 
or humane about weapons that are used with possible violent, injurious, and deadly effects is bound to 
security discourse and practice (Anaïs 2015).  Prevailing scholarship on non-lethal weapons focus on the 
weapons themselves, their users and/or their targets (Rappert 1999, 2003; Davidson 2009, 2013).  While 
this research is analytically rich, it largely supports a dominant view of non-lethal weapons as nothing 
more than weapon technologies, capabilities, or tools.  I believe this serves to acclimatize knowledge 
about non-lethal weapons that depoliticizes, whether intentionally or not, their increasing use in state 
security agendas around the world today.  In contrast I take a critical approach to question the taken-for-
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granted understandings and common sense assumptions of non-lethal weapons in security.  
Understanding how particular security narratives or discourses are exercised to promote (and obscure) 
certain agendas about (non-)lethality is a critical objective to this research (O’Lear 2018).  Shifts in civil-
military relations expose that security is, in fact, “coming home,” necessitating a widening of the 
theoretical gaze of non-lethal interventionary exercises of state power (Coaffee & Wood 2006, p. 503, 
emphasis added).   
The central objective of my research is to examine the broader political and spatial impacts of 
non-lethal intervention.  Making the case for critical geographies of non-lethal weapons is the first step in 
demystifying the shifting ambiguities of (non-)lethality and (in)security in non-lethal state interventions 
in contested spaces.  I conduct an intensive study that seeks to understand how non-lethal weapons 
change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state 
interventionary power and violence.  My analysis is focused on state sanctioned violence, the 
identification of bodies and spaces as threats in contested space, and the prioritization of science and 
technology in the service of state security agendas.  I explore state interventionary power emphasizing the 
use of theory and methods that link the discursive and material dimensions of knowledge production and 
practice with the ways they impact non-lethal state interventions in contested space.  Importantly, I 
ground my analysis with an empirical case study in Bangkok, Thailand to expose the lived everyday 
experiences and embodied consequences of geographies of non-lethal weapons.   
The competing demands of governance have entangled forms of social and political order, the use 
of force, and the legitimization of non-lethal intervention.  The policy, social, and spatial implications of 
this entanglement demand a reckoning.  I concentrate on unpacking the spatial and scalar elements to 
acknowledge and better understand the fact that (non-)lethality operates differently at different socio-
spatial levels from orbital space right down to the individual body.  Correspondingly, my primary 
research questions are:  
1) How do non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways 
that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence?   
2) How are non-lethal weapons stabilized within global police-military-network policy frameworks 
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that shape state interventionary power in securing contested spaces?     
 
To address these questions, I construct a conceptual framework drawing heavily on Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) and its applications to critical political geography.  STS offers dynamic ways 
of thinking about the geographies of non-lethal weapons, highlighting the often-invisible roles of 
knowledge, expertise, and socio-technical practices in shaping, sustaining, subverting, or transforming 
relations of security and power (Jasanoff 2004).  Integrating STS and critical concepts in political 
geography related to security creates intellectual space to advance more robust, nuanced, and spatially 
focused reflection of how (non-)lethality in security is discursively produced, understood, and stabilized.  
As O’Lear (2018) states, “How an issue is presented or framed, so to speak, influences how we see and 
understand the issue, thus highlighting why it is useful to identify and examine particular discourses” (p. 
9).  As a distinct contribution to scholarship in political geography, I employ STS to understand how 
scientific and technological knowledge-making and implementation is materialized through non-lethal 
weaponry that co-produces the ways state power and violence is exercised in contested spaces.   
Building upon my conceptual framework my methodological framework is devised to address the 
diverse relations of security, technoscience, and non-lethal weaponry through the co-production of many 
dynamic, complex, and contradictory discourses.  Therefore, my methodology is centered on discourse 
analysis (Waitt 2005).  Specifically, I use discourse analysis to unpack the various discursive framings 
non-lethal weapons in security policy and practice to better understand how (non-)lethality operates in 
non-lethal state interventions in contested spaces.  My discourse data develops from a labor-intensive 
collection, review, and analysis of more than 200 textual sources, including government documents, 
reports, speeches, print media, books, and videos (etc.) spanning a four-year period (2014-2018).  I 
identified and selected source materials and texts using a content analysis approach to generate broad 
coding themes.  This is followed by a detailed coding and data organization schema using intertextual 
research models.  Intertextual research models are used to understand the co-production of security with 
specific attention paid to the robust linkages between scientific, technological, and security discourses.  
Finally, I conduct my analysis of source materials and texts investigating their political, social, and spatial 
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context and ‘effects of truth’ to show how co-produced and competing discourses constitute relations and 
practices of non-lethal weapons relating to two master discursive frames: technoscientific and 
political/ideological.      
The aim of this research is to show the ways master and counter framings of non-lethal weapons 
produce discursive structures around security, (non-)lethality, and technoscience that shape the 
geographies of non-lethal weapons.   
Importantly, my empirical case study in Bangkok, Thailand examines the legitimization of non-
lethal weapons in security governance that reifies the false binary logic of (non-)lethality. The Thai 
military junta has successfully manipulated the false binary to exercise violence to quell political and 
social dissent in the name of security.  I contend that case study research in political geography serves a 
vital role: “It shows the world to be persistently diverse” (Castree 2005, p. 441).  My co-productionist 
STS conceptual framework and discourse analysis methodology centers on practice.  It considers the 
messiness of my methods and fieldwork, how they shape, and are shaped by, the complexities of 
sociopolitical contexts and sociomaterial networks—and what they do (Law 2017).  This implies that I 
understand the ways my theories, methods, and materials play out in practice in ways that shape and 
reproduce the social and spatial world.  Case studies that connect STS and political geography reject 
tendencies to overgeneralize, account for messiness, and afford an opportunity to employ the best flexible 
methods to answer research questions, not necessarily limited by disciplinary or methodological norms 
(Pickett et al. 2019).  My case study grounds relations of society, technoscience, and security in space and 
place but more importantly, it provides an understanding that non-lethal weapons are experienced in 
everyday life with very real socio-political, spatial, and embodied consequences. 
What are Non-Lethal Weapons?  
In 2017, a special issue of Critical Studies on Security: “Becoming Weapon”, called upon 
scholars of weaponry to engage a “new research agenda” that challenges traditional conceptualizations of 
weapons as “static material objects” (Bousquet et al. 2017, p. 1).  The various authors reject common-
sense notions of what a weapon is and direct scholarly inquiry towards process and relations engaging 
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“how objects, ideologies, practices, bodies and affects are bound to specific assemblages of violent 
intentionality” (Bousquet et al. 2017, p. 1; Meiches 2017; Hall Kindervater 2017; Shah 2017).  
Questioning the basic conceptualization of “what actually makes a weapon?” illuminates the diversity of 
knowledge regimes, materials, social and political institutions and discourses that constitute a weapon 
(Bousquet et al. 2017, p. 4).  In other words, emphasizing making or becoming weapons affords an 
opportunity to examine the specific conditions of development, operational parameters and future 
trajectories of any given weapon.  The everydayness of weapons is thus displaced and analysis can move 
beyond simple technical performance descriptions and inquiries.  The questions posed and theorizations 
postulated by “Becoming Weapon” encourage critical engagement with weapons and the normative 
orders and epistemologies that tend to obscure greater intellectual interrogation.  The special issue 
concludes with Shah’s (2017) argument that 
“weapons emerge through a relational set of performances by and between various forces 
(technical properties, legal and ethical criteria, operational directives, military strategy) that 
delineate a boundary between legitimate and illegitimate violence.  As agents of destruction, then, 
weapons materialize or become intelligible through an apparatus in which specific objectives for 
fighting war and killing and injuring become appropriate” (p. 89). 
 
However, what about weapons that materialize as an effort to not kill—to minimize injury and 
violence? How does the delineated boundary between legitimate and illegitimate violence transform the 
ways weapons are then employed in contested spaces and bodies?  Geographies of non-lethal weapons 
must address fundamental conceptualizations of non-lethal weaponry to determine the changing dynamics 
of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the (il)legitimacy of state interventionary 
power and violence.  As such, this research seeks to address the underlying assumptions and questions 
about non-lethal weapons: How does a non-lethal weapon become one?  What knowledge regimes, 
materials and norms are implicated in the process of weaponizing non-lethality? How are non-lethal 
weapons situated in the body-politics of violence?     
Reflecting different assessments of conventional definitions, “non-lethal weapons” as a class of 
weapons, devices and munitions are explicitly designed and intended to incapacitate targeted persons or 
materials without death or permanent/significant injury and/or to disable equipment with minimal damage 
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to the surrounding environment (Davidson 2009; DoD 2013).  Importantly, non-lethal weapons are 
intended to have “reversible effects” on personnel and/or materials (DoD 2013).  Non-lethal weapons are 
orthodoxly categorized into eight classes: Kinetic Energy, Electrical, Chemical, Biochemical, Biological, 
Optical and Optical/Acoustic, Acoustic, and Directed Energy.  However, generalizations of non-lethal 
weapons are unconstructive as the technical specifications, characteristics, operational and deployment 
parameters, and human effects are too diverse (Davidson 2009, 2013).  The underlying growth of 
classified non-lethal weapons is dependent upon the growing assumption that state security apparatuses 
must fill the capability gap between “shouting and shooting” (LeVine & Rutigliano 2015, p. 242).  Non-
lethal weapons are classified in a labyrinth of paradoxes that will be examined further throughout this 
dissertation.  
While the diverse range of weapon systems and technologies identified as “non-lethal” continues 
to multiply, definitional contradictions and ambiguities plague different assessments of non-lethal 
weapons categorization and classification.  It would be reticent to ignore the primary concern of the 
present discussion, the term non-lethal itself.  First and foremost, ambivalence and controversy stem from 
long standing disagreements over the merits and definitions of the term ‘non-lethal’.  Many scholars and 
experts believe that the term non-lethal as an overarching classification should be avoided and other terms 
such as “less-lethal” or “less-than-lethal” are more appropriate (Casey-Maslen 2010).  The debate over 
the term non-lethal encompasses wider ontological and epistemological debates regarding how 
knowledge regimes, materials, and norms impact weapon design, development, and deployment.  The 
divisive term ‘non-lethal weapon’ will be used throughout this project, rather than others or avoiding the 
term all together, strategically to mirror the global police-military-network’s language.  It affords an 
opportunity to examine how the language of security legitimates the weaponization of non-lethality, 
which is meant to facilitate broader policy, legal, and public acceptance.  There is a conscious effort to 
soften the associated language and terminology of non-lethal weapons and this assists in the tendency to 
fetishize weapons technology (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2014; Rappert 2003).    
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The subsequent chapters examine that the legitimacy of non-lethality in weapons systems justifies 
the use of violence and (re)interprets how expertise, politics, science, and technology intersect to promote 
future trajectories of weapons increasingly wielded against citizens (Rappert 2003).  Critically 
scrutinizing the discourses and imagery that legitimize insentient weapons serves to ensure that sentient 
human bodies are not ignored.  The centrality of the body needs to be addressed within an analysis of 
non-lethal weapons.  In contrast to the anathema of advanced weapons technology in warfare that 
disappears bodies, literally and emblematically, the actual violence inflicted on bodies by non-lethal 
weapons is both visible and calculable (Gregory 2016).  The level of pain inflicted and the scale and 
longevity of injury experienced by the body becomes an important analytical determination in the 
development and deployment of non-lethal weapons (Rappert 2007a).  More aberrant though is that the 
calculations of violence and injury aimed at the body is framed by non-lethal weapon’s capabilities to 
defeat the recipient’s resolve, the physical (and psychological) effects are subsidiary (Rappert 2003).  A 
‘benign violence’ becomes imaginable and intelligible devised within a continuum of force that 
simultaneously (re)defines state power and political subjectivity.               
Non-lethal weapons emerge within and from systems of (non)lethality, legitimacy, and 
violence(s) through which metrics of injuring—and killing—are calculated and determined strategic 
necessities in policing contested spaces and bodies and preserving the legitimacy of state power in a new 
arm’s race “to find weapons designed to keep people alive” (Rapper 2003, p. 18).  In sum, non-lethal 
weapons are objects in perpetual formation that produce diverse desires and visions that derive from a 
range of policies and practices that maintain the normalcy of binaries of technical and non-technical, 
political and apolitical and social and asocial.   
Summary of Chapters  
This introductory chapter sets the stage for my research and introduces the ontological 
scaffolding and a brief synopsis of my theoretical framework, methods, data collection, and analysis (i.e., 
my research design) for the ensuing investigation to address my research questions listed above.  Chapter 
2 provides my literature context review.  Transgressing disciplinary boundaries, I draw on literature in 
12 
 
political geography and Critical Security Studies (CSS) to provide an understanding of the intersections 
of policing, security, and (non-)lethality.  The core objective in Chapter 2 is to identify key literature to 
situate security and non-lethal weapons in geography and advance conceptual ideas I develop in 
forwarding my critical geographies of non-lethal weapons.     
Chapter 3 details my conceptual framework which draws greatly on STS.  I employ STS as a 
conceptual framework to address how science and technological knowledge making and knowledge 
implementation are materialized through non-lethal weaponry as co-producing the ways state power is 
exercised and becomes entangled with policing space and bodies.  I advance the notion that linking STS 
and political geography offers new ways of thinking about the geographies of non-lethal weapons.  My 
conceptual framework situates non-lethal weapons within systems of knowledge, social practices, security 
norms, and frames, and embodied as their place in modern society develops.  
Subsequently, Chapter 4 describes my overall methodology. I detail my methodological 
framework’s background and basis for why discourse analysis is the principal methodology I employ to 
address my research questions.  I define discourse and elucidate the significance of employing a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis.  My research design employs content analysis and intertextual research 
models to organize and code data from a wide range of relevant source materials from official policy 
documents to military and police field manuals and think tank reports to media stories related to non-
lethal weaponry.  As the chapter concludes I delve into my analysis of the co-production of security and 
non-lethal weapons.  Chapter 4 also includes a description of the research challenges I faced while 
conducting research in and on Bangkok, Thailand in which the military coup in May 2014 and its 
legalization under constitutional referendum in August 2017 limited my original access to sources and 
data.  
Chapter 5 serves as my analysis chapter.  I address my research questions by analyzing how non-
lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies by addressing and 
interrogating technoscientific and political/ideological framings of non-lethal weapons.  Moreover, I 
consider the spatialization of technoscientific and political/ideological framings of non-lethal weapons.  I 
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analyze the ways master and counter framings of non-lethal weapons produce discursive structures 
around security, (non-)lethality, and technoscience that shape the geographies of non-lethal weapons 
undertaken through forms of technological transformation and political violence.   
Chapter 6 grounds my analysis with an empirical case study in Bangkok where the legitimization 
of non-lethal weapons in security governance reifies the false binary logic of the (non-)lethal distinction 
that the Thai military junta has successfully manipulated to exercise violence to quell political and social 
dissent in the name of law, order, and security.  The case study illustrates the importance of my analysis 
and how non-lethal weaponry and security in Bangkok, Thailand foregrounds experts who co-construct 
security knowledge and expertise that is exercised to depoliticize and perpetuate apolitical security 
realities of non-lethal state intervention.  A co-productionist STS approach investigates the specificities of 
its historical and social contexts, the material and social relations co-constructing the research object and 
knowledge about it, and the effects the research object has on other processes and relations. My case 
study account for messiness of doing research on non-lethal weapons, and affords an opportunity to 
employ methods to answer my research questions, not necessarily limited by disciplinary or 
methodological norms. 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides concluding thoughts about the broader implications and impacts of 
this research.  Importantly, this project imagines and promotes political mobilizations that are aimed at 
reflexive, anticipatory, and responsible participation and cooperation in contested spaces.  A politics of 
this kind subverts hegemonic security-logic and promotes alternative possibilities for what a “sense of 
security” entails (Durodié 2006, p. 193).  Overall, this research project asserts the idea that non-lethal 
weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the 
legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence while becoming stabilized in the global police-
military-network.  My research is situated to record those day-to-day technoscientific and state policies 
and practices that underwrite the (re)making of the conceptual boundaries of the state and individual 





 Re-thinking Security: Non-Lethal Intervention in Policing and Security  
 
Introduction  
The following literature context develops the scaffolding to examine the changing dynamics of 
policing contested space in relation to the conceptualizations of non-lethality in security.  It is the first 
step in re-thinking security as non-lethal weapons continue to shape state interventionary power in 
contested spaces.  The often-ambiguous relationships between governance and security, force apparatuses 
of the state and civilians, and the use of force and violence necessitates a widening and deepening of our 
knowledge.  Transgressing disciplinary boundaries, I draw on literature in Political Geography and 
Critical Security Studies (CSS) to understand the intersections of policing, security, and non-lethality in 
the broadest sense, “this includes discourses, ideas, power relationships, bodies of knowledge, techniques 
of government, technologies, and the linkages between them” (Hanson 2006, p. 3).      
This chapter proceeds in five main sections.  The first provides a survey of key areas of research 
in geographies of policing and security and links it to the ways I engage CSS.  This discussion is followed 
by an introduction to the ‘global police-military-network’ that serves as a principle spatial 
conceptualization in my project.  Subsequently, I define ‘space-taking politics’ as a technique and model 
that has changed spatial and social relations in contested spaces as the proliferation of non-lethal 
intervention attempts to govern the unknowable and unpredictable.  In the following section, I locate non-
lethality in geography.  Geographic literature on the logics of (in)security is vigorous, but less attention 
has been paid to non-lethality and its operation within contested spaces, contentious politics, and 
exercises of state disciplinary power.  Finally, I conclude with remarks on the contentions of conducting 
research on state power and security.  
Political Geographies of Policing and Security 
Geographers have made notable contributions to the geographies of police/policing and security.  
At its core, political geography is concerned with the spatial dynamics of power.  Deliberations on 
meanings, genealogies, and conceptualizations of power lends themselves to decades of scholarship.  
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Traditionally, political geography centers on the state in the relationship between space and political 
power (Agnew 2002).  While political geography has intensely diversified its areas of inquiry beyond the 
state my research project privileges the state.  I do so because state power exercised by mechanisms (such 
as regimes, frameworks, institutions, technologies, practices, and materialities) of policing and security 
maintain the state’s legal monopoly of the use of force and violence.  Exercising legal force and violence 
is a crucial domain of the state.  It not only claims a monopoly to its use but also monopolizes the 
decisions of what counts as “violence”.  The capacity of the state to exercise violence is intrinsically 
bound to its legitimacy to govern.  Meaning, the state’s aptitude to exert force and violence assists in the 
state’s ability to maintain its own legitimacy.  As such, the political geographies of policing and security 
continue to grapple with state power and violence in all its complexities.                 
Almost 30 years ago, Nicolas Fyfe published a paper claiming that research on the police was 
“conspicuously absent from the landscape of human geography” (1991, p. 249).  Building upon Steven 
Herbert’s (1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b) seminal works, early research on the geographies of police and 
policing centers on police enforcement across different spaces and scales.  Geographers identified and 
explored various everyday police functions like public reassurance (Yarwood & Edwards 1995), crime 
reduction and investigation (Herbert 1996b; Walker 2003), emergency services, (Mawby & Wright 2003) 
and public order maintenance (Herbert 1999; Fielding 2005).  It was broadly conceived that the police 
embody the political geography of the state and illuminating these “micro-geographies of state power” 
exposed a litany of issues and concerns for political geographers conducting research on police and 
policing (Fyfe 1991; Jakson 1994; Keith 1993; Scarpaci & Frazier 1993).  Despite Fyfe’s call for 
geographers to engage police and policing in geography more another survey of the geographies of 
policing published 15 years later found that “interest in this topic remains on the margins of human 
geography’s research agenda” (Yarwood 2007, p. 447).  
At the same time, early geographers engaged security as a distinct area of inquiry only 
tangentially related to police and policing.  Claims of “spatial differences” between policing and security 
divided intellectual labor on the broader relational geographies of policing and security (Yarwood 2007).  
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Analytical inquiry on the police and policing was limited to “places” while security was perceived to 
incorporate the broader concept of “territory.”  This division reflects perceived differences in spatial 
practices and geographic scale.  Even recent scholarship divide conceptualizations of policing and 
security, though in more subtle ways.  As Yarwood and Paasche (2015) argue, “Policing is most 
commonly associated with the ‘maintenance of order, the control of disorder, the prevention of crime and 
the detection of offenders’ (Rawlings 2008, p. 47) whereas security is concerned with the protection of 
people, places, or objects from threats” (p. 362).  While I acknowledge geographic literature that stresses 
the subtle differences between policing and security, I follow the recent trend in political geography that 
recognizes the relationality of policing and security (Dalby 2010).  Therefore, throughout this project the 
terms “security” and “policing” are considered within greater social and spatial assemblages of order, 
management, and discipline.  
A relational approach allows for “policing and security to be considered relatively to and fluidly 
with each other” (Yarwood & Paasche 2015, p. 366).  It recognizes the fundamental shift in (global) 
policing and security practices that continually transgress geographic scale encompassing a range of 
spatial practices as the traditional binaries of external/internal and military/policing blur (Bigo 2001, 
2014).  In other words, it considers the multiple sets of spatial and social relations and practices in 
policing and security that confront one another, reinforce, weaken, or otherwise relate to one another.  
More recent work on the relationality of policing and security highlight the diversity in the work political 
geographers are doing, how they do it, and why they do it (see Coleman 2016; Woodward 2016; Williams 
2016; Shah 2016).  In an era where policing and security have garnered an vast amount of public attention 
political geographers have engaged questions of state power and the racialization and povertization of 
policing (Mitchell 2010, 2011), the affective relations of police power (Woodward & Bruzzone 2015), the 
blurring of policing and immigration enforcement (Coleman 2012), transnational policing and security 
(Goldsmith & Sheptycki 2007; Bowling 2010), and the militarization of the police (den Heyer 2014; 
Radil et al. 2017).  While this brief survey of the literature does not serve as a comprehensive review on 
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police and policing in geography, it indicates that political geographers have continued to make deeper 
engagements with the geographies of policing and security.   
While my project draws on the literature above, my focus on the political geographies of security 
and policing relates to how particular security policies, practices, and materialities manage, order, and 
discipline contested space.  To better facilitate this process, I draw significantly on recent scholarship in 
Critical Security Studies (CSS).  While there are a range of critical approaches in CSS, “they are all 
constantly involved in judgements about what security means, and in deciding and discriminating what 
the objects and objectives of security studies should be” (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010, p. 2).  In 
particular, I am drawn to CSS because of its explicit orientation towards a “theory-practice nexus”.  The 
intellectual framework that theories of security inherently inform security practices (and vice-versa), such 
that “reconceptualized understandings of security and strategy might aid the transformation of real-world 
practices” (Wyn Jones 1999, p. 167).  I engage the theory-practice nexus through two core ideas in CSS.  
First, I employ security as a derivative concept, the way security is thought about, given meaning, and 
enable practices derives from the multiplicity of ways the world is known and how it works more broadly 
(Booth 1991).  Secondly, security cannot be divorced from its material existence and its embodied 
experiences and accounts (Buzan 1991; Wyn Jones 1999).  Therefore, as a political orientation CSS 
affords an opportunity to engage critical theory through an emancipatory lens to reconceptualize how 
security theory and practice co-produce our world(s) (Booth 2007).  I am interested in how police and 
security policies and practices securitize public spaces through various technostrategic discourses and 
practices of security aimed at managing bodies and spaces through which perceptions of threat, unease, 
and insecurity becomes spatially understood and articulated (Mitchel 2010).  Therefore, I engage policing 
and security relationally linking political geography and CSS in three broad ways:   
1) I investigate how policing and security practices of discipline, order, and management shape and 
define spaces and bodies as contested.  The force apparatuses of the state that underpin state 
security power employ various geopolitical narratives and discourses aimed to identify and define 
notions of threats and danger.  These (micro-) geopolitical narratives assist in generating notions 
of fear, chaos, and insecurity in perceived ungoverned space enacted among “deviant” bodies 
who occupy such space.  Thus, state power is increasingly understood through the state’s ability 
to generate novel forms of governance through security.   
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2) I examine the wider social and political networks that constitute policing and security in contested 
spaces through the lens of on-going technoscientific governance.  I consider the ways security 
expertise mediates through different forms of knowledge—scientific and technological, political, 
cultural, legal, etc.—and how that expertise manifests as direct action exercised against bodies, 
often violently.  For example, how the scientific community facilitates greater knowledge and 
understandings of technologies of social and political order (i.e., non-lethal weapons) assists in 
technologizing contentious politics. 
3) I collapse the subtle distinctions between policing and security in my conceptual framework and 
engage them as co-producing social and political knowledges and orders with significant spatial 
outcomes.  This conceptual framing affords an opportunity to better understand how discourses 
and materialities of security, technoscience, and (non-)lethality are vast, multiple, competing, and 
often contradictory while the security realities they produce continue to be quite stable.   
 
Non-lethal weapons are bound not only to the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies, 
but also to how security logics are employed to preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and 
violence.  I want to think about the ways technologies and techniques of state power ‘make life’ in spaces 
that are highly contested.  I examine non-lethality and non-lethal weapons in state interventions with 
critical suspicion because as so-called solutions to the vulgarity of extreme violence and death in conflict 
non-lethality and non-lethal weapons continue to cause gross destruction, unnecessary suffering, and even 
death.  Therefore, I am concerned with how non-lethality in state security continues to “make things 
happen” (Anaïs 2015, 52).  Geographers have drawn significant attention to policing and security 
mechanisms contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of the ways state power shapes space. 
This project continues that trajectory by focusing on state sanctioned violence, the identification of bodies 
and spaces as threats, and the prioritization of science and technology in the service of state security 
agendas.     
Assemblages of Security: The Emergent Global Police-Military-Network 
Issues of security and governance are often linked in fundamental ways to questions about the 
stability of social and political order generally.  In our current political climate speculation about a ‘crisis 
of insecurity’ globally drives increased state securitization (Sheptycki 2003; Murakami Wood 2017).  To 
a degree, insecurity and society have become inseparable.  It is commonplace to describe global civil 
society, the dynamic ensemble of linked social processes and phenomena, as perpetually “at war” against 
drugs, crime, terror, etc. (Keane 2003; Graham 2010).  Indicative of a discursive and operative shift in 
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military-civilian relations, security is bound to the (re)imaginations of a blurred juridical and operations 
separation between intelligence, policing, and military doctrine across all scales (Graham 2010).  As 
O’Lear (2018) argues, “Security is the new war and the primary motivation for military activity” (p. 130).  
Moving beyond domestic political accounts of security to explore transnational and international 
police/military relations illuminates historical contexts and contemporary manifestations of a growing 
interconnected global security agenda (Murakami Wood 2017).  
Recognizing that there is no single source of security paradigms, a glimpse into the historical 
contexts of modern governance and state making provides insight into the current complexities of global 
governmental institution-building, of particular significance, a growing coordination of military and 
police paradigms worldwide.  Geographers and other scholars have conducted—and promoted—
noteworthy research on this phenomenon starting in the Age of Empire (Pratt 1992; Gregory 2012) and its 
subsequent violent and exploitive expression during Colonialism (Sharp 2008; Blaut 2012).  Colonial 
powers used militarized disciplinary power to order, sanitize, and regulate spaces and bodies.  As such, 
the mechanisms of policing and securitizing space and bodies was founded upon a constitutive power 
deployed and mobilized on the fabrication of a social and spatial order based upon a “Western” cultural 
imperialism (Gregory 2004; Neocleous 2008, 2013; Neocleous & Rigakos 2011).  Significantly, as the 
tropes of colonial order spread from colony to colony it also had a considerable ‘boomerang effect’ 
(Foucault 2003).  Modes of disciplinary power exercised were brought back to the “West” influencing the 
apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of ordering spaces and bodies (Foucault 1977, 1991; Graham 
2010; Gregory 2011).  As “testing grounds” of disciplinary power colonial spaces and bodies were 
targeted by a full spectrum of epistemic and embodied violence marshaled through ideologies of a 
permanent security (Graham 2010, p. 203).  This hegemony of security then filtered, through less violent 
ways, back to the “West”.  So, while current scholarly buzz around the increasing (para)militarization of 
policing and the policization of the military escalates (see Radil et al. 2016), it has long been the case that 
geographical imaginations of disciplinary power and police/military relations are linked, politically, 




Colonial geographical imaginations not only instituted the scaffolding for policy/military 
relations but continue to function in conjunction with current global (security) ideologies, particularly 
neoliberalism.  The pervasiveness of neoliberalism, in relation to world order in geography cannot be 
ignored (Springer 2008, 2010, 2011).  While the intricacies of conceptualizing neoliberalism are outside 
the purview of this research (see Springer 2013, 2015, 2016), as a hegemonic ideology, it mutually 
reinforces security regimes that strengthen transnational police/military relations.  The relationship or 
reciprocal constitution of security and neoliberalism traverses all scales of social and political life driving 
the proliferation of the “War on Terror” and building institutional collaboration around transnational 
organized crime (drugs, human trafficking, and weapons sales) in contemporary society (Edwards & Gill 
2003).  The collisions and cohesions of security and neoliberalism operate across a wide spectrum of 
“transnational insurgences” and offer a militarized framework through which to understand the world 
(Graham 2010, loc. 1429).   
From a security perspective, primary objectives of global security institution-building today 
revolve around increasing the cooperation, capacity, and capabilities of interoperability among militaries, 
security forces and law enforcement agencies with heavy reliance on multilateralism and an operational 
pursuant to common Rules of Engagement (ROE) (Williams 2002; Watkin 2004).  This militarily 
technical jargon conceals the deep undercurrents of political, social, and ideological frameworks that must 
align for this collaboration to be made possible.  It is indicative of a blurring and blending of military, 
security, and police paradigms and discourses across space and within various political and social 
contexts.  The normalization of militarized discourses muddies critique and romanticizes the aggressive 
disciplining of bodies and spaces.  It constructs the threads through which the web of police/military 
relations transforms and becomes stabilized into formal police/military networks.  It must be understood 
that these networks are not solely securitized systems organized around the reproduction of social and 




To assist in building a conceptual foundation in which to explore global police/military relations 
and networks, I turn to assemblage theory (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; DeLanda 2006).  While there is a 
remarkable diversity in how ‘assemblage’ is employed in geographic literature (see Anderson & 
McFarlane 2011), I use the term to signal coded discourses, practices, and materialisms of global 
police/military intersections what I subsequently refer to as the “global police-military-network”. The 
global police-military-network indicates concrete and material transfers of knowledge, technologies, and 
personnel across global security governance institutions and structures.  In this respect, assemblage is 
used as a ‘descriptor’ within an assemblage-based analysis of socio-spatial relations (Anderson & 
McFarlane 2011).  This means the global police-military-network, as an assemblage, is composed of a 
complex of heterogeneous elements that emphasizes “gathering, coherence and dispersion” (Anderson & 
McFarlane 2011, pp. 125-125).  It indicates a collective synergy of relations between these elements that 
serve to assemble, re-assemble, or dis-assemble linked social, spatial, and material practices that are 
contingent, emergent, and transformative (Deleuze & Guattari 1987; DeLanda 2006).  For example, as an 
analytic-descriptor the concept of global police-military-network identifies significant institutions and 
actors that draw strategic geopolitical calculations, promoting particular ways of being (or not being) and 
means of doing (or not doing).           
In outlining the parameters of the global police-military-network, it is worth acknowledging the 
distinctiveness of each state’s institutional development and governance, thus, each has its own security, 
police, and military history and future trajectory (Sheptycki 2003).  Engaging geographic inquiry into the 
global police-military-network is not meant to ontologically flatten analysis of security, military, and 
police relations. Rather, it provides a wider lens in which to engage theorization.  From this perspective, 
security governance transgresses seemingly distinct motives and agendas allowing for an analytical 
calculus of emerging trends and patterns in security ideologies, strategies, policies, and practices that have 
widespread impacts.  For skeptics of the conceptualization of a global police-military-network, with 
regards to the character of a global security governance, it is important to ask questions as the power of 
security institutions is derived from their capacity and ability to exercise coercive and violent force 
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(Sheptycki 2003).  What I argue though, is that security governance is shaping, and in turn shaped by, the 
global police-military network is currently undergoing a transformation related to how the use of force is 
exercised in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state power and violence in contested spaces.  I believe 
this transformation is fundamentally linked to the ways in which technoscience and non-lethality have 
become entangled within the matrix of state security power that lead to highly calculated sociopolitical 
and spatial arrangements.   
A vision of technological omnipresence and omniscience drives the global proliferation of 
technophilic state security regimes signaling startling capabilities in identifying, tracking, and targeting 
bodies (Graham 2010).  As Staples (2014) argues, “We seem to be entering a state of permanent visibility 
where our bodies and our behaviors are being monitored, tracked, or watched continuously, anonymously, 
and systematically” (p. 5).  The potency of technological advancement in the global police-military-
network mobilizes vast processes of (re)innovation concerned with reducing perceived insecurity, 
deviancy, and disquiet ensuring docility of spaces and bodies (Witman 2006; Staples 2014).  The pace of 
this change engenders enormous uncertainty in how technologies, like non-lethal weapons, are developed 
and used in the policing of bodies and spaces.  What is certain is that technoscientific advancements and 
innovations in security are forceful and create unknowable futures in the global police-military-network 
(Brown et al. 2000; Van Lente 2000; Farrell 2006).  Beyond the political and social determinations of 
how technologies of security are designed and used lie ideological imperatives, like ethical frameworks, 
that struggle to withstand the challenges of advancements in technologies designed and deployed to 
target, discipline, injure, and kill by the global police-military-network. The surge in interest indicated by 
broad security discourses in the moral and ethical implications of advance technologies in security, 
particularly in weapon systems, highlights the struggle to define the limits of security governance.   
The evidence of temporal and spatial interconnections of the global police-military-network 
across the world today is driven by the primacy of the expansion of the United States (U.S.) security 
agenda (Gregory 2012).  Since the Allied victory in World War II (WWII), the U.S., as the world’s global 
super power, has engaged in the production of new forms of knowledge, constructed new categories of 
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(in)security, and redefined the global security landscape emphasizing the need for increased cooperation 
and stronger security networks.  The U.S. not only spends more than any other state on security and 
defense, it has the most comprehensive military, security, and police training programs in the world.  
Attempting to hone its capabilities to conduct “full-spectrum” warfighting and defense, the U.S. drives 
the global police-military-network both ideologically and materially (Farrell 2006, p. 121).     
Some examples are found in the joint United States Department of Defense (DoD) and 
Department of State Foreign Military Training Report (2015-2016).  It elucidates that in 2015-2016, 
55,900 individual security (both police and military) training events occurred in 154 countries impacting 
approximately 76,400 participants (p. ii).  Also, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
program, a “highly effective component of U.S. security assistance”, is used to promote education in 
building strong civilian-military relations for both military and civilian personnel in 119 states globally 
(MRT 2015-2016, p. II-2).  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted 240 military 
training events in 2016 including the largest war game in eastern Europe (Anakonda) since the Cold War 
where 31,000 troops from 23 states participated (Duval Smith 2016).  More recently, the 2017 iteration of 
Cobra Gold, Asia’s largest annual multinational military exercise, featured 29 countries.  The extension of 
military interoperability is not limited to conventional military operations but has also proliferated as 
domestic policing becomes more transnational.  For example, under the International Liaison Program, 
the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has “intelligence officers” stationed in 14 international 
cities.  Another example is the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 
that works with law enforcement and security institutions across the world, particularly in Central and 
South America, to combat the impact of international drugs and crimes (MTR 2015-2016).  The more 
these networks expand and strengthen the greater the fetish of security becomes which befits the state’s 
ability to “remodel expectations about political rights, individual liberties and social freedoms […] 
enabling the production of political docility” (Necleous & Rigakos 2011, p.48-49). 
The views of political geographers to state power as a matter of realpolitik has increased the 
visibility of security policy and practice.  However, the harder to come by, seemingly trivial rituals of 
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security policy and practice deliver specific understandings in how distinctions between foreign and 
domestic, national and international, society and state, and military and police is increasingly blended and 
blurred (Staples 2014; Coleman 2016).  Promoting a conceptual global police-military-network not only 
renders the geographies of security perceptible and analytically developed but also assists in decoding the 
hidden geographies of security and connecting them to greater understandings of security and social 
relations (Kearns 2017).  The military, police, and security forces that encompass the state’s primary use 
of force entities must be analytically explored together as their ideological and operational union 
increases and is exercised as spatially-based coercive and violent force (Kraska 1997).       
What is perceptible is that an emergent global police-military-network that is constantly evolving 
and has a range of unintended consequences, and is designed in relation to an increasing need by states to 
orchestrate and maintain social order strengthened by the hegemony of security (Bigo 2011; Kraska & 
Kappeler 1997; Anaïs 2015).  But, as Sheptycki (2003) notes, “In a world that has gone global we must 
ask: whose order and how is it sustained” (p. 44)?  The global police-military-network is a direct 
consequence of the techniques and technologies of security governance designed and deployed to remove 
perceived disorderly, disquiet, and deviant bodies and the paradigms (re)shaping the accountability and 
legitimacy of state power.  Under the umbrella of a global security order, states continue to bolster their 
power to use repressive (violent) actions, hyper-surveillance, and persuasive rhetoric continually eroding 
citizens’ liberties in the name of security, order, and stability (Jackson 2011; Kempa 2011; Rimke 2011).  
These pathologies augment the resurgence of state power and reinforce the current politics of security 
whereby global revolts, wide-spread social movements, and revolutions take to the streets, plazas, and 
squares contesting such politics (Mason 2013). 
Space-Taking Politics and Contested Spaces 
At a time when revolts, revolutions, and social movements are spreading across the globe, 
understanding why and how people engage in public assembly and collective action in public spaces has 
become ever more vital (Merrifield 2013; Uitrmark & Nicholls 2014; Eder & Öz 2017; Arampatzi 2017).  
Whether it is anti-austerity politics in Syntagma Square in Athens, Greece or pro-democracy resistance in 
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Taksim Square in Istanbul, Turkey, the visibility of contentious politics has considerably revived attention 
to the relationship between civilians and the state.  Contentious politics is understood as “concerted, 
counter-hegemonic social and political action, in which differently positioned parties come together to 
challenge dominant systems of authority, in order to promote and enact alternative imaginaries” (Leitner 
et al. 2008, p. 157; Tarrow 2001).  As contentious politics spills into the streets, public squares, and 
plazas of the world’s cities, space becomes a significant vector of analysis.  Space-taking politics, the 
spatial manifestation of contentious politics (demonstrations, occupations, mobilizations, protest camps, 
etc.), illustrates the possibilities of disruptive power of political subjectivity in everyday life (Lefebvre 
1991; Feigenbaum et al. 2013; Daphi 2017).  Furthermore, space-taking politics engenders a desire to 
create ‘liberated spaces’ and have become the single most important theme in ongoing social movements 
across the globe as contentious politics becomes spatialized (Leitner et al. 2008). 
Geographic literature on space-taking politics is rich in theory and is primarily situated within 
urban geography (Leitner et al. 2008).  The foundations of this literature stems from the writings of Henri 
Lefebvre.  Lefebvre seminal texts, The Right to the City (1968), Space and Politics (1973), and The 
Production of Space (1991) built a framework for an urban revolutionary romanticism that called for a 
radical restructuring of political, social, economic, and spatial relations in the city and beyond.  The 
concept of ‘the right to the city’ developed as a significant source of theoretical inquiry in geography 
(Soja 1996, 2000; Purcell 2002; Mitchell 2003; Harvey 2013).  The right to the city focused on the need 
to (re)address the power relations that form the foundations of the production of urban space, shifting 
control away from the state (and capital) towards urban subjects (Purcell 2002).  According to Lefebvre 
(1996), “the right to the city is like a cry and a demand […] a transformed and renewed right to urban 
life” (p. 156).  Using the foundation of the right to the city geographers extended the theoretical reach of 
Lefebvre, offering a multiplicity of impassioned possibilities for a new urban politics through social 
action (Mitchell 2003; Harvey 2013).    
Research spatializing social action produced a wide range of case studies of both resistance and 
activism responding to a varied range of themes—globalization, environmental justice, immigration—but 
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focused primarily within urban contexts (O’Lear 1997, 1999; Purcell 2002).  As Uitrmark & Nicholls 
(2014) argue, “Cities serve as sites of politicization because they are incubators of the relational conduits 
that enable activists from different sectors to engage with one another’s struggles and look beyond narrow 
temporal and spatial horizons” (p. 970).  A flurry of geographic inquiries into ‘urban revolts’ spawned 
greater attention to the ways contentious politics is spatialized and how geography “matters to the 
imaginaries, practices and trajectories of contentious politics” (Leitner et al. 2008, p. 158).  Of major 
concern to geographers is how socio-spatial theories interact and inform the dynamics of contentious 
politics.  
To answer these questions, early research on contentious politics and space tended to pick one 
theme and asserted its primacy obscuring the diversity of participants, motives, strategies, practices, etc. 
(Della Porta 2014; Erensü & Karaman 2017).  Early geographers also regraded space-taking politics as 
‘exceptional’ and temporally and spatially bounded often theorized through states of emergency (Adey et 
al. 2015) and or spaces of exception (Elden 2009; Agamben 2005; Gregory 2011).  However, recent 
geographic research focuses less on “seeing social movement as ‘event’ or ‘spectacle’ to understanding 
social movement as a ‘process’ grounded in the ‘everyday’ and ‘quotidian’- so that theoretical nuance can 
be produced” (Arampatzi 2017, p. 47).  New political subjectivities emerge within and alter contentious 
politics and space in innovative and imaginative ways through social and spatial interaction (O’Lear 
1997, 1999).  
Space-taking politics seeks to re-order, disrupt, and re-signify space challenging the hegemonic 
norms and dominant systems of authority.  The insurrectionary properties of space-taking politics are a 
reminder that, “there is a continuous struggle between competing forces speaking to define and control 
the use of space” (Starr et al. 2011, quoted in Daphi 2017, p. 35).  A struggle increasingly defined by state 
policy interventions and practices tied to a tenuous and blurred distinction of police and military 
operations and use of force options in ordering and securing contested space and removing disruptive 
bodies.  These blurring distinctions have geographical concerns but more importantly space plays a 
significant role in the activation and actualization of space-taking politics and state intervention (Jones 
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2009).   Contested spaces become incubators for state interventionary strategy and practice whereby the 
state can test the thresholds of accountability, acceptability, and legitimacy of various rationalities, like 
non-lethality in use of force continuums, and technologies, like non-lethal weapons. 
Space-taking politics—as a technique and model—has transformed as the proliferation of non-
lethal intervention in contested spaces attempt to govern the unknowable and unpredictable.  How 
specific security discourses and materialities of and within contested spaces shape interactions, even after 
the event, between civilian/public, security forces, apparatuses of the state, and (social) media, that has 
lasting effects on bodies and spaces, can be explored (Daphi, 2017).  The disciplinary techniques of 
dislocating bodies and securing contested spaces are elaborate displays of power and knowledge inscribed 
on bodies (of civilians and security forces); they are an (dis)ordering of public spaces and a (re)shaping of 
the accountability and legitimacy of state interventionary policy and practice (Staples 2014; Coleman 
2016; Woodward 2016; Williams 2016).   
To secure highly contested space and dislocate bodies implies new forms of interventionary 
power that forge novel spaces between security mechanisms and civilian engagement.  The theories and 
practices of dislocating bodies and securitizing space are beholden to use-of-force options.  In the context 
of this research project use of force is understood as degrees or stages of force exercised through various 
techniques used to dislocate bodies and secure contested spaces.  While diverse permutations involving 
the ways security mechanisms guide and clarify the stages of exercising force in use of force policies 
many are linked to a continuum, “which detail varying levels of force in terms of severity” and explicitly 
detail what is considered “objectively reasonable force” against civilians (Terrill 2005, p.110-111).  A use 
of force continuum frames a simplified design indicating a perceived logical progression of force from 
tactical presence to lethal force.  A very common use of force continuum is the “linear design” (Table 
2.1), that is modeled in the form of hierarchical steps (McEwen 1997).  Irrespective of what continuum 
design is employed, different security mechanisms maintain different ideas about use of force.  An in-
depth discussion on the use of force is outside the purview of this project (Lubell 2010; Gray 2018).  
However, two factors become central when thinking through use of force in state interventions: a belief 
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that a use of force continuum, as an operational administrative proficiency, depoliticizes the question of 
legitimacy in exercises of the use of force, and in the perceived logics of force disciplinary and sometimes 




Continuum  Use of force policy and practice description 
Level 1 Officer Presence Physical appearance; professional bearing  
 
Level 2 Tactical Communication Clear and deliberate verbal commands; strong non-verbal 
positions (empty hand/open stances, defensive stance, 
ready stance)  
 
Level 3 Physical Control “Soft techniques”: body holds, wrist locks and “Hard 
techniques”: strikes, take downs 
 
Level 4 Defensive/Intermediate 
Weapons 
Deployment of ‘non-lethal’ weapons: OC (pepper spray), 
batons, Tasers, K9, 12-gauge bean bags, 37mm gas or 
impact munitions, 40mm direct fire impact munitions 
 
Level 5 Lethal Force Verbal warning, firearms, strike to vital areas, vehicles, 
weapons of opportunity  
 
  
The legitimacy of the use of force by the state generates significant debate as fundamental 
questions about what kind of force, how to measure force, and through what means force can be applied 
and justified against civilians (Rappert 2007).  Moreover, how society permits the state’s deployment of 
coercive, violent, and indeed lethal power through use of force is significant.  The destructive 
potentialities of the global police-military-network requires massive effort to maintain its legitimacy.  In 
other words, the use of force in the global police-military-network is imbued with legitimacy.  However, 
as Rappert (2003) asks, “what does it mean to speak of force as having legitimacy” (p. 3)?  To complicate 
matters further, questions revolving around non-lethality and the use of non-lethal weapons in use of force 
continuums draw a litany of different results (see Terrill & Paoline 2012).  
The central assumption of security discourse revolves around the idea of security as a public 
good, a social contract between state and citizen (Rappert 2007).  As such, a social contract reinforced by 
non-lethality in the use of force is a means of appropriating valuations of life.  If the global police-
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military-network is perceived to value the sanctity of human life above all else then its actions that order, 
discipline, and regulate space and bodies become a falsely benign clause of the social contract (Anaïs 
2015).  We, as citizens, accept the possibility of violence and death, as a legitimate means of achieving a 
greater sense of security pursued by the global police-military-network.  To demystify the ambiguities 
that surround non-lethal state interventions in contested spaces we need enhanced reflexive and 
responsible understandings of the weaponization of non-lethality, which is meant to facilitate broader 
policy, legal, and public acceptance.  Understanding how the legitimacy of non-lethality in security, state 
interventionary power, and weapons systems are used to justify the use of force and violence against 
bodies in contested spaces affords an opportunity to locate non-lethality in geographic research.      
Locating Non-Lethality in Geography  
As I stated above, geographic literature on the logics of (in)security is vigorous, but less attention 
has been paid to non-lethality and its operation within contested spaces, contentious politics, and 
exercises of state disciplinary power.  It is not surprising that geographers and other social scientists 
engage theory and praxis of non-lethality in a limited sense as non-lethality assumes logics of 
“unremarkabilitiy” (Anaïs 2015).  Research on political violence in geography tends to focus on 
“spectacle”, the extraordinary, and/or moments of violent aberration (see Gregory & Pred 2007; Springer 
& Le Billon 2016).  This statement does not serve as a comprehensive rendering of political violence in 
geography.  Many scholars examine political violence through varied avenues of analysis such as “slow 
violence” (Nixon 2011; O’Lear 2016) and forms of “structural violence” (Galtung 1969; Inwood et al. 
2016; Jones 2016).  In this vein, I am concerned with the subtle and vastly nefarious ways political 
violence is co-produced in security through non-lethality.  Non-lethality has become accepted within state 
interventions through complex web of socio-political and technoscientific relations as non-problematic.  
The increasing acceptance of the integration of non-lethality in the use of force and weapon design 
reveals non-lethality as “an intelligible solution to the ethical and legal quandaries brought about by the 




Following the groundbreaking work on non-lethality by Seantael Anaïs (2015), I believe that non-
lethality must be understood as an assemblage composed of a complexion of heterogeneous relationalities 
between the politics of security, technology, and broader regimes of governance.  The collective synergy 
of relations between these elements serve to co-produce linked social, spatial, and material practices of 
non-lethality in state interventions in contested spaces.  Thinking through non-lethality in this way, I can 
begin to ask important “how” questions that lead to the techniques and forms of knowledge by which 
non-lethality operates in security:  
1) How does non-lethality serve as a legitimating function in security?  
2) How does non-lethality make wider programs of state interventionary power possible?  
3) How does non-lethality shape social and spatial relations materially?   
 
Examining these questions affords an opportunity to understand the ways non-lethality in security 
entrenches certain ethical assessments about the value of life and death and technological assumptions 
about weaponry which sustain moral and technical frameworks perceived to be unquestionable.   
The legitimization of non-lethality in security governance reifies a (false) binary logic between 
policies and practices categorized as non-lethal on one hand and lethal on the other.  The non-lethal/lethal 
binary institutionalizes perceived fixed and naturalized categorizations of violence in security governance.  
Also, it makes viable practices and materialities of violence inherently linked to technical objects (i.e.,, 
non-lethal weapons) used in security governance.  This “non-lethal/lethal distinction” in security policy 
and practice operationalizes a security governance aimed to mitigate notions of threats, unease, and 
insecurity directed at bodies and spaces under the pretenses of justifiability, acceptability, and legitimacy 
of interventionary exercises of violence (de Larrinaga 2016; Shah 2017).  The state’s ability to assert the 
justifiability, acceptability, and legitimacy of the use of force generates the hegemonic “discourses, ways 
of speaking, ways of knowing, and ways of making ethical determination” that are so difficult to 
challenge (Anaïs 2015, p. 8).  In other words, non-lethality serves to legitimate a range of policies and 




Non-lethality has become a solution designed to strengthen the state’s tenuous monopoly in 
exercising violence within an ethos of morality.  Examining the ethics and discourses of morality within 
the (non-)lethal distinction uncovers the material specifications of injury, damage, and death through the 
use of technologies (weapons design) and bureaucratic administration (security strategy) that make wider 
programs of state interventionary power possible.  The widespread adoption of non-lethality enables and 
embodies an accepted and expected ways of injuring (and killing) in state interventions (Shah 2017).  The 
state evokes humanist discourses which sustain notions of valuing the sanctity of life when non-lethality 
directs state interventions.  As the everydayness and familiarity of security continues to penetrate all 
aspects of life the boundaries between non-lethal and lethal have stabilized within modern security 
frameworks, instituting a materialized non-lethality that is a weaponized non-lethality. These normative 
designations of violent force are materialized through non-lethal weaponry and their technical 
calibrations.  The technical specifications of ballistics, electric currents, decibels, etc., facilitate actual 
violence perpetrated against bodies by non-lethal weapons that is not only visible and calculable but 
understood as a moral alternative to death (Gregory 2016).    
Challenging or questioning the state’s motives not to kill in state intervention seems almost 
sacrosanct.  One would hope that the state operationalizes technologies and bureaucratic administration to 
discipline, manage, and order spaces and bodies in ways that fosters life rather than ways that end life.  It 
is not my intent to re-direct state’s focus on their legitimate claim to take life but rather I want to think 
about the ways technologies and techniques of government ‘make life’ in spaces that are highly contested.  
I examine non-lethality and non-lethal weapons in state interventions with critical suspicion because as 
so-called solutions to the vulgarity of extreme violence and death in conflict non-lethality and non-lethal 
weapons continue to cause gross destruction, unnecessary suffering, and even death.  Therefore, I am 
concerned with how non-lethality in security continues to “make things happen” (Anaïs 2015, p. 52).  
 Overall, non-lethality shapes the socio-spatial relations within modern security frameworks that 
cause a shift in how security happens, “It makes new forms of intervention possible; it makes new 
programs of political action acceptable; it makes certain ethical assessments seem natural and therefore 
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indisputable; and makes new technical and strategic realities possible” (Anaïs 2015, p. 6).  I believe non-
lethality extends the interoperability of the use of force in state interventions particularly through the 
development and deployment of non-lethal weapons that are meant to foster life of the individual and the 
state.  By locating non-lethality within contexts of contentious politics and contested spaces in this way I 
can navigate the blurring between the state war machine and policing, order and use of force, and 
intervention and violence.  
Chapter Conclusions: Notes on Security, Policing and Geography 
This project is situated within knowledge production in three ways that must be addressed before 
an in-depth analysis can move forward.  First, the state continuously produces new forms of knowledge in 
relation to security that shapes imaginations and social being as well as (re)defines reality in often 
ambiguous, covert, and unintelligible ways (Neocleous 2008).  Over time, the state has successfully 
constructed a master narrative of security that legitimizes its ability to pursue violent and disciplinary 
exercises of power from civil law and order regimes to operations in theaters of war.  To engage security 
through the lens of the state runs the risk of being coopted by its logic and serves a security that is violent, 
oppressive, and exploitive, “enabling a political docility in the name of security” (Neocleous & Rigakos 
2011, p. 29).  It is important to recognize the increasingly militarized grids of intelligibility through which 
the state pursues political, social, and spatial ordering and critique such conceptualizations.   
Second, as part of the historical project of building a globalized police-military-network imposing 
neoliberal logics of (in)security across the world, a ‘security industry’ has emerged in tandem with and 
beyond the powers of the state (Neocleous 2008).  Propagation of ‘security risks’, ‘security measures’, 
‘security information’, ‘security professionals’ (etc.) shapes commercial practices that are motivated by 
profit.  What was once identified as the military-industrial-complex has extended beyond the theatres of 
war penetrating spaces of everyday life and can be widened conceptually to be understood as a “security-
industrial-complex” (Staples 2014, p. 59).  Thus, how security becomes part of the sense-making of 
everyday life is driven significantly by “selling security” and generating conceived insecurities 
(Neocleous 2008; Åhäll 2016).  It is imperative to acknowledge the wider culture of fear propagated by 
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the security industry that has very real consequences for peoples and spaces and resist analytical 
abstractness.  
Third is the role that a growing security intelligentsia has in forwarding knowledge regimes that 
sustain normative ideologies of security.  The ascendancy of security has demanded a growing intellectual 
undertaking.  A variety of disciplines, Geography, Political Science, International Relations, and Security 
Studies to name a few, have methodically and meticulously studied – and promoted – the ostensibly 
indispensable nature of security.  Through foundational agendas, models, perspectives, and concepts 
ontologies of security in academic work has become essential in the creation and reproduction of security 
knowledge, a knowledge that mimics the jargon of security and power itself (Neocleous 2008).  While 
there is a significant growing intellectual critique of security, or techniques of security, underway there 
are limitations: “Critiques of security tend to broaden the analytic reach of security” (Rigakos 2011, p. 
60).  As such, this project is situated in an ongoing reorganization of critical work on security that pushes 
past analytical blockages (Neocleous 2008; Neocleous & Rigakos 2011; Hynek & Chandler 2013).  In 
this context, my research reimagines the power of security in (re)defining our modes of life emphasizing 























Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework 
Science and Technology Studies: The Technoscientific Governance of Non-Lethal Weapons 
 
Introduction  
Although, there are multiple, concurrent, and competing conceptual frameworks for engaging and 
understanding non-lethal weapons and state disciplinary power, this research draws heavily on Science 
and Technology Studies (STS).  What this chapter demonstrates is that STS offers new ways of thinking 
about the geographies of non-lethal weapons, highlighting the often-invisible roles of knowledge, 
expertise, and technical practices in shaping, sustaining, subverting, or transforming relations of security 
and power (Jasanoff 2004).  The chapter examines the ways state projects of security are produced and 
practiced through the transformative dynamics of science and technology in (re)arranging contemporary 
society (Felt et al. 2017).  In doing so, I broadly consider the ways “science and technology shape how 
humans experience, imagine, assemble, and order the worlds they live in” (Felt et al. 2017, p. 1).  More 
specifically, I explore how scientific and technological knowledge-making and implementation are 
materialized through non-lethal weaponry and co-produces the ways state power is exercised in contested 
spaces.  
   This chapter proceeds in seven main sections.  In the first section, I provide an overview of my 
conceptual framework linking political geography and STS.  Subsequently, I explore theoretical 
underpinnings of STS.  In the following section, I trace the emerging relationship between STS and 
geography.  The importance of space and place in STS is long debated (see Henke & Gieryn 2006) 
whereas the integration of STS in geography is relativity nascent and needing.  In the next section, I 
discuss how adopting STS’s notion of co-production within my conceptual framework addresses not only 
the theoretical rigor that STS bears on this project but also STS’s growing methodological orientation 
towards practice.  This discussion is followed by an exploration of technoscience as a core of security 
governance in modern security frameworks by theoretically engaging Foucault’s (1979a, 1991, 2007, 
2008) concept of “governmentality”.  Subsequently, I explore the intersections of STS, security, and 
knowledge making where I trace two major themes in the study of security and knowledge in STS and 
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how they inform my overall conceptual framework.  The first theme centers on how we imagine security: 
the scopes and discourses of security (Vogel et al. 2017).  The second theme addresses knowledge, non-
knowledge, secrecy, and ignorance in how technoscientific legitimacy and accountability in modern state 
security frameworks are generated.  Finally, I provide some general conclusions about taking an STS 
approach.  
Conceptual Overview: Taking an STS Approach  
A central concern of STS derives from the complexities of the production of knowledge and its 
ordering (Latour 1987).  My conceptual framework coalesces STS theories and methods to offer new 
ways of thinking about the geographies of non-lethal weapons emphasizing knowledge production and 
implementation emerging within a technoscientific security governance that co-produces the ways state 
power is exercised in contested spaces.  This affords an opportunity to understand how non-lethal 
weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the 
legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence.  There are three overall objectives as to why I use 
this conceptual framework in my analysis of the geographies of non-lethal weapons and how it is 
illustrated well in the context of my analysis and case study in Bangkok, Thailand. 
The first objective is analyzing the global police-military-network as a site of co-production 
which creates both knowledge and social-security order.  The global police-military-network is an 
assemblage of security actors, institutions, and mechanisms that manage highly politicized, competing, 
and contested technoscientific knowledge frames for security policy-making and implementation.  The 
aim is to illuminate the competing master frames and counter-frames and emphasize a move towards 
greater transparency and accountability in security governance. 
The second objective is to explore the transformative relationship between technoscientific 
knowledge production, state making, and everyday subjectivities.  The politics of this co-production is 
both mundane and mysterious; “It is mundane about worldly things and accounts of their details—and 
mysterious—involving hidden agendas compounded by hidden contingencies” (Lynch 2006, p. 11).  My 
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conceptual framework affords opportunities to challenge the security visions of states viewed as optimal 
in social, political, and spatial ordering of contested spaces.   
The final objective is to understand the merging traces of technoscience and security governance 
that define our political and social futures as defined by security hegemony and omnipresence as innately 
embodied in everyday life.  The relationship between technoscience, security, and (non-)lethality is 
dynamic and heterogeneous and is manifested in the daily practice of non-lethal weapons development 
and deployment (Anaïs 2015).  Using this in conceptual framework, I situate non-lethal weapons as 
embedded in systems of knowledge, social practices, security norms, and frames, and embodied. 
Unpacking Science and Technology Studies   
As a vibrant intellectual field, STS embraces a range of theoretical perspectives, all purposely 
centered on exploring science and technology’s place in society (Kuhn 1962; Latour & Woolgar 1979; 
Jasanoff 1996, 2004).  STS considers how knowledge is produced beyond “the lab” or by specific 
individuals (i.e., weapon designers/scientists) and understands science and technology as actively social, 
“they do not provide a direct route from nature to ideas about nature; the products of science and 
technology are not themselves natural” (Sismondo 2008, p. 14).  STS is diverse, multifaceted, and 
theoretically and methodologically dense.  A quote which I believe sums up STS nicely is, “STS in one 
lesson? Not really” (Sismondo 2006, p. 13).  Even so, this section provides insights into the historical 
formation of STS and the importance of STS in my conceptual framework.  The theoretical grasp of STS 
progressively expands across the breadth of the social sciences “wherever people are engaged in creating 
knowledge and rearranging materiality” (Felt et al. 2017, p. 22).   
If we begin with common notions of science and technology we become engrossed in the 
naiveties of positivism, falisficationism, and realism as well as the trappings of objectivity.  Yet, it sets 
the stage so it must be briefly discussed.  In simplistic understandings, science engenders a sense of 
“progress” by accumulating knowledge—towards discovery and searching for “truth”—using systematic, 
calculable, and repeatable procedures (Sismondo 2011).  Science scans the “natural” world and 
formulates theories based upon empirical data that validates or invalidates such “truth” claims.  
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Technology sits secondary in this view of science as “technology is often seen as the relatively 
straightforward application of science” (Sismondo 2011, p. 8).  The formal relations of science and 
technology center on a scientific rationality that places clear emphasis on defining what is science and 
what is not.  This process of defining science became the foundation of what would emerge as STS’s 
greatest debate—the “Science Wars”.  The “Science Wars” are in the past (for the most part) and from the 
rubble emerged an integrated field of STS that rejects scientific and technological determinisms as 
discussed below.   
While there is no one linear way to trace the emergence of STS as a distinctive discipline over 
time, Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) Structure of Scientific Revolutions is widely considered a seminal text in 
producing a field that becomes “science studies”.  Kuhn exposed the practical problems of science 
conceptualized above and used social theory to engage the broader political meanings of science (Turner 
2006).  Kuhn’s research drew attention from a variety of disciplines where the “conflict between science 
as an authoritative technique and science as a form of life,” were taking new forms (Turner 2006, p. 50).  
The easing of classificatory practices and discipline bordering between so-called scientific and non-
scientific disciplines encouraged the growth of research related to the “social studies of science” and 
“philosophy of science”.  Initially, these areas of research tended to be highly abstract.  The “sociology of 
science” transpired to ground the theoretical nature of this research.  Latour and Woolgar (1979) cynically 
noted that these approaches “seem sometimes to have the sole purpose of proving merely that scientists 
are also human” (p. 11).  Their early work sets the stage for the “social construction” of science that is the 
bedrock of the STS we know today (Latour & Woolgar 1979, p. 12).   
Following Latour and Woolgar’s lead, most early work in STS focused on how science and 
technology shaped society particularly the study of scientific communities and their practices (Latour & 
Woolgar 1979).  Scholars were concerned with how knowledge production impacted the research process 
as well as the basis of their methodological practices.  Understanding laboratory processes and practices 
afforded an opportunity to see how knowledge production becomes accepted and then entrenched 
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institutionally.  Of significant concern emerged disputes over the authority of science and experts and 
their roles in the actual production of (scientific) knowledge.  
Rather than leaping forward, STS approaches takes a few steps back, erecting scaffolding that 
emphasizes the importance of knowledge production itself.  STS asks us to question and examine 
knowledge production—What are our objects of study? What kind of questions are asked? What kinds of 
data are collected?  How and why is certain knowledge promoted?  Using STS approaches acknowledges 
that in the process of making and understanding science and technology, we are in turn (re)made (Felt et 
al. 2017).  As such, current STS work emphasizes understanding not only how science and technology 
shapes society but also how society, in turn, shapes science and technology.   
Of course, our understandings of science and technology has transformed with rapid pace as 
much of the defining phenomena of human history is situated at the nexus of science, technology, and 
society (Jasanoff 2004).  Whether it is the threat of nuclear annihilation or daily use of increased 
networked digital information gathering (i.e., cellphones), science and technology is highly influential in 
the ways we experience everyday life.  Not surprisingly, STS has extensively contributed to 
understanding the complexities, sensibilities, and materialities of the relations of science and technology 
in modern societies.     
Following the ‘critical’, ‘cultural’, and ‘interpretative’ turns in the social sciences in the 1970s, 
STS has grown into an intellectually multifaceted and dynamic field.  STS “creates integrative 
understandings of the origins, dynamics and consequences of science and technology” and seeks to 
understand its various sources and meanings tapping into a variety of disciplines (Hackett et al. 2008, p. 
1).  As its foundational concern, STS investigates how scientific knowledge and technologies are 
constructed in all their complexities: ontologies and epistemologies, abstractions, and materialisms and 
their contested futures (Sismondo 2011; Woolgar & Lezaun 2013; Van Heur et al. 2013).  
Unpacking the ontological complexities of STS exposes that we all “live in a world of ontological 
multiplicity” (Mol 2002; Law 2017, p. 43).  Ontological multiplicity indicates that there are multiple 
simultaneous realities shaping our world(s); a heterogeneous relationality (Law & Singleton 2015).  
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Starting from the assumption that the development of science and technology are social and active, the 
field inherently understands that discourses, practices, and materialities of science and technology are 
interwoven with heterogeneous meanings, values, and societal power dynamics (Sismondo 2011; Jasanoff 
2004).  As Jasanoff (2004) states,   
“Scientific knowledge in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of reality.  It both embeds and is 
embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and 
institutions—in short, in all building blocks of what we can term the social.  The same can be said 
even more forcefully of technology” (pp. 2-3). 
 
Therefore, science and technology are not solely empirical phenomena but are deeply social 
(Jasanoff 2004; Carrol 2006; Pickering 2013).  Importantly, STS maintains an aversion to universalist 
claims about science, technology, knowledge, and even STS itself (Lynch 2006).  This affords an 
opportunity to engage a variety of anti-essentialist positions regarding science, technology, and society: 
“The sources of knowledge and artifacts are complex and various: there is no scientific method to 
translate nature into knowledge, and no technological method to translate knowledge into artefacts” 
(Sismondo 2011, p. 10).  Regardless of the seemingly immutable nature of science and technology there 
are always multiple potentialities, representations, and interpretations (Sismondo 2011).  STS’s focus on 
heterogeneous relationality allows for in-depth ontological and epistemological scholarly inquiry.     
As STS continues to diversify its ontological reach, research on technoscience has proliferated 
widely in the social sciences.  The connections between technoscience and social, political, and spatial 
realities makes meaningful the ways in which bodies, spaces, and socio-political relations are articulated 
and enacted (Michael 2006; Sismondo 2011; Jasanoff 1996, 2004; Borrás & Elder 2014).  As Felt et al. 
(2017) argues; “STS scholarship emphasizes that in the process of making science and technology, people 
also make and remake themselves, their bodies and identities, their societies, and their material 
surroundings” (p. 1).  A range of critical perspectives, such as ‘feminist technoscience’ (Haraway 1997; 
Åsberg & Lykke 2010) and ‘postcolonial technoscience’ (McNeil 2005), have forcefully drawn attention 
to the ways in which, “the discursive and material aspects of sociotechnical relations and processes of 
materialization are inextricably intertwined” (Åsberg & Lykke 2010, p. 301).  Building upon these critical 
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perspectives, subsequent sections focus on the importance of technoscientific processes and relations 
between discursivity and materiality and subjectivity and embodiment in security knowledge and practice 
(Lykke 2008).      
Scientific knowledge and technology are ever more present in everyday life as their co-
constitution with our social and political world(s) transpires at a rapid pace (Braun & Whatmore 2010).  
Whether engaging mechanisms of military power, practices of governance, economic invention, moral 
and ethical frameworks, ideological imaginations, or social change science and technology continually 
shapes the world around us (Felt et al. 2017).  It is my belief that the shifting ontologies of STS around 
the contingency and indeterminacy of what is known and how it is known is an important connection 
between STS and geography that can be explored.  Together, our values, desires, and imaginaries shape 
the making of that very same knowledge (Felt et al. 2017).  STS finds its objects of inquiry wherever 
knowledge is produced and materiality (re)arranged.   
Overall, STS is an intellectual space that offers invaluable insight into the constant transforming 
processes and practices in which ontological determinations of non-lethal weapons form.  It calls into 
question who can make legitimate knowledge claims about non-lethal weapons and who gets to define 
what matters in imagining and shaping the future of non-lethal weapons.  In posing these “who 
questions”, I am actively considering alternative conceptualizations of non-lethal weapons.  STS affords a 
lens in which to address the ways that science and technology produce configurations of the social, 
political, and spatial realities of non-lethal weapons (Law 2002).  Non-lethal weapons demonstrate how 
scientific and technical knowledge-making is incorporated in practices of state governance, and, in 
reverse, how practice and state governance influence the making and use of knowledge.  
STS and Political Geography  
I believe greater engagements between STS and geography can produce analytically rigorous 
research on a range of contemporary issues transgressing geographic scale—security, climate change, 
globalization, migration—important to the development of geographic knowledge.  Specifically, I 
contend that STS can extend the already robust literature on security knowledge and practice in political 
41 
 
geography in ways that are more attuned to the changing dynamics of a “technoscientific security 
governance”.    
STS wrestled with space and place for quite some time (Wilbanks 2004; Henke & Gieryn 2006).  
Beyond the obvious engagement of STS research in examining places where science happens (i.e., 
laboratories, field stations, archives etc.), STS research has also theorized how the geographies of science, 
technology, and society interrelate (Livingstone 2003, 2010).  STS confronts normative ideas that space 
and place “pollute the credibility of science” and reject science’s perceived “universal” nature (Henke & 
Gieryn 2006, p. 369).  The debates about space and place in STS are indicative of how STS scholars 
challenge the “hands off” attitude towards science that plagues much of the social sciences.  Rather than 
imagining science “as floating transcendent and disembodied about the messiness of human affairs”, STS 
locates science and technology in space and place (Livingstone 2010, p. 179).  Even with STS’s 
engagement with spatial perspectives, geographers have been slow on the uptake of STS in relation to 
other disciplines.   
While geographers have made occasional incursions into STS, when engaging science and 
technology the tendency in geography is to “neglect STS’s theoretical insights [...], focusing rather on its 
methodological contributions” (Furlong 2010, p. 461; Dixon & Whitehead 2008).  Methodologically, 
geographers have mapped the geographic diffusion of scientific discoveries and technological innovations 
over space and time (Wilbanks 2004).  This research is noteworthy but the lack of theoretical 
engagements with STS is a gap geographers must fill.  While there are notable exceptions (Barnes & 
Farish 2006; Asheim & Gertler 2006; Whatmore 2006; Leydesdorff & Persson 2010; O’Lear 2016), the 
theoretical blindness and methodological focus of geographers mitigates the conceptual robustness that 
STS offers.  
Assimilation of STS in geographic research tends to focus on normative understandings of a 
distinct ontology of technology or the geographies of technology focusing on the materiality of 
technological objects (see special issue Social and Cultural Geography 9(6), 2008).  Other STS-
Geography integrations are situated in early studies that employed ‘Actor-Network Theory’ (ANT) 
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(Bosco 2006).  ANT, developed by leading scholars in STS, Michel Callon (1986), Bruno Latour (1987), 
and John Law (1987), is a general framework that attempts to understand the interrelations of science and 
technology and posits that technoscience is central to the idea of modernity.  In STS, ANT is a materialist 
theory that translates how “science and technology explicitly engage in crossing back and forth between 
objects and representations, creating situations in which humans and non-humans affect each other” 
(Sismondo 2011, p. 67).  In other words, ANT in STS focuses on understanding the production of 
scientific knowledge and its material forms.  As ANT flourished across the social sciences it largely 
collapsed into other theoretical baskets, such as materialist theory, focusing less on the production of 
scientific knowledge;  
“Since its original focus on the construction of scientific knowledge, ANT has gone much further 
and transcended disciplinary fields.  Today, scholars, including geographers, follow a similar 
route—that of tracing heterogeneous associations among many things—to understand the 
construction of the social in general” (Bosco 2006, p. 150).       
 
Although, STS is consistently looking to neighboring disciplines “to enrich ways of capturing, 
describing and intervening in the world”, geography tends to retreat behind its permeable disciplinary 
boundaries (Felt et al. 2017, pp. 24-25).  Opening a stable space for geographers working at the interface 
of STS and geography is a difficult task.  I believe that political geography’s well developed and critical 
approaches to the dynamics of ‘the political’ and power and its spatialities complement STS’s approaches 
to understanding knowledge production and its technoscientific materialities (see O’Lear 2016).  
Integrating STS and critical concepts in political geography related to security creates intellectual space to 
engage ontological multiplicities and novel epistemological and methodological frameworks regarding 
security policy and practice of non-lethal weapons. 
Specifically, I draw on recent trends in critical feminist geopolitics, that center the body, as a 
significant vector of analysis that bring STS and geography closer together.  Critical feminist geopolitics 
is a way to identify, analyze, and critique the formation of various constructed identities directed at the 
body through material relations that are often excluded from conventional socio-spatial politics (Tyner 
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and Henkin 2015).  Like STS, it is purposely subversive in that it offers counter-narratives to 
conventional understandings of knowledge and power. 
Recent critical feminist scholarship examines relations among intimacy, violence, and geopolitics 
that politicizes understandings of the intimate and readdresses the primacy of macro-level geopolitical 
policies and practices that render the body invisible in such relations (Pain 2015).  “Intimacy-geopolitics” 
connects violence across scale and rejects the spatial hierarchy between the international or geopolitical 
on one hand and the everyday or intimate on the other (Pain 2015, p. 64; Bernazzoli 2015; Massaro 2015; 
Sjoberg 2015).  Weaving critical feminist geopolitics and STS in my conceptual framework recognizes 
that the production of knowledge and practice of non-lethal weaponry transpires in ways that are attuned 
to the (dis)entanglements of objects, assemblages, events, processes, and practices that uncovers 
networks, connections, and relations.  It highlights embodiment, strengths of affects and meaning between 
entities and relations between humans, non-human beings, and non-living things (Moss & Donovan 
2017).  As a critical geographer acclimatized to STS theory and practice, I can reveal the co-produced 
relational spatialities and geographies of security, non-lethality, and technoscience. 
STS, Security and Practice: Adopting Co-production as a Theoretical and Methodological 
Approach 
Beyond the rich diversity in STS’s theoretical and conceptual frameworks STS takes novel 
approaches to methods and practice.  There is a growing trend in STS towards ‘practice’ and how 
practices manifest in relational ways that blur traditional distinctions between knowledge and methods 
(Law 2008, 2017).  STS accepts the messiness of research and works through the ways knowledge, 
practice, and materiality structure the world together (Jasanoff and Kim 2015).  The growing trend 
towards practice in STS and materiality in political geography fits well in understanding how non-lethal 
weapons are (re)produced and what non-lethal weapons actually do and make happen.  Therefore, moving 
towards practice in STS scholarship is of significant concern in my conceptual framework.  It recognizes 
that technoscientific practices are methods that shape and (re)produce our social and security worlds.  As 




“STS suggests that methods are never simply techniques.  Theories, methods, the empirical, 
modes of writing, disciplinary structures, audiences, authorities, and realties—all are staged 
together.  Other candidates are jostling to join the list, including organizational structures, career 
concerns, social, economic, technical and publishing infrastructures, and imaginaries, national or 
otherwise” (p. 47). 
 
In other words, STS investigates the practices of doing technoscience across a wide array of 
social and political relations and interests.  For example, how non-lethal weaponry is designed can move 
beyond simple understandings of technical manufacturing schematics and starts to unravel the complex 
sociotechnical assemblages of social and spatial ordering embedded in the ways expertise, technical 
infrastructures, and imaginaries work.  This affords an opportunity to focus on the ways theory, method, 
and the empirical function within the ways non-lethal weapons are understood, designed, developed, 
deployed, and legitimated.  As Law (2017) argues, “STS focus on practice means that theory, method and 
the empirical get rolled together with social institutions (and sometimes objects).  They are all part of the 
same weave and cannot be teased apart” (p. 32).  In other words, I can begin to explore the ways 
epistemic knowledges, technoscientific framings, and social orders are all co-produced in state 
interventions and deployment of non-lethal weaponry (Jasanoff 2004; Felt et al. 2017). 
My conceptual framework is grounded by the STS-sourced co-productionist framework that 
critiques normative knowledge regimes by exploring often unacknowledged dimensions of ethics, values, 
lawfulness, and power within knowledge and practice that constitute science, technology, and society 
(Jasanoff 2004).  Co-production implies the mutually constitutive and inherently intertwined nature of 
technoscience, politics, and society in theory and practice (Chilvers & Kearnes 2016).  It makes note of 
the social dynamics of cognitive commitments and understandings as well as emphasizes the epistemic 
and material relations of those very same social dynamics (Jasanoff 2004).  Co-production can be defined 
as 
“the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and 
society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it.  Knowledge and its 
material embodiments are at once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; 
society cannot function without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without 




The co-productionist framework is helpful in unveiling the consequences related to the ‘expertise’ 
associated with producing forms of knowledge and social, political, and spatial order.  As a critical 
framework, it seeks to avoid the traps of both social-political and technoscientific determinisms that are 
often maintained in relations between order and knowledge, such as ethical and moral hazards.  Using co-
production prompts an acknowledgement that knowledge both embeds and is embedded in institutions, 
representations, practices, and is embodied as social subjectivities (St. Clair 2006).  From this perspective, 
“ways of knowing the world are inseparably linked to the ways in which people seek to organize and 
control it” (St. Clair 2006, p. 66).  Thus, co-production is not limited to abstract theory or ideas but is 
equally material and practiced (Jasanoff 2004).  
There are several recurrent and overlapping research areas of interest in STS scholarship that offer a 
means of organizing work in the co-productionist framework that are relatable to non-lethal weapons.  In 
each of the focal areas discussed below, work in the co-productionist framework stresses the constant 
intertwining of the cognitive, the material, and the social (Jasanoff 2004, pp. 5-6, emphasis added):  
1) Emergence and stabilization of new objects or phenomena: 
New discourses about new objects and phenomena reflect specific means of representation that 
fosters new understandings and political and social orders (Latour 1987, 1993).  Regarding the 
emergence and stabilization of non-lethal weapons, it is important to investigate how people 
recognize them, classify them, and assign meaning to them thus creating new discourses in which 
to speak of them.  Understanding the complex discourses of non-lethal weapons is the foundation 
of my methodology discussed in Chapter 4.   
2) The framing and resolution of controversy: 
The resolution of controversy elevates forms of knowledge, policy, and practice that determines 
its supremacy over other forms of competing knowledge, policy, and practice.  For example, the 
ability for military, security, and police institutions to legitimize the sensibility of non-lethality in 
use of force options becomes more difficult to confront as their experts frame the controversies 
themselves without much public debate.   
3) Intelligibility and portability of the products of science and technology across time, space, and 
institutional context: 
The intelligibility and portability of non-lethal weapons is structured by their representation and 
framing in knowledge regimes.  The development, procurement, and deployment of non-lethal 
weapons is considered in largely technical terms and they are treated as options that resolve 
difficulties, not ones that would raise social, ethical, and political questions of their own.   
4) The cultural practices of science and technology in contexts that endow them with legitimacy and 
meaning:  
This inherently relates to the cultural practices of non-lethal weapons in contexts that endow them 
with legitimacy and meaning.  For example, the ways security experts create, with credibility, the 
standards of violence and metrics of injury impacting how non-lethality is understood and 
practiced in use of force continuums across the global police-military-network.   
46 
 
I use the co-productionist framework in STS as offering new ways to think about power and 
governance more generally as it presents more varied and dynamic ways of conceptualizing knowledge 
regimes and social-political structures, orders, and categories (Jasanoff 2004).  First, I examine the role 
and meaning of non-lethality in security and how they produce uneven geographies.  Second, I challenge 
master narratives/framings of non-lethal weapons use in state interventions in contested spaces.  Finally, I 
propose that understanding power and governance in an era where non-lethal weapons are legitimized as 
a violent means of compliance can be understood better through a technoscientific governance.  From this 
perspective, the projects of social and political ordering which emerge from the integration of non-
lethality in security cannot be uncoupled from power and (a technoscientific) governance.   
Employing co-production unpacks STS and develops greater understandings that stress the 
interconnection between the macro and the micro between knowledge, practice, and materiality in 
security studies.  This greater understanding assists in increasing the transparency of the influence of 
technoscientific policy and practice in security frameworks.  It brings sources of social, political, ethical, 
and moral dynamism to the forefront of technoscientific debates, deliberations, and determinations.  Co-
production allows for new topologies of theory, empirical inquiry, and practice that shapes security, state 
power, non-lethal weaponry, and political subjectivity as relational and emergent (Chilvers & Kearnes 
2016).  
Non-Lethality, Security Governance and Technoscience 
Understanding the nature of security governance is a complex, multidirectional, and 
polymorphous challenge.  Acknowledging the limitations of our capabilities to understand—in all its 
complexity—the nature of security governance, I engage “governmentality” (Foucault 1979a, 1991, 2007, 
2008) to understand how modern state security governance has become inexorably bound to 
technoscience, discursively, materially, and through practice.  I posit that technoscience is a core of 
security governance in modern security frameworks.  Of course, this point is not to argue that security is 
driven by technoscience alone.  Rather it focuses on how the shifting dynamics of security are in part 
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constituted by technoscientific knowledge, practices, and material objects as seen throughout my case 
study. 
A recurring theme within STS concerns the relationship between science, technology, and the 
realm(s) of political power and institutional exercises of such power (Irwin 2006).  STS perspectives on 
security governance draw critical reflection and empirical examination on the representations, meanings, 
and relationships of broad rules (laws), networks, institutions, and actions on security, scientific, and 
technological matters (Chilvers & Kearnes 2016).  I believe that STS has much to say about key concerns 
in political theory—power, political legitimacy, public participation—and we can start by understanding 
the mutually constitutive relationship among non-lethality, security governance, and technoscience.  
In contemporary security governance, the (non-)lethality distinction forces us to think about the 
mixing and integration of science, technology, and security in the global police-military-network in new 
ways.  Building upon Andrew Pickering (1995a, 1995b), these processes, practices, and elements occur 
because of “mangling”.  Mangling is a dynamic and reciprocal transformation of entities and phenomena 
interrelating (Pickering 1995a, 1995b; Barnes & Farish 2006).  In this case, science, technology, and 
security are mangled.  As they interact, their knowledge base and practices change considerably and 
rarely can be understood in their original forms.  Mangling provides a means in which to understand 
changing dynamics of state governance and interventionary power in relation to the genealogy of non-
lethality in security (Anaïs 2015).  A specific rationality of governance inspired by the mangling of non-
lethality, technoscience, and security facilitates teasing out various relations of power:   
the world-building alliances of humans and non-humans in technoscience shape subjects and 
objects, subjectivity and objectivity, action and passion, inside and outside, in ways that enfeeble 
other ways of speaking about science and technology.  In short, technoscience is about worldly, 
materialized, signifying and significant power (Haraway 1997, p. 51).  
 
The relations of power embraced between technoscience, security, and non-lethality shape actual 
relations of the global police-military-network through a multiplicity of modalities of power: sovereign 
interventions, disciplinary techniques and technologies, and apparatuses of security (Foucault 1979a, 
1979b).  While a range of theorists provide essential contributions in addressing the relations of these 
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modalities of power, Michel Foucault’s (1979a, 1991) understanding of the emergence or workings of 
power through his concept of “governmentality” underpins this conceptual framework.  Arising from his 
seminal work (1979a), governmentality emerged as a salient approach in rethinking politics, society, and 
power: “It made explicit a different relationship between governance and the subject as a way of drawing 
together the micro and macro analyses of power” (Bratich et al. 2003, p. 4).  Over time, Foucault’s work 
on power shifted across his theorizations of discipline (1979b), panopticism (1979b), biopower (1985) 
and self-formation (1988), all influencing his ongoing work on governmentality (Huxley 2007).  I argue 
that the mangling of non-lethality, technoscience, and security constitutes a technoscientific 
governmentality.  In practices of security, a technoscientific governance assists in working through the 
ways that non-lethal weapons, as a technology of governmentality, produce certain forms of power and 
security that (re)shape state interventionary power and political subjectivity.   
In simplest terms, Foucault’s theory of governmentality refers to the arts and sets of rationalities, 
technologies, and techniques used for directing subjects and regulating their conduct “where the conduct 
of conduct is the key activity” (Bratich et al. 2003, p. 4; Foucault 1991).  Foucault purposefully leaves the 
term “conduct” suspended in a state of ambiguity; “to ‘conduct’ is at the same time to ‘lead’ others 
(according to mechanisms of coercion that are, to a varying degree, strict) and a way of behaving within a 
more or less open field of possibilities” (Foucault 1994, p. 341). In doing so, it enables us to negotiate the 
“art of government” in different ways.  Foucault situates the “conduct of conduct” as the central problem 
to government as competing forms and sources of power emerge simultaneously (Foucault 1991).  It 
reexamines the traditionally statist views of the relationship between governor (the state) and governed 
(subjects).  Governmentality allows us to understand governing as practices that are diverse beyond core 
functions of the state and recognizes that power emanates from numerous sources outside (and within) the 
state.  The conduct of conduct is created at countless sites through various sets of rationalities, 
technologies, and techniques including schools, medical facilities, prisons, religious centers, and scientific 
laboratories (to name a few).  For the purposes of my conceptual framework, conduct is understood 
through the lens of mechanisms of coercions both theorized and materialized.  This approach offers an 
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excellent opportunity to understand technoscientific knowledge production and how it shapes 
materialized security practices.   
In relation to technoscientific knowledge production, we can draw upon Foucault’s (1991) 
observations about “power/knowledge”.  This conceptualization of governmentality centers knowledge 
production; “the practice of government involves the production of particular ‘truths’ about these entities.  
In seeking out the history of these truths, the literature on governmentality offers critical insights about 
the constitution of our societies and our present” (Larner & Walters 2004, p. 2).  Exploring these truth 
regimes involves exploring the entanglements of the production of knowledge and processes of 
subjectification in the construction and guidance of (self-) conduct.  Moreover, as Foucault (1988) states, 
“The main point is not to accept this knowledge at face value but to analyze these so-called sciences as 
very specific ‘truth games’ related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand 
themselves” (p. 17).  While Foucault’s influence in STS is light in comparison to other fields of social 
science, STS approaches appreciate the need to understand the production of knowledge.  A 
technoscientific governmentality, then, allows for an analysis of knowledge production that assist in 
disciplining, fostering, managing, and monitoring the conducts of individuals, institutions, and the state.   
Furthermore, Foucault (2004) also provides the conceptual framework in which to understand 
materialized security practices and how they shape technoscientific knowledge production through his 
notion of “counter-conduct” (p. 200).  Counter-conduct emerges from Foucault’s attempts to wrestle with 
ideas of power/resistance.  As Foucault (1990) states, “where this is power, there is resistance” (p. 95).  
The concept can be understood in terms of challenging knowledge and practice exercised in conducting 
others.  Scholarship on the concept of counter-conduct is rich particularly in relation to contentious 
politics (Death 2010; de Larrinaga 2016).  Death (2010) uses Foucault’s conceptualizations of conduct 
and counter-conduct to assess social movements, protests, and dissent.  In doing so he designs an 
“analytics of protest” (Death 2010, p. 236).  Death’s analytics of protest destabilizes traditional binaries, 
highlights the inescapable interrelations between relations of power and “is specifically designed to show 
how protest and government are mutually constitutive” (Death 2010, p. 236).  The same can be said about 
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the interrelations among relations of non-lethality, technoscience, and security and their materialization in 
non-lethal weaponry.   
Following Foucauldian logic, technoscientific governmentality regarding non-lethality informs 
power that deliberately intervenes in citizens’ everyday lives to simultaneously foster the conduct (read: 
life) of the individual and the state (Bratich et al. 2003).  In my conceptual framework, non-lethal 
weapons are technologies of governmentality—produced through assemblages of power/knowledge, 
conduct, and counter-conduct that make interventionary forms of governance possible and legitimate 
(Death 2010; Anaïs 2015; de Larrinaga 2016).  Engaging a technoscientific security governance is not a 
straightforward process, the magnitude and pace of the transformations in technoscience and security and 
how they inform and manipulate competing futures is vertiginous.  As such, my dissertation aims to 
demonstrate that an STS-sourced technoscientific governmentality stabilizes everyday technoscientific 
and security knowledge and practice and human bodies and nonhuman objects that assemble our world 
(Braun & Whatmore 2010).  It facilitates greater understandings of how technoscientific knowledge and 
technologies of social and political order (non-lethal weapons) are rendered meaningful in policing 
contested spaces. 
STS, Security, and Knowledge Production  
STS has, with great effort, exerted itself as a source of analytical understandings of the 
conceptual foundations of contemporary social and political theory (Lynch 2006).  Today, research in 
STS explicitly explores growing political questions around security.  As political theory within STS 
cultivates relevance, the matrixes of politics and power become increasingly difficult to remove from the 
movements of technoscientific change (Jasanoff 2004).  Expectedly so, STS has significantly contributed 
in analyzing technoscientific transformations of security given its focus on the social and political 
dynamics of science and technology.  
As our security environment becomes more intricate, technoscience continues to influence 
security governance in distinctive ways.  I focus on the shifting and often ambiguous dynamics of 
knowledge making and implementation in security frameworks.  As Vogel et al. (2017) argue, “The 
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process of knowledge making has been identified as crucial to both the making of security and the 
broader implications of security mechanisms (such as regimes, frameworks, technologies, practices, and 
materialities)” (p. 973).  As such, practitioners of STS conduct research that constructs a “STS-security 
interface” (Vogel et al. 2017, p. 974).  STS scholarship working at the forefronts of the STS-security 
interface assists in “opening up the black boxes of science and technology” to better understand and 
respond to current global security challenges (Miller 2017, p. 909).  Broadly, three key STS-security 
interface ideas—design, innovation, and expertise—serve as my foundation to explore knowledge 
production in relation to non-lethal weapons.   
Employing STS, I conceptualize design in relation to non-lethal weapons beyond the limitations 
of technical determinisms of objects.  The social relations embedded in the design process must be 
investigated as well to understand how non-lethal weapons have become stabilized within the global 
police-military-network.  Investigating design in relation to its sociotechnical complexity affords an 
opportunity to understand what components and materials are used, how and why they are used, who 
partakes, and to what result.  More importantly, STS (re)politicizes the science and technology of 
weapons design.  Implicitly, non-lethal weapons are designed to maximize compliance while minimizing 
the risks of lethal results.  STS considers how the science and technology of non-lethality operate within 
and related to non-lethal weapon design that enable legitimate exercises of state interventionary power.  
Thus, I examine the design of non-lethal weapons beyond their technical drawings, measurements, and 
material moldings to understand their implicit sociotechnical dynamics in my analysis and case study.   
Using the STS-security interface, I consider innovation as a continual process of transformation 
through which technoscientific knowledge, objects, and practice are co-produced.  Innovation, 
particularly technological innovation, is invoked as a dominant narrative/frame and solution in 
confronting some of society’s greatest challenges (i.e.,, climate change, terrorism, migration etc.).  Non-
lethal weapons are framed as innovations in policing and securitizing that fosters life considering greater 
shifts in humanitarian ideals, ethical frameworks, and moral responsibility within the (non-)lethality 
distinction.  By examining how non-lethal weapons are treated as innovations across the global police-
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military-network assists in understanding why their continued deployment is increasingly normalized in 
contested spaces.  Security continually innovates, nurturing a competitive environment (driven by profit 
and master narratives) among actors, institutions, and peoples that become reliant on knowledge 
production, and in particular, expertise.   
STS research challenges normative assumptions about experts and expertise.  Rather than 
understanding expertise as just the retention of knowledge, STS investigates how the production of 
knowledge is organized and regulated. Who gets to participate, in what ways, and when do they 
throughout the process? Who is imbued with the accountability of authority about knowledge; and what 
systems and norms are used in producing and operating knowledge in significant societal decisions 
(Miller 2017).  Knowledge exists across relations of power and authority that are central to how 
knowledge and knowers are employed in governance.  Security expertise is situated at the apex of 
power/knowledge;  
As societies confront contemporary social and political challenges, the framing and analysis of 
problems and solutions is profoundly influenced by how societies define what counts as expertise, 
who counts as an expert, how expert advisory institutions are organized and what authority 
experts are granted in relation to other participants in decision processes (Miller 2017, p. 912).    
 
Overall, how security experts design and pursue innovation concerning non-lethal weapons 
becomes essential to understand how non-lethal weapons are stabilized within the global police-military-
network and their transformative power in shaping the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies.  
All of which preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence.  Design, innovation, and 
expertise transpire within two major themes of the STS-security interface related to the geographies of 
non-lethal weaponry that I will detail below.      
Theme #1: Imagining security: the scope, boundaries, and discourse of security 
One of the most important themes at the forefront of the STS-security interface centers on the 
ways we imagine security.  STS interrogates the multiplicity of ways security is defined and imagined and 
asks important questions about how knowledge(s) of security co-produces security enterprises (Vogel et 
al. 2017).  In STS, how security gets “framed” becomes a significant vector of analysis.  It investigates 
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the intersections of the kinds of security and technoscientific knowledge(s) and expertise that become 
extremely important in “what security means and the power and influence of security enterprises” (Vogel 
et al. 2017, p. 974).  I use the STS concept of “framing” (Goffman 1974; Roth et al. 2003) as part of my 
analytical toolbox to address how knowledge, practice, and materialities with regards to the organization 
of knowledge in state disciplinary power, non-lethal intervention, and technoscientific governance co-
produce legitimacy and accountability in modern state security frameworks.   
Over time, STS research employed various forms of “framework analysis” (see Benford & Snow 
2000; Roth et al. 2003).  The approach to framing that my conceptual framework draws on is inspired by 
Erving Goffman (1986).  His sociological approach to “framing” examines the practices of institutions 
and actors in daily life, “to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete 
occurrences” (Goffman 1986, p. 21).  This approach directs STS inquiry towards understanding how 
actors “mobilize and counter mobilize ideas and meanings” through conceived knowledge regimes and 
expertise (Roth et al. 2003, p. 10).  Importantly, STS analysis is attuned to the ways framing is dependent 
of knowledge.  While there are often “official” or “master” frames imbued with specific authority and 
power, “counter-frames” compete to displace those relations of authority and power (Roth et al. 2003 p. 
12).  STS analysis also acknowledges that frames are dependent of material practices and objects, like 
non-lethal weapons (Bijker et al. 1997).  Framing non-lethal weapons and their practices of security in 
technoscientific governance makes visible the ways that the co-production of knowledge, practice, and 
materiality mobilizes ideas and meanings of (non-)lethality in multiple ways.     
The STS-security interface not only problematizes the interconnections and relations between 
technoscience and security it also investigates more basic questions about the process of how 
technoscience-security relations are produced, known, and subsequently framed.  Employing frame 
analysis, the important aspects of the relationship among security, technoscience, and non-lethality 
coalesce in how we imagine legitimacy and accountability in modern state security frameworks.  As such, 
the framework analysis employed in my case study examines how technoscientific and 
political/ideological framing and counter-framing of security and non-lethality sustains legitimacy and 
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accountability in modern state security frameworks.  In other words, the two ways that STS looks at how 
security is portrayed in relation to non-lethal weapons are technoscientific and political/ideological and 
the processes by which those portrayals are produced either identifies the problematic context and 




Diagnostic Framing: identifies problematic context and 
conditions necessitating change  
 
To the extent that the state embraces the tenuous 
monopoly on exercising violence as part of its portfolio 
of security mechanisms where use of force is presented 
and practiced as a legitimate way of resolving 
contentious politics, the calibration and metrics of 
(non-)lethality becomes an accountable way the state 
achieves its security means.  The perceived reduction 
of the acceptability of lethality and injury in the 
deployment of non-lethal weapons legitimizes the 
state’s expanding use of force options in the growing 
global police-military-network.   
 
Analytical Framing: addresses 
what should be done  
 
To the extent that non-lethal 
weapons make new forms of 
state interventionary and 
disciplinary power possible and 
engenders political violence as 
new technoscientific and 
security realities become 
acceptable the range of 
conditions of non-lethal 
weapons deployment needs to 







1) Invokes scientific and technical determinisms 
 
Political/Ideological Framing:  
1) Invokes strategic 
objectives, ethical 
assessments, and moral 
frameworks     
 
 
The dynamics of framing and counter-framing security and non-lethality become a useful method 
for understanding how modern state security frameworks are imbued with legitimacy and accountability.  
As a hegemonic ideal, security facilitates and conceals an arrangement of governing practices all of which 
necessitates justification of state action particularly related to the use of force (Loader & Walker 2007).  
State framing of security as “public goods” and “social contracts” systems of accountability and 
legitimacy in security mechanisms has become deeply entrenched and defended by the state.  Of 
considerable concern to the state is their accountability in maintaining social and spatial order and the 
legitimization of use of force by security mechanisms (and others) in utilizing technologies of 
governance, like non-lethal weapons, to maintain such order.  The balance of the legitimate right to 
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violence is at stake for the state.  How the state frames use of force, interventionary power, and (non-
)lethality in security has become entrenched in debates of (inter)national (in)security threats and fears and 
risk assessments.  This is significant because the co-production of security knowledge, expertise, and 
practice is overwhelming opaque, driven by classified spaces of secrecy and proprietary practices that 
exclude democratic participation. 
Theme #2: Knowledge, non-knowledge, secrecy, and ignorance 
Questions of how the production of security knowledge is controlled, regulated, and concealed 
have propelled recent research involving issues of secrecy and disclosure in STS (Barak 2011; Matsumoto 
2014) and political geography (Coleman 2016; Williams 2016).  As discussed above, a central concern of 
the STS-security interface is the production of knowledge.  Thus, the practices of organizing, managing, 
and ordering knowledge are also of significant concern—who has access, how does access and authority 
work, how does this impact the security policy and practice?  These questions have drawn considerable 
attention in recent STS research on security knowledge particularly related to the complexities of secrecy 
and disclosure (Masco 2010; Abeysinghe 2013).  While secrecy and disclosure are not exclusive to 
research on security, the significant implications and consequences of secrecy in security require unique 
thoughtfulness.  The power of secrecy in security mechanisms is difficult to overestimate as spaces of 
classification, closed knowledge communities (“black boxes”), and compartmentalization of knowledge 
create analytical obstructions.   
One of primary ways the state and security mechanisms exert the supremacy of their knowledge 
and the maintenance of classified spaces rests to an unprecedented degree on their capabilities “to manage 
the public/secrete divide through the mobilization of threat” (Masco 2010, p. 433).  The “secrecy/threat 
matrix” situates secrecy beyond simple acts of obstructing information (Masco 2010, p. 433).  Secrecy 
enacted within classified spaces and black boxes is a generative force that co-produces knowledge and 
social and political order (Rappert et al. 2006).  Relations of secrecy transform security policy and 
practice as systems of ethical regulations and moral economies with significant democracy deficits drive 
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particular understandings and framings of threats, violence, risk, and (in)security itself.  As such, the 
disclosure of secretes in or by state security mechanisms provokes extreme responses. 
As secrecy becomes more entrenched in technoscientific security governance, the ways in which 
researchers can investigate the co-production of knowledge and its consequences become more tenuous.   
Secrecy generates a multiplicity of logical quandaries for STS researchers to contend with as spaces of 
classification, black boxes, and the compartmentalization of knowledge is purposeful in obfuscating.  In 
spaces of classification, security experts stress the importance of classification and its preservation in 
black boxes.  The importance of classification in the production of technoscientific and security 
knowledge derives from its centrality in epistemological, institutional, and social, political, and spatial 
orders (Abeysinghe 2013).  Classification schemas are often taken for granted as objective and functional 
in sorting knowledge and defining action.  As such, classification becomes highly important in how 
technoscientific “facts” become embedded in, normalized and legitimated in security frameworks without 
public participation.  
Spaces of classification and black boxes mitigate the ability for counter-framing and public 
decision-making and participation in security decisions to transpire.  This has significant consequences 
for how technoscientific governance enacts state disciplinary power, (non-)lethal intervention within use 
of force options.  I find it disconcerting that the technoscientific knowledge most pertinent to security and 
everyday life is largely unknown (Michael 2006).  The ordering, reordering, and disordering of 
knowledge in spaces of classification and black boxes simultaneously empowers and disempowers 
people.  Theorizing and making practicable structures of public participation and public decision-making 
in technoscientific security operations has become a major concern in STS (Thrope 2006).  Preferably, 
security governance demands sites of co-production where the relations between technoscience, security, 
and knowledge are made visible;  
“Such institutional mechanisms would have to be able to deconstruct hegemonic visions and 
methods, choices and policy decisions and then reconstruct and renegotiate in a participatory, 
equitable and fair way with all parties.  The aim is to open up a space [...] to a more transparent 




Overall, the ways in which knowledge is produced and framed concerning the heterogeneous 
relationality between technoscience, (non-)lethality, and security are essential to understanding how non-
lethal weapons are stabilized in modern state security frameworks that are imbued with legitimacy and 
accountability in the global police-military-network. Technoscientific and security knowledge and 
practice transforms the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the 
legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence.   
Conclusion: Taking an STS Approach  
Overall, STS addresses my research questions in three significant ways.  First, it is purposely 
subversive in that it offers counter-narratives to conventional understandings in and around security found 
in other disciplines.  In asking how non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces 
and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence, I am 
questioning conventional wisdom about state-civilian relations.  ‘Expert’ bodies continue to argue that 
non-lethality in security is not political but a moral/ethical concern of state-civilian relations.  
Furthermore, they frame the use of non-lethal weapons—security’s primary operationalization of non-
lethality—as a technical issue not a political issue.  Yet, security governance employs science, 
technology, non-lethality, and security in very political ways regarding the production and 
implementation of knowledge(s).  My project uses STS to offer a rewarding analysis of expert bodies 
working through highly debated and contested knowledge in relation to security and science and 
technology policy making and implementation.  It provides a theoretical lens in which to understand how 
the production of knowledge becomes salient, credible and legitimate for non-lethal state interventions in 
contested spaces.     
Second, STS’s interdisciplinary nature adapts and innovates methods, tools, and frameworks to 
emerging political and social trends.  My conceptual framework lends itself to a methodological 
framework that integrates a wide range of knowledge sources and texts transgressing boundaries 
challenging false binaries of the political and apolitical, social and asocial, and technical and non-
technical.  Moreover, it provides alternative visions of sociotechnical arrangements in exercises of power.  
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For example, there is an opportunity to focus beyond the actual science and technology of non-lethal 
weaponry, not only their design and engineering, but physical, psychological and other forms of study in 
around security that format or perform security as a result.  The diverse relations of security, 
technoscience, and non-lethal weaponry can be identified and more thoroughly understood through the 
co-production of the many dynamic, complex, and contradictory knowledges and material embodiments 
above.  Moreover, it affords an opportunity to understand how dominant knowledge regimes stabilize 
non-lethal weapons in the global police-military-network.     
Third, STS contextualizes knowledge and materiality in terms of broader discursive and historical 
contexts and as such is well positioned to critique actual practices and responses.  A co-productionist STS 
emphasizes the processes and practices whereby knowledge and context produce each other 
simultaneously.  The sources of knowledge, practices, and materialities of non-lethal weaponry are 
complex and varied.  Assertions, theories, designs, uses, and practices are embedded within, are produced 
by, and produce the competing knowledge communities maintaining non-lethality in security.  Moreover, 
it affords an opportunity to understand how dominant knowledge regimes stabilize non-lethal weapons in 
the global police-military-network.  As such, STS well situates future geographers asking questions about 
science, technology, and security, such as how the production of science and technology becomes 

















Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
Building upon my conceptual framework and primary research questions, my methodological 
framework is devised to conduct a comparative, intensive study that seeks to understand how non-lethal 
weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the 
legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence.  It addresses the heterogeneous relationalities of 
security, technoscience, and non-lethal weaponry through the co-production of many dynamic, complex, 
and contradictory knowledges (policies) and material embodiments (practices).  My methodological 
framework acknowledges that the ways non-lethal weapons are conceived in security policy is 
inseparable in how they are enacted in practice in everyday life.  While my methodology is centered on 
discourse analysis, my conceptual and methodological frameworks are designed to complement each 
other in addressing non-lethal weapons in security policy and materially in practice in contested spaces.     
This chapter proceeds in five main sections.  In the first section, I situate myself as a researcher 
engaging my positionality and reflexivity and its importance in my research project.  Subsequently, I 
detail my methodological framework’s background and basis for why discourse analysis is the principal 
methodology I employ to address my research questions.  This is followed by a brief section explaining 
how I define discourse and employ a Foucauldian discourse analysis.  The next section explicates my 
research design in which I highlight the ways I employ my methods, content analysis, and intertextual 
research models, to organize and code my data.  In the following section I delve into my analysis of the 
co-production of security and non-lethal weapons.  The concluding section of this chapter describes the 
research challenges I faced while conducting research in and on Bangkok whereby the stabilization of the 
military coup in May 2014 and its legalization under constitutional referendum in August 2017 limited 
my original access to sources and data.  
To balance the positivist and normative leanings of conventional textual methodological 
approaches, I detach myself from the strategy of treating “methods as a bridge between theory and a 
technical instrument of analysis” and I conceptualize methods as practice (Aradau et al. 2015, p. 3).  This 
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affords an opportunity to understand the complex relationality and intersectionality of security that 
reflects the interconnectivity of state governance and everyday life (Aradau et al. 2015).  As such, 
methods no longer serve as simply a means to collect data per a set of techniques but exist as practices in 
security regimes themselves.  Methods-as-practice indicate that methods are messy and never 
straightforwardly techniques.  Knowledge production and its methods are socially and materially complex 
networks of practice.  In STS, methods cannot be conceived of as distinct from their social contexts and 
networks—they are heterogeneous, interconnected, and co-constructed as discussed below (Law 2017).  
Positionality and Self-Reflexivity 
Before addressing my methodological framework, I believe it is important to mark the 
geographical and other knowledges promoted and produced in this research as situated and partial 
(Haraway 1991; Rose 1997).  The interpretive and critical turn of the 1970s onward in geography exposed 
the ways geographers have situated themselves among a range of ontologies and epistemologies that 
compete, coalesce, and contradict in knowledge work.  As discussed in the previous chapter, knowledge 
production is imbued with significant power relations.  There is power in who gets to ask questions, 
power in who gets to answer, and power in who gets to validate the results.  To address the inherent 
power differentials evoked in my research, I avoid universalist, disembodied, and positivist notions of 
objectivity in my research that render lived experiences of state policing, order, and violence invisible.  
Knowledge production and research are dynamic and on-going processes.  I continually examine and 
reflect on my role as a researcher and my relationships with the objects of knowledge I ‘produce’ in my 
research.  As Mansvelt and Berg (2005) argue, “All knowledge is a product of embodied knowers, located 
in particular places and spaces” (p. 252).   In my research, I pay particular attention to how the relations 
of security, technoscience, and non-lethality are embodied at the site of the everyday.  
As I locate my knowledge, I simultaneously locate myself as a researcher and writer by 
addressing my positionality (England 1994).  By positionality, I am referring to “a researcher’s explicit 
report ‘locating’ their lived experiences within a project” (Dowling 2010, p. 25).  The ways in which this 
research project was designed, conducted, and written are tempered by my various subjectivities and my 
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life experiences through which these subjectivities are constituted.  As a white, male, Western researcher, 
I recognize the various privileges I embody and how they are reproduced in my research and writing.  The 
power, privilege, and position of my social and spatial location indicate that I need to ensure that my 
research on security matters avoids being patronizing, threatening, imperialist, and (re)colonizing.   
Acknowledging my positionality within this research project underpins my commitment to self-
reflexivity (England 1994; Rose 1997; Kobayashi 2003; Dowling 2010).  Defined by Kim England 
(1994), reflexivity is “self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of 
self as researcher” (p. 82).  As a positioned researcher, I am entrenched within socio-political and spatial 
relations that influence my research.  As such, in employing a reflexive approach I subject myself to the 
same critical analysis as I do my research.  As Kobayashi (2003) argues, “Self reflexive scholars are 
above all concerned about the potential for recreating or reinforcing the forms of social exclusion that are 
at the heart of both our research and social acts” (p. 346).  I believe that critical self-reflexivity is the most 
appropriate way to acknowledge my own social position and how my interactions, behaviors, and 
relations are reflected within my research.  Throughout my research, I’ve considered the ways in which 
my subjectivities allow me to navigate contested spaces and spaces of security, both physically and 
intellectually, at safer levels than individuals whose subjectivities identify their bodies as threatening 
and/or marginalized. 
To address my positionality, I must explain my deliberate choice to use Bangkok as my case 
study.  First, as a white, male, Western researcher, I occupy a privileged position in Bangkok where 
many, if not all, of my interactions involved asymmetrical power relationships; “the Western researcher 
represents not only a colonial past but also a neo-colonial present” (Vanner 2015, p. 1).  I mediate those 
relationships with critical self-scrutiny because my research involves analysis of policies and practices 
that have intense social and political impacts.  Also, I must acknowledge that I have spent significant time 
in Thailand before completing my initial field work in December 2015 and January 2016.  As a research 
assistant at Kent State University, I completed extensive field work in Southeast Asia, particularly 
Cambodia, funded by the National Science Foundation (grant #1262736).  Due to the length of travel I 
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needed to complete visa runs which I fulfilled in Thailand.  Since July 2013, I have traveled to Thailand 
two times for extended periods (more than four weeks).  Not only have I spent a significant amount of 
time in Bangkok, but I also traveled extensively across Thailand.  Throughout my travels, I had the 
opportunity to build a strong network in both Thai and expatriate communities in Bangkok and beyond.  
In July and August, 2013, while I visited Bangkok there was growing political instability that led 
to a noticeable increase in military, security, and police forces deployment across the city.  The increasing 
militarization of public space was indicative of the forthcoming political crises that led millions of Thai 
people into the streets in mass demonstrations.  In December, 2013, massive anti-government protests 
were ongoing and continually disrupting everyday life in the city, which disrupted a planned visa-run to 
Bangkok.  In response to a massive call to action to occupy Bangkok and increasing safety concerns (an 
estimated 3.5 million people marched through Bangkok on Dec. 22, 2013), that trip was cancelled.  
Eventually, these massive demonstrations and space-taking occupations led to a military coup on May 22, 
2014.  
In the fall of 2015, my twin brother moved to Thailand, which further strengthened my ties to that 
place.  Prompted by a determination of what my dissertation research would entail, I returned to Thailand 
in December 2015 and January 2016 whereby I conducted a research feasibility assessment and initial 
field work.  While I was conducting this preliminary research, Bangkok was immersed in ongoing 
discussions of democratic reform because of the 2014 coup and mounting contestation over public space.  
Since the time of my preliminary fieldwork, the political and social climate in Bangkok significantly 
changed as Thai citizens’ liberties have been eroded, political parties have ceased to function, mass 
demonstration has become illegal, and censorship of the media continues to rise which significantly 
impacted my research agenda as discussed in the final section of this chapter.  Overall, by engaging and 
understanding my positionality through critical self-reflexivity, I balance my intimate connections in and 
to Thailand with intellectual rigor and integrity.  My aim is to understand the complexities of the 
geographies of non-lethal weapons and using a place whereby I have strong connections as a case study 
will assist in my overall analysis rather than hinder it.   
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Steeped in critical feminist training, I acknowledge that this research project is part of a concerted 
political project meant to transform society by challenging and disrupting the hegemonic power relations 
of security and the state.  For me, positionality and reflexivity have little meaning if not linked to greater 
political and personal agendas meant to transform our world; “How we choose to change the world is a 
very personal matter; but the results are not” (Kobayashi 2003, p. 348).  The depths of my positionality 
and reflexivity are entangled with logical, ethical, and moral questions to which I do not claim to have the 
full answers.  What I can claim is that the unremitting arrangements of power and exercises of violence 
continue to shape everyday life, everywhere. Reimagining future geographies of security and non-lethal 
weapons needs to cultivate commitments to critical self-reflexivity.  As Griffin (1993) eloquently claims, 
“It is perhaps a choice each of us makes over and over, even many times throughout one day, whether to 
use knowledge as power or intimacy” (p. 295).  In my work, I strive to emphasize intimacy to connect 
everyday experiences to larger systems of privilege, knowledge, and power that produce uneven social 
and spatial relations 
Methodological Framework Overview  
To address my two research questions, my overall methodological framework is dependent upon 
discourse analysis.  Over the past few decades, the ‘discursive turn’ in human geography has transformed 
the ways texts and discourses are analyzed, providing new methodological approaches through which to 
understand the “situatedness of knowledge, the contextuality of discourses and the active role which 
spatial images play” (Häkli 1998, p. 333).  Discourse analysis bolsters my conceptual framework in that it 
provides ways to examine how security knowledge is produced, practiced, and normalized through 
relations of power.  Specifically, I use discourse analysis to unpack the various geographies of non-lethal 
weapons in security policy and practice and to better understand how the (non-)lethality distinction 
operates in state interventions and contested spaces.  I adopt discourse analysis to highlight the 
significance of the construction of meanings and relations of security, technoscience, and (non-)lethality, 
focusing on the links among discourse, context, and its practice.    
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Drawing on Waitt (2005), there are three main objectives of using discourse analysis as my 
primary methodology: 
1) To investigate the consequences of security discourse, related to actions, perceptions, or attitudes 
of non-lethal weapons rather than merely the analysis of statements and or texts.  
2) To identify and critique the frameworks within which assemblages of discourses are co-produced 
and disseminated whereby people and institutions construct meaning(s) of security, 
technoscience, and (non)lethality. 
3) To expose the maintenance of security mechanisms that preserve structures and systems about 
individuals and spaces in security worlds and realities “as unchangeable, normal, or common 
sense” (p. 165).  
 
Several qualitative methods readers, including human geography ones, provide varying 
approaches to discourse analysis (see Hay 2010; Hennink et al. 2010).  It becomes apparent quickly that 
harnessing the complexities, multiplicities, and ambiguities of text and discourse is demanding work.  As 
Müller (2011) points out, doing discourse analysis is often “accompanied by a rather vague specification 
of the methodology that underpins this analysis” (p. 1). There is no commonly accepted methodological 
standard in conducting discourse analysis which at times makes it difficult to conduct explicit and 
systematic analysis (van Dijk 1990).  Geographers have made calls for theoretical engagements to find a 
common definition, conceptual underpinning, or a common approach but they have largely gone 
unheeded (see Dalby 1991; Ò Tuathail 1992; Ò Tuathail 2002).  Many discourse analysts argue that a 
standard formula for discourse analysis would mitigate its effectiveness as a methodology.  The fact that 
there is no standard “how-to-do-a-discourse-analysis” process is one of the primary reasons behind my 
use of discourse analysis and supports my STS conceptual framework (Müller 2011, p. 3).  
The analytical power of discourse analysis draws on my abilities to be self-reflexive in the ways I 
apply discourse analysis in my research and fosters the importance of being a theoretical and 
methodological bricoleur resisting normative and positivist trappings and dominant narratives (Torfing 
1999; Howarth 2004; Müller 2011; Aradau et al. 2015).  This is significant for critical scholars of security 
who problematize knowledge regimes that sustain normative ideologies of (in)security, risks, and threats.  
Discourse analysis affords an opportunity for me to understand the complex sociotechnical assemblages 
of social and spatial ordering embedded in technoscientific security governance.  It involves complex 
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balancing acts between the goals and scopes of the analysis, research focus, and the types of data to be 
collected (Wetherell 2001).  To stabilize this balancing act, I systemize my approach to discourse analysis 
following Müller’s (2011) three core dimensions of analysis of discourse in critical geopolitics—context 
of analysis, analytic form of analysis, the political stance of analysis—and translate them to engage the 
scope of my own research project.      
The co-production of security is always linked to particular contexts as meanings shift between 
social, political, and spatial arrangements.  As such, the first core dimension is the context of analysis, “It 
is the discourse analyst’s task to establish the context for the reader to participate in the discursive 
meaning construction” (Müller 2011, p. 4).  As I started this project I generally knew what texts would be 
relevant to my research questions, but as I proceeded I realized that the multiple and overlapping contexts 
would overwhelm the data collection and analysis process.  I had to specifically define how much and 
what kind of context needed to be included (Wetherell 2001).  To define the context(s) of this project, I 
employed content analysis in three different phases detailed in my Research Design section.   
The second core dimension is the analytic form of analysis (Müller 2011).  Various analytic 
forms of analysis exist within qualitative methods from interpretive or explanatory forms (see 
Angermüller 2001) to more critical post-structuralist forms (see Strüver 2007).  Drawing upon the critical 
nature of my conceptual framework, the analysis of discourse in this project focuses on the practices of 
co-production of the meaning and social and spatial effects of technoscience, security, and non-lethality.  
My co-productionist approach permits a comparative, intensive exploration into how technoscience, 
security, and non-lethality are employed to frame discourses and practices.  This approach makes clear 
why I use a Foucauldian understanding of discourse as I am most “concerned about the ways in which 
meanings get legitimised, normalised and finally accepted as reality and social rules”, as explained in the 
next section (Strüver 2007, p. 688).  As such, I employ intertextual research models (Hansen 2006) to 
understand the mutual co-production of discourses related to non-lethal weapons within a growing 
technoscientific governmentality as discussed below.   
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Müller’s (2011) final dimension of analysis of discourse revolves around the political stance of 
analysis; “A critical, political take on discourse analysis centrally asks the questions of how phenomena 
variously termed dominance, hegemony, unequal power relationships or social inequality come about and 
how the constitution of the social world might be imagined alternatively” (p. 7).  Adopting a critical 
approach to discourse analysis acknowledges my active role in this research and how through critical 
understanding I challenge dominant security narratives of non-lethal weapons.  A critical analysis of how 
technoscientific security discourses embody forms of power/knowledge centers this methodology.  
Discourse analysis is employed to link these discourses to ideologies, power relationships, and knowledge 
production. 
Overall, drawing upon Müller’s (2011) three core dimensions of analysis of discourse, my 
methodological framework’s main objective is the analysis of how and with what consequences various 
institutions and agents involved in security policy and practice use discourse to frame non-lethal weapons, 
how discourses co-produce knowledge and meaning about non-lethal weapons and their socio-spatial 
effects, and how non-lethal weapon security discourses are constituted as active forces in contested 
spaces.  In other words, I am concerned with how discourses operate strategically to accomplish certain 
spatial, social, and political ends of state exercises of interventionary power in contested spaces.      
What is Discourse? Conducting Foucauldian Discourse Analysis  
Due to discourse analysis’s no one-size-fits-all nature, it is important that I am transparent in the 
ways I employ discourse analysis as a methodology.  In this section, I identify the way in which I 
conceptualize discourse and how the ways security discourse is co-produced and becomes entrenched in 
socio-technical, political, and security worlds through policy and practice.  My methodological 
framework acknowledges that the ways non-lethal weapons are conceived in security policy is 
inseparable in how they are enacted in practice in everyday life.  I work beyond the discourses themselves 
and tease out the relations between discourse and practice to understand how discourses work materially 
and become embodied (Sharp 2003).  Discourses move beyond discrete silos of self-referential meaning, 
encompassing traces of complex practices embodied in everyday life (Angermüller 2001).  
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“Discourse is a notorious term within human geography and other social sciences because of the 
messy multiplicity of meanings associated with it” (Dittmer 2010, p. 275).  To clarify the messiness, I 
rely upon Foucault’s theorizations of discourse.  Rather than employing an orthodox linguistic meaning of 
the word “discourse” as written or spoken communication, Foucault constructed a theoretical framework 
in which to understand discourse.  This framework affords an opportunity to explore “the rules about the 
production of knowledge through language (meanings) and influence over what we do (practice)” (Waitt 
2005, p. 184).  As such, a Foucauldian understanding of discourse fits best within my conceptual and 
methodological frameworks that critically engages the production of knowledge.  Foucault employs 
various definitions of discourse throughout his work, but Waitt (2010) identifies two overlain 
explanations of discourse that underpin my analysis:  
1) All meaningful statements or texts have effects on the world; 
2) Statements that appear to have a common theme provide a unified effect on meaning construction 
through discursive structures (regimes of truth) (p. 218).  
 
Foucault’s definitional framework centers on the production and circulation of knowledge and its ability 
to create “regimes of truth” (Foucault 1974b, 1979b).  Over time, these regimes of truth produced through 
discourse shape classifications and norms that define, order, and discipline subjects, concepts, and 
objects.  As discussed in the previous chapter, Foucault emphasizes the operation of technologies of 
power and their relations to the production of knowledge.  Like Foucault, I am interested in how 
knowledge production regimes produce meanings and realities that order, manage, and discipline attitudes 
and practices of security and (non-)lethality.  Moreover, how these meanings and realities become 
legitimized and normalized become a significant vector of analysis.  I conceive of discourse(s) as a 
“mediating lens that brings the world into focus by enabling people to differentiate the validity of 
statements about the world(s)” (Waitt 2010, p. 215).  Therefore, I focus on how particular knowledges 
related to non-lethal weaponry embedded in technoscientific governance and the global police-military-
network are sustained as ‘security realities’.   
To assess these connections, I work through the "discursive structures" that co-produce the 
mutual relationship between power and knowledge of security, technoscience, and non-lethal weaponry in 
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state interventions of contested spaces (Foucault 1949b).  Generally, Foucault employs the concept of 
discursive structures to refer to the ways knowledge(s) and meaning(s) are ordered and disciplined, 
typically informing hegemonic understandings of the world.  Discursive structures ‘fix’ concepts, ideas, 
and meanings of the world within specific contexts and spaces (Waitt 2010).  In other words, they 
“establish limits to, or operate as constraints on, the possible ways of being and becoming in the world by 
establishing normative meanings, attitudes, and practices” (Waitt 2010, p. 233).  Foucault recognized the 
inseparability of discourses, institutions, and social practices and their role in power/knowledge.  Simply 
put, Foucault is interested in the ‘effects of truth’ within different modalities of power and knowledge 
(Foucualt 1974b).  Consequently, discursive structures allow me to reconcile the fact that discourses of 
security, technoscience, and (non-)lethality are vast, multiple, competing, and often contradictory while 
the ‘security realities’ they produce are actually quite stable.   
My project recognizes the interaction of security, technoscientific, and (non-)lethality discourses 
as embedded in greater regimes of knowledge production whereby meaning is produced, power is 
expressed and exercised and the world is rendered recognizable through a securitized/militarized lens.  
Using Foucault’s theorization of discourse allows me to explain how security policy and practice become 
accepted as social, political, and spatial realities.  More importantly, I recognize these “realities” as 
contextually variable and co-produced, “being the outcome of uneven social relationships, technology, 
and power” (Waitt 2010, p. 215).  Therefore, discourse analysis affords an opportunity to understand how 
security knowledge and practice operates within conceived common sense and hegemonic ways, often 
rendering other sets of ideas and knowledge regimes invisible. 
Research Design 
This section and its subsections explicate my research design and how I do discourse analysis.  I 
draw significantly on the work of Gillian Rose (1996, 2012) and Gordon Waitt (2005, 2010) in 
identifying stages and employing strategies for my discourse analysis.  As previously discussed, 
conducting discourse analysis is not necessarily intuitive.  In order to analyze how specific sets of security 
discourses related to non-lethal weapons operate as hegemonic models in state security mechanisms, 
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interventions, and contested spaces, it is crucial to identify my stages for doing discourse analysis.  
Modifying Rose’s (2001) seven stages of discourse analysis, I conduct my discourse analysis in three 
broad stages.   
In the first stage, I identify source materials and texts that define my context of analysis using a 
content analysis approach to generate broad coding themes.  This is followed by detailing my analytic 
form of analysis where I employ intertextual research models to code, more thoroughly, my source 
materials and texts first to organize and then to begin initial interpretation.  I discuss how intertextual 
research models are used in understanding the co-production of security with specific attention paid to the 
robust linkages among scientific, technological, and security discourses.  In the final stage, I conduct my 
analysis of source materials and texts investigating their political, social, and spatial context and ‘effects 
of truth’ to show how co-produced and competing discourses constitute relations and practices of non-
lethal weapons.  
Content analysis: choosing source materials and texts  
This section details how I identify my contexts of analysis and distinguish the scope of the 
specific assemblages of source materials and texts related to non-lethal weapons at various levels and 
units of analysis.  Choosing source materials and texts for discourse analysis was accomplished using 
content analysis.  I employ content analysis in this stage because of its focus on meticulous, methodical 
investigation, and interpretation of specific assemblages of material to recognize concepts, patterns, and 
meanings that reflect the co-production of technoscientific security governance and everyday life (Berg 
2007; Berg & Latin 2008; Leedy & Ormrod 2005).  Content analysis allows researchers to examine 
significant volumes of data in systematic ways, serving as a foundation in which to pursue greater 
analysis using other complimentary methods (Krippendorff 2003).  In this project content analysis is 
useful in determining source materials and texts and examining overarching trends, themes, and patterns 
informing my coding process.           
In this initial stage, content analysis was conducted in three phases.  My first phase of context 
defining identified source materials and texts of immediate relevance to non-lethal weaponry, for 
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example, surveying policy documents that define non-lethal weapons.  The more general or distant 
aspects of socio-political and spatial contexts surrounding non-lethal weapons and security were framed 
during my second phase of context defining, for example, collating media material related to non-lethal 
weapon deployment in contested spaces.  The final phase of my context defining links my immediate and 
distant contexts to form a more concrete overarching context.  It aimed to identify source materials and 
texts related to my case study in Bangkok to focus on comprehensive socio-political and spatial meanings 
and relations of security, technoscience, and (non-)lethality.  
Overall, content analysis involved the collection, review, and analysis of more than 100 textual 
sources, including government documents, reports, speeches, print media, books, and videos (etc.) 
(Appendix 1).  Two techniques of content analysis were drawn on to reveal coding themes and frames; 
manifest and latent content analysis.  Manifest messages, elements that are countable and quantifiable, 
and latent messages, meanings and symbolisms interpreted, were combined as much as possible to create 
the most reliable criteria of selection related to source materials and texts (Holsti 1968; Babbie 2007).  
While some scholars perceive a tension with using both manifest and latent content analysis (Berg 2007), 
I find blending the techniques useful in reducing data sets and emphasizing each other’s strengths.  For 
example, finding the rate with which a certain term or theme (i.e., “non-lethal”) appears in a source 
material or text could suggest its significance or lack thereof.  Manifest and latent content analysis and 
subsequent coding are paralleled by ‘descriptive’ and ‘analytic’ codes respectively (Cope 2010; Rose 
2012).  
This approach informed my criteria of selection of source material and text as descriptive codes 
and analytic codes emerged.  Descriptive codes are typically thought of as categorizing labels as they 
answer “who, what, where, when and how” types of questions (Cope 2010, p. 283).  They are those 
themes or terms that are most immediate to research question(s).  Based on preliminary research from 
initial literature review a priori descriptive codes were identified: 1) Government security policy; 2) 
Military, security, and police forces policy; and 3) Science and technology policy.  Therefore, originally, 
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content analysis was conducted in relation to three assemblages of materials of immediate relevancy to 
non-lethal weaponry: 
1) Government policy, legislation, and legal documents and reports;  
2) Military, security, and police publications and policy documents; and  
3) Scientific and technological reports and documents. 
 
These source materials and texts served as my starting points: sources almost certainly to be 
particularly productive, relevant, and interesting (Rose 2012).  Indeed, many of these key source materials 
and texts provided relevant data such as the United States Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 
3000.3E which updated the authority, policy, and assigned responsibilities for the management of the 
DOD non-lethal weapons program and is cited as constituting the primary definition of non-lethal 
weapons across multiple source materials and texts.  Once these more obvious starting points were 
preliminarily examined, it was clear I needed to widen the range of source materials and texts to capture a 
more comprehensive understanding of non-lethal weapons in security policy and practice.  New source 
materials and texts needed to be included if I was going to answer my research questions 
comprehensively.   
Drawing upon the starting points above, three emergent analytic codes that reflected important 
themes in which I was interested were identified; 1) media response(s); 2) wider political policy; and 3) 
alternative political/social policy.  Analytic codes are often thought of as widening and deepening the 
process of discursive analysis leading to “new and unexpected connections, which can sometimes 
generate the most important insights (Cope 2010, p. 283).  Therefore, in the second phase of my content 
analysis, the criteria of selection for source materials and texts were broadened to include distant aspects 
of socio-political and spatial contexts surrounding non-lethal weapons: 
1) Media and media organizations reports;  
2) Non-governmental organizations publications and reports;  
3) Non-state security agencies/corporations; 
4) Academic analyses and public discourses; 
5) Think tanks publications and reports; and 




These assemblages of source materials and texts started to reflect a shift as initial codes derived 
from my research questions, literature review, and staring point materials advanced through more 
interpretive codes that recognize complex patterns, relationships, and meanings.  As such, linkages 
between my immediate and distant contexts in source materials and texts were made clear.  A clear 
coding structure started to emerge as I continued to accumulate source materials and texts.  As such, I 
used this coding structure to organize and identify source materials and texts based on their 
commonalities, relationships, and disjunctures into three overarching themes that would be engaged in my 
subsequent analysis; 1) official discourses; 2) wider political discourses; and 3) alternative political 
discourses.   
One of the major difficulties with discourse analysis is knowing where and when to stop the data 
collection process.  At the end of this phase, I noted that the source materials and texts I collected seemed 
to “have enough material to persuasively explore its intriguing aspects” (Rose 2012, p. 199).  However, 
before I began analyzing, I needed to complete one more phase of data collection and collate source 
materials and texts directly related to my case study.  Thus, the third and final phase of content analysis 
identified and assembled source materials and texts specifically related to my case study in Bangkok: 
1) Thai government policy, legislation, and legal documents and reports;  
2) Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTA) and Royal Thai Police (RTP) publications and policy 
documents;  
3) Thai media and Thai media organizations publications and reports; and  
4) Thai non-governmental organizations publications and reports. 
 
This final phase of context defining allowed me to form a more concrete and dense overarching 
context that included case specific source materials and texts.  The three phases of content analysis 
formed the foundation upon which I could begin to think critically about the social and spatial production 
of source materials and texts (Waitt 2010; Rose 2012).  These social and spatial dimensions “are a good 
starting point for critical interpretation because discourses operate as a process, restricting not only what 
can be said about the world but also who can speak with authority” (Wood and Kroger 2000; Waitt 2010, 
p. 225).  Identifying my overarching descriptive codes and eventual analytic themes, official discourses, 
wider political discourses, and alternative political discourses, acknowledges that my context of analysis 
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is grounded in the struggle of and for power in the production of knowledge concerning non-lethal 
weapons.  
Content analysis assists in identifying and constructing my context of analysis that highlights 
comprehensive socio-political and spatial meanings and relations of security, technoscience, and (non-
)lethality within my source materials and texts.  The comprehensive catalogue of descriptive labels and 
analytic themes drawn from a wide range of sources indicate the intertextuality of my research project.  
Intertextuality describes the supposition that meanings are co-produced as a series of relationships, 
interconnections, and linkages between source materials and texts rather than residing in the sources 
themselves (Waitt 2010).  To analyze the complex co-produced meanings and relations of (non-)lethality, 
security, and technoscience I subsequently employ “intertextual research models” (Hansen 2006).             
Intertextual research models 
In the following section, I detail how I employ intertextual research models to continue the 
process of organizing and coding the various data as well as start the process of analyzing source 
materials and texts.  Expanding upon the research of Lene Hansen (2006), this project examines security 
discourse in relation to non-lethal weapons from a range of diverse textual sources using intertextual 
research models.  My framing of Hansen’s (2006) intertextual research models (see Table 4.1) is 
conceived to align with the greater theoretical and methodological framework of this research project 
focusing on knowledge co-production.  While the models are distinct, they are not mutually exclusive.  
Each model identifies method, analytical foci, objects of analysis, frame type, and goals of analysis and 
are by no means an exhaustive list of the discourses and sources that can be analyzed.  This method 
affords an opportunity to understand the complex heterogeneous relationality and intersectionality of 
security policy that reflects the interconnectivity of state governance and everyday life in relation to non-
lethal weapons (Amicelle et al. 2015).  These research models serve to organize the depth and breadth of 
knowledge related to security and non-lethal weapons discourse and allow me to focus analytically on my 
research questions.  
The mutual co-production of source materials and texts exposes that seemingly distinct texts are 
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located within a shared textual space, “all texts make references, explicitly or implicitly, to previous ones, 
and in doing so they both establish their own reading and become mediations on the meaning status of 
others” (Hansen 2006, p. 55).  The meanings of texts are then bound to broader co-produced 
representations and interpretations which have significant political, social, and spatial implications.  This 
practice was conceptualized by Julia Kristeva (1980) and is known as intertextuality.  Originally, 
employed by poststructuralist theorists to upset conceptions of fixed meanings and interpretations, 
intertextuality constructs a network of textual relations; “any text is the absorption and transformation of 
another” (Kristeva 1980, p. 66; Allen 2000).  It focuses attention to the ways texts are co-produced, both 
channeling and restricting the information articulated.  Intertextuality affords an opportunity to 
analytically, politically, and empirically engage source materials and texts—speeches, policy briefs, 
policy legislation, reports—as inherently connected to broader discursive practices (Hansen 2006). As 
such, it is a methodological approach that allows for an in-depth and comparative discourse analysis. 
     There are two forms of intertextuality: explicit and implicit.  The explicit form of intertextuality is 
employed to draw upon a textual past, particularly one of authority, and engages textual linkages by using 
quotes or references (Hansen 2006).  Citing the classics or seminal texts in the field is the most obvious 
way explicit intertextuality emerges.  It confers a sense of legitimacy for its own explanation and 
“reconstructs and reproduces the classical status of older ones” (Hansen 2006, p. 57).  The implicit form 
of intertextuality is subtler and is employed to articulate how concepts, themes, and meanings are 
produced and involves identifying linkages, such as those in secondary sources (Hansen 2006).  
Regardless of the form of intertextuality, source materials and texts interact at the level of meaning as 
even direct quotes are (re)read in a different context of analysis within each different text.  As Hansen 
(2006) states, “This implies that the intertextual focus is not only on which texts are being quoted or 
which links are being made by other texts, but also how texts are read and interpreted” (p. 57).  This holds 
significant bearing in my project as I am interested in how security realities, truth regimes, and knowledge 
are constructed within source materials and text and reproduced from one text to another located in 
particular co-produced security discourses. 
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I employ three intertextual research models drawing on key components of my conceptual and 
methodological frameworks.  As described above, content analysis was used to identify source materials 
and texts that could be coded, organized, and initially analyzed for all three models.  The frame types 
derived from my framework analysis in Chapter 3 fall into two categories: master frames, imbued with 
specific authority, power, and expertise, and counter frames that compete to displace the master frames.  
Both master frames and counter frames could exemplify either a technoscientific or political/ideological 
framing which it draws on for legitimacy and authority (see Table 3.1).  My intertextual research models 
were designed to accommodate new materials, texts, and analysis throughout my process to provide a 
comprehensive coding, organizing, and initial analyzing method.                 
Model 1’s analytical focus is official discourses related to non-lethal weapons.  Official 
discourses are identified here as discourses through which state power and action are legitimized through 
non-lethal weapons policy or practice.  Official discourses emanating from government, military, or 
international institutions of governance are powerful in shaping not only the policies of security but their 
actual enactment.  The development, procurement, and deployment of non-lethal weaponry are almost 
exclusively situated within official discourse.  So, while this model may seem conservative in relation to 
the overall critical nature of this project, significant analysis is conducted here.  Official source materials 
and texts are the objects of analysis in this model, such as policy statements or legislation and law about 
non-lethal weaponry, which are direct discourses or texts by official institutions and agents.  Model 1 has 
two goals of analysis; 1) the emergence and stabilization of master frames; and 2) the responses of official 
discourses to critical discourses.   
Model 2’s analytical focus examines wider political discourses deriving from agents and 
institutions whose ability to influence the formation of non-lethal weapons policy and practice is less but 
nonetheless significant.  Political opposition, the media, corporate institutions, think tanks, research 
institutes, and non-state security organizations are integral in shaping the fervor or suppression of security 
policy and practice.  Engaging political opposition discourse facilitates analysis of the discursive and 
political hegemony of the official discourse of Model 1 and provides insight into how policy and practice 
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could change during transitions of political power.  For example, the military coup in Thailand brought 
swift changes to security policy and practice from the previous civilian-led government.  The media has 
an integral role in shaping and framing policy and practice and engaging with the public more directly, 
therefore deserves considerable discursive analysis especially in relation to visuals and representations of 
state interventions in contested spaces.  Corporate institutions and non-state security organizations, like 
weapons manufacturers, have significant influence and authority within the policy decision making 
process and therefore cannot be overlooked in analysis.  Model 2 has two goals of analysis; 1) maintain or 
challenge the hegemony of master frames; and 2) the likely/anticipated transformation of master frames. 
Model 3’s analytical focus engages alternative political discourses related to non-lethal weapons.  
The auxiliary texts are produced by a variety of agents proliferating into the realm of public debate.  
Institutions and agents were selected as part of defining the context discussed above.  Model 3 engages 
the importance of widely offered representations of agents and discourses that are engaged in on-going 
debates about security and non-lethal weaponry.  This model allows for the inclusion of more marginal 
agents and institutions in the analysis.  To limit the scope of this model, I collected and coded alternative 
political discourse viewed in conjunction with grassroots movements or bottom-up approaches.  Model 3 
engages security and non-lethal weapons policy and practice directly related to practice and lived 
experiences with non-lethal weapons deployment in contested spaces.  Model 3 has two goals of analysis; 
1) legitimize or contest the goals of Models 1 and 2; and 2) expand academic and public debate.  
Table 4.1 









1) Heads of states 
2) Governments 
3) Senior civil servants 
4) High ranked military 
5) Heads of international 
institutions  
 
Wider political discourses 
1) Political opposition  
2) The media 
3) Corporate institutions 
4) Non-state security 
organizations 
5) Think Tanks 




1) Social movements 
2) Academia  
3) NGOs 







1) Direct texts  
a. Policy 
statements 
b. Legislation and 
law  
c. Reports and 
documents 
2) Supportive and 
secondary texts 
3) Critical texts  
 
Wider texts 
1) Debates, speeches, 
statements 
2) Reports 
3) Media publications  




Auxiliary texts  
1) Academic analyses 
2) Reports  





1) Technoscientific  
2) Political/Ideological 
 
Master Frame(s) and/or 
Counter Frame(s)  
1) Technoscientific  
2) Political/Ideological 
  
Counter Frame(s)   





1) The emergence and 
stabilization of master 
frame(s) 
2) The responses of 
official discourses to 
critical 
discourses/counter 
frame(s)    
  
1) Maintain or challenge 
the hegemony of master 
frame(s) 
2) the likely/anticipated 
transformation of 
master frame(s) 
1) Legitimize and/or 
contest goals of Models 
1 and 2.   
2) Expand academic and 
public debate  
 
Shifts in analysis from Model 1 to Model 2 to Model 3 indicate the shifting level of analysis as well as the 
increasing complexity of that analysis.  The shifts also reflect the level of influence in the formation and 
practice of security and non-lethal weapons policy and practice.  Examples of how I employ these models 
are below:     
Primary Research Questions: How do non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing contested 
spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence?  How 
are non-lethal weapons stabilized within global police-military-network policy frameworks that shape 
state interventionary power in securing contested spaces?     
Model 1 Hypothesis:  Through the production and representation of non-lethal weapons, official policy 
discourses institutionalize, and normalize specific understandings of security that legitimize the 
deployment of non-lethal weapons in the use of force against civilians.  
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Model 1 Analytical Focus (Data): Non-lethal Weapons Executive Seminar (NOLES) principal findings, 
Non-lethal Weapons Capabilities: Report on an Independent Task Force (2004), North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) studies on non-lethal weapons (SAS-035, SAS-040, SAS-060, SAS-078 and HFM-
155), Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) Reference Book 2011/2012, Non-Lethal 
Weapons: Technologies & Global Market 2014-2020, and Thailand’s Internal Security Act.  
Model 2 Hypothesis:  The legitimacy of non-lethal weapons in contested spaces produces wider programs 
of state political action regarding the use of force against civilians, and these actions weaken responsible 
deliberation and cooperation surrounding policies and practices of security.   
Model 2 Analytical Focus (Data): the Bangkok Post, The Nation, Thai Rath (ไทยรัฐ), Daily News, 
opposition party statements (led by former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva), Foreign Correspondents 
Club of Thailand (FCCT), and The Media Agency Association of Thailand (MAAT).  
Model 3 Hypothesis:  Non-lethal weapons provide a means by which increasingly interventionary security 
regimes can exercise violence to quell political and social dissent under the pretenses of “ethical” and 
“humane” interventions in contested spaces.  
Model 3 Analytical Focus (Data): Chachavalpongpun (2014; 2016), McCargo (2002), Haanstad (2012; 
2013), Poothakool & Glendinning (2013), Omega Research Foundation’s (OMEGA) “The Human Rights 
Impact of Less Lethal Weapons and other Law Enforcement Equipment,” Small Arms Survey’s 
“Transfers and Transparency 2016,” Human Rights Watch’s, “Human Rights Aspects of Thailand’s 
Internal Security Act.” 
Intertextual research models provide a focused way in which to engage discourse analysis of 
security policy and practice of non-lethal weapons and state interventions in contested spaces.  They 
afford an opportunity to theorize the ways source materials and texts construct power/knowledge through 
their capacity to legitimize authority and expertise about non-lethal weapons.  I can identify discourses 
that construct specific knowledge regimes about security and non-lethal weapons whereby knowing 
accommodates such authority and expertise.  While engaging security, knowledge, authority, and 
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expertise often become intertwined and inflated such that discourses are deciphered through conceived 
power differentials.  As discussed in Chapter 3, authority and expertise are not inherent but assembled 
through modalities of power and the (re)production of discourses and the identities constructed within 
them (Foucault 1977).  Discourse and ‘knowing’ therefore become an important analytical optic for 
analysis (Hansen 2006).  As such, security and non-lethal weapons discourse is knowledge that is 
constructed through different modalities of power that sanction and challenge the (il)legitimate exercise 
of state interventionary power in contested spaces.  In other words, ways of knowing security and (non-
)lethality simultaneously produce ways of practicing security and (non-)lethality.   
Analysis: Co-Producing Security Discourse and Non-Lethal Weapons  
The co-production of non-lethal weapons and security deserves considerable discursive analysis.  
In understanding security as a discursive practice, I contend that security both articulates philosophies and 
grounds materiality such that the two cannot be disconnected, especially regarding non-lethal weaponry.  
The constitution of security regimes not only exacerbates interstate relations, extending the reach and 
grasp of the globalized police-military-network, but also shifts our understanding of security at all scales 
changing the dynamics of state interventions in contested spaces.  On the surface, as a discursive practice, 
security mediates the complexities of varied stakeholders, institutionalizing and normalizing their 
understandings of policy options and practices that are then enacted.   
To delve deeper, the complexities of shaping and realizing security mobilize particular social-
political subjectivities (Shapiro 1981, 1988, 1990).  This is illustrated in how spaces and bodies are 
defined as threats, volatile, and/or insecure, and subsequently acted upon.  In contested spaces, to 
“secure” reflects interventionary exercises and dislocation, often violently.  As such, contested spaces 
become incubators for state security strategy and practice whereby the state can test the thresholds of 
accountability, acceptability, and legitimacy of various techniques and rationalities of order.  Thus, 
security is constituted, not only in broadest sense as the ‘security-ness’ of space and bodies, but also 
literally as what political agents do engendering deliberation and debate about the (non-)lethality 
distinction (Amicelle et al. 2015).  This exposes the relationality of security: discourses, ideations, power 
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relationships, regimes of knowledge, techniques of governance, technologies, political subjectivities, and 
their linkages (Amicelle et al. 2015).  To conceptualize security as discursive and relational implies that 
security knowledge and practice articulates meanings, framings, and lenses of interpretation that contrast 
with the rather objective and normative ways in which security is conceived and implemented by 
policymakers and security planners (Hansen 2006).  It also implies a theoretical and empirical analysis 
that examines how security is articulated and achieved by conflicting political institutions, security, and 
corporate organizations, the media, citizenry, and other agents (Der Derian 1992; Shapiro 1988, 1997; 
Hansen and Waever 2002; Hansen 2006).  This illustrates two key implications of co-producing security 
and its significance in understanding the geographies of non-lethal weapons and why discourse analysis 
provides the best methodology to understand it: 
1) The effects of truth are a power-laden process through which particular knowledge is deployed by 
security institutions/regimes as a mechanism of social and spatial control.  
2) While discourses are always inherently unstable, multiple, and contradictory, security discursive 
structures operate to give fixity in contested space, bringing a militarized/securitized common-
sense order to the world.   
 
Therefore, discourse analysis affords an opportunity to problematize how (in)security is treated as 
a given; “For something to become a security concern, institutional, political, technological, and various 
other work is performed that makes it a matter of insecurity” (Aradau et al. 2015, p. 3).  The co-produced 
modes of knowledge about security, technoscience, and (non-)lethality continually recalibrate security 
governance and its political, social, and spatial effects.  As such, identifying, examining, and critiquing 
the discourses surrounding security and non-lethal weapons assists in understanding how non-lethal 
weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the 
legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence. Also, it challenges how non-lethal weapons 
become stabilized within global police-military-network policy frameworks.   
A critical analysis of my data began with interrogating political, social, and spatial circumstances 
within the discourses that invoke specific security realities (Waitt 2010).  Foucault recognized that 
discourses are grounded within political and social networks whereby “groups are empowered and 
disempowered relative to one another.  He saw discourse as subtle forms of social control and power” 
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(Waitt 2010, p. 225).  The production of discourse therefore is a power-laden process.  I can investigate 
the consequences of security discourse, related to actions, perceptions, or attitudes of non-lethal weapons 
rather than merely the analysis of statements and or texts.  First, I consider the analytical focus of my 
source materials and text by examining the political, social, and spatial circumstances of authorship and 
audience.  The ways in which discourses are produced is significantly dependent on the intended 
audience.  Authors use specific discourses to stimulate demands, perceptions, attitudes, and actions of 
their intended audience.  How non-lethal weapons are framed in security discourse assists shaping how 
individuals make sense of them which has significant consequences as particular regimes of truths are 
communicated in lieu of others.  It is not incidental that official discourses dominate discussions, debates, 
and knowledge making of non-lethal weapons.        
Of course, this is not to imply that audiences serve as inactive recipients of meanings of 
discourses.  In fact, audiences are an integral part of the discursive knowledge-making process as 
“audiences can be conceptualized as co-authors of a text” (Waitt 2010, p. 228).  Framings, meanings, and 
interpretations of discourses are always multiple and multi-directional.  Understanding discourses is 
politically, socially, and spatially contingent as competing meanings, power relationships, and ideologies 
are linked to the lived experiences of authorship and audience members.  Asking questions of the 
authorship and audience of source materials and texts becomes an important way in understanding how 
power is diffused in the production of knowledge in the context of establishing, maintaining, and/or 
challenging security realities forwarded in discourse (see Table 4.2).  More specifically, I examine how 
expertise, authority, and power/knowledge embedded in security discourses operate strategically to 
accomplish certain spatial, social, and political ends of state exercises of interventionary power in 
contested spaces.       
Table 4.2 
Political, Social, and 




Questions Asked (selected) 
Why is this answer important in 
the context of establishing, 
maintaining and/or challenging 
security realities? 







identities and power relationships of 
its author(s) and intended 
audience(s)?   
Who has rights to the text? 
Why was the text produced?   
Who is/are the intended 
audience(s)? 
What are the political norms of 
viewing selected texts? 
what consequences various 
institutions and agents involved in 
security policy and practice use 






Who authored the text? 
Who commissioned the text? 
How is the text produced? 
How is the text distributed?  
How actively does an audience(s) 
engage the text?  
What are the social norms of 
viewing selected texts? 
Provides insight into how 
discourses co-produce knowledge 
and meaning about non-lethal 




Where was the text made? 
Where is/are the audience(s) of 
text?  
What are the geographic contexts of 
the text?  
Provides insight into how non-
lethal weapon security discourses 
are constituted as active forces in 
contested spaces. 
    
The next process in my Foucauldian discourse analysis investigates the ‘effects of truth’ of my 
discourses to identify and critique the frameworks within which assemblages of discourses are co-
produced and disseminated whereby people and institutions construct meaning(s) of security, 
technoscience, and (non-)lethality.  Specifically, through discourse analysis I investigate how knowledge 
production generates regimes of truth that institutionalizes security realities that order, manage, and 
discipline ideas and practices of (non-)lethality.  Discourses of security and non-lethal weaponry employ 
various 'strategies of conviction' in establishing and/or maintaining technoscientific or 
political/ideological frames meant to normalize and legitimize non-lethal weapons (Waitt 2010).  In other 
words, discourse analysis is employed to link security and non-lethal weapon discourses to the ways 
power/knowledge operates within a technoscientific governmentality that disciplines, fosters, manages, 
and monitors the conducts of individuals, institutions, spaces, and the state.   
In doing so, the ways in which security, technoscience, and (non-)lethality become understood in 
the knowledge-making process as valid, legitimate, and authoritative is exposed.  Thus, I pursue a critical 
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analysis of the ways my data imagines security within the STS-security interface.  This opens 
geographical inquiry into the various ways security is defined and imagined and asks important questions 
about how knowledge(s) of security and non-lethal weapons co-produces security mechanisms of 
interventionary power in contested spaces.  In particular, I investigate how expertise shapes and produces 
effects of truth within my data.  Security expertise mediates between a multitude of forms of knowledge 
and “is crucial to understanding whose knowledge informs security-making and to reflect on the impact 
and responsibility of security analysis (Berling & Bueger 2015, p. i).  The effects of truth are then bound 
to the ways technoscientific-security relations are produced, known and subsequently framed.  The 
analysis of source materials to determine frame types follows the framing process drawn from my 
conceptual framework in Chapter 3: 
Framing Processes: 
1. Diagnostic Framing: identifies problematic context and conditions necessitating change  
To the extent that the state embraces the tenuous monopoly on exercising violence as part of its 
portfolio of security mechanisms where use of force is presented and practiced as a legitimate 
way of resolving contentious politics, the calibration, and metrics of (non)lethality becomes an 
accountable way the state achieves its security means.  The perceived reduction of the 
acceptability of lethality and injury in the deployment of non-lethal weapons legitimizes the 
state’s expanding use of force options in the growing global police-military-network.   
 
2. Analytical Framing: addresses what should be done  
To the extent that non-lethal weapons make new forms of state interventionary, disciplinary 
power possible and engender political violence as new technoscientific and security realities 
become acceptable, the range of conditions of non-lethal weapons deployment needs to be better 
understood as the global police-military-network expands.  
 
I identified two dominant frame types that emerge from an analysis of my source materials:     
 
1. Technoscientific Framing: invokes scientific and technical determinisms;  
2. Political/Ideological Framing: invokes strategic objectives, ethical assessments, and moral 
frameworks     
 
Technoscientific frames are formed by invoking scientific and technological expertise to 
depoliticize discussion and debate of non-lethal weapons.  The emergence and stabilization of 
technoscientific master frame(s) are dependent upon technoscientific determinisms of non-lethal 
weaponry as developed and deployed in solely technical terms, not terms that would raise social, ethical, 
or political questions of their own.  Political/Ideological frames are formed by invoking the strategic 
84 
 
objectives, ethical assessments, and moral frameworks of the (non-)lethality distinction.  Security experts 
use the sensibility and conceived morality of non-lethality in use of force options which is difficult to 
criticize or confront as the other position in the (false) binary of the (non-)lethality distinction are lethal 
options.  As such, an analysis of dynamics of technoscientific and political/ideological framing (and 
counter-framing) of security and non-lethality becomes a useful method for understanding how modern 
state security frameworks are imbued with legitimacy and accountability to intervene in contested spaces.    
It is also important to explore silence in my source materials and texts, “becoming attuned to 
silence in your texts is as important as being aware of what is present” (Waitt 2010, p. 235).  What is not 
said or remains invisible in texts can be just as important as what is said and is visible (Rose 2001).  
Foucault understands silence as operating on at least two levels within discourse.  The first ‘silence as 
discourse’ acknowledges how subjectivities are created within discourse.  Authority and expertise are 
bound to such questions as who has the right to speak or who does not? And who is silenced?  The second 
way Foucault conceptualizes silence is through his notion of privileged or dominant discourse that 
silences alternative understandings of the world.  I engaged significant investigatory analysis into the 
complexities of secrecy and disclosure in dominant discourse of security and non-lethal weapons.  This 
area of inquiry is drawn from my conceptual framework that addresses the power of secrecy in security 
mechanisms.  Spaces of classification, closed knowledge communities (“black boxes”), and the 
compartmentalization of knowledge create analytical obstructions that produce dominant discourses of 
security and non-lethal weapons that can be analyzed.    
Overall my analysis considers how knowledge co-production generates meanings and regimes of 
truth that order, manage, and discipline security realities of non-lethal weapons through which social and 
spatial control is exercised by the state.  While these discursively co-produced security realities are 
unstable, multiple, and at times contradictory various strategies of convictions are employed to bring 
about a militarized/securitized common sense order to state interventions in contested spaces.  In other 
words, dominant discourses and master frame types of security and non-lethal weapons legitimize and 
normalize non-lethal weapons deployment against bodies in contested spaces.  Therefore, Foucauldian 
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discourse analysis is employed to link these discourses to ideologies, power relationships, and knowledge 
production related to non-lethal weaponry embedded in technoscientific governance and the global 
police-military-network. 
Chapter Conclusions: Research Challenges   
Of course, an exhaustive analysis of all materials related to non-lethal weapons goes beyond the 
scope of this present project.  I acknowledge that the scope of this research project and its limitations 
impact and influence the interpretation and analysis of my findings.  However, the extensive nature of my 
research context review, my research design, and analysis all forward a rigorous study within the scopes 
identified in my introduction and my research questions.  Even so, throughout this dissertation project I 
confronted numerous research challenges, particularly connected to methodology and overall project 
formation in relation to my case study in Bangkok.  As I prepared my dissertation research outline and 
proposal I knew that I would have to contend with certain challenges right away such as Thailand’s 
precarious political climate, access to data, and my ‘otherness’ being non-Thai which included language 
barriers as my Thai language skills are at low proficiency levels.  While these challenges are significant, I 
fleshed out contingency plans to deal with each.   
I was acutely aware that in May of 2014, the Constitutional Court ordered Prime Minister 
Yingluck Shinawatra out of office and the RTA seized power through military coup.  The National 
Council for Peace and Order (NPCO) (a military political unit) was given assent by King Bhumibol under 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha as Prime Minister to rule by martial law and executive order.  However, early 
on the NPCO released its “roadmap to democracy” a collection of reforming policies that would restore 
civilian rule.  Many scholars, analysts, and activists saw this as a sign of increased cooperation between 
the NPCO and citizens demanding democratic rule be reinstated (Hewison 2014).  Indeed, early analysis 
of data showed that Thailand’s political climate afforded an opportunity to examine an empirical case 
study where the normalization of military-police paradigms and incorporation of non-lethal intervention 
policy and practice in contested space was ongoing and indicative of current contentious space-taking 
politics across the globe.   
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Yet, when I arrived in Bangkok in December 2015 for my initial fieldwork, it had become clear 
to most that the “roadmap to democracy” was rhetorical.  Thai citizens’ liberties are continually eroded, 
political parties function in name only, and censorship of the media is at all-time highs (Chavalpongpun 
2016; Hewison 2014).  The RTArF through the NPCO consolidated its power in all areas of government 
and continued to delay a referendum on a new constitution that would restore democratic rule while 
banning protest and enacting various forms of political repression (Hewison 2014).  While in Bangkok, it 
was highly visible that spatially based coercive interventionary force by the Thai security apparatus was 
at the heart of the NCPO’s state making project.  Major public spaces in which I had planned to conduct 
participant observation, Lumphini Park, Ratchaprasong intersection, and Silom, were heavily policed and 
surveilled.  Small manned-security structures were built and surveillance cameras were placed throughout 
these public spaces in Bangkok.  I was even sternly asked not to take photos of these new security 
measures.   
On August 7, 2016 a constitutional referendum was held and approved by the Thai people which 
consolidated and legitimized the military’s influence and rule in Thai politics for the foreseeable future.  
While the details of the politics of the constitutional referendum are outside the scope of this project (see 
Pruksacholavit & Garoupa 2016; Bermeo 2016; McCargo et al. 2017) its passing considerably impacted 
my project.  The NCPO and RTA used various national security concerns to manipulate their increasing 
privileged political standing and justify their increasing extension into all areas of Thai politics.  Shortly 
thereafter, access to interview participants from the RTArF and RTP that I had requested were denied not 
formally but by their ceasing correspondence.  That fall semester I realized that interviews were no longer 
going to be a part of my project.  The centralization of state power under the NCPO and increasing 
punishment of dissenters shifted my original plans to collect and access data from interviews and 
participant observation to a discourse analysis methodology.  
Access to data is a methodological limitation that all researchers must contend with in some way 
or another however, access to data (people, organizations, documents, etc.) related to security matters 
confronts spaces of classification, various black boxes, concealments, and denials.  I acknowledged this 
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limitation by exploring knowledge and secrecy in my conceptual framework and my analysis.  I also set 
up rigorous search parameters for data regarding non-lethal weapons, security, and policing in Bangkok 
that allowed me to field more data than expected including leaked documents, such as communications 
between Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) and the RTP (see Appendix 1).  I originally sent 
correspondence letters, interview requests and filled out research query forms by email to the RTArF, 
RTP, the U.S. Non-Lethal Weapons Joint Directorate, Joint Science and Technology Institute, and Joint 
Research and Development Program to gain access to data and build contacts.  I discovered that 
attempting to access data through official channels yielded far less response than informal connections 
built throughout my time in Thailand and in my research process.  The RTP was initially interested in my 
research project as they are generally open to researchers and research (see Puthpongsiriporn & Quang 
2005; Haanstad 2008; Chambers 2015).  However, with shifting political dynamics in Thailand occurring 
simultaneously, that connection ceased in November of 2017.  While access to data was strained by the 
serious implications of the centralization of state power and the states proclivity for secrecy, concealment, 
and denial I collected a significant amount of useable data.          
As I am non-Thai, my otherness related to my positionality discussed above impacts my overall 
research design and methodology.  My status as an American citizen allowed me to navigate these 
politically charged spaces of security with more ease than if I were a Thai citizen.  Under the NCPO in 
Thailand, dissent and vocal opposition are rarely tolerated and such actions have significant 
consequences.  For example, the NPCO increased policing and charges under the lese-majeste laws, 
which criminalize defamation, insulting, or threatening the king, queen, heir-apparent, or regent, to 
actively deter political dissent by likening any dissenting opinions with opposition to the king (Chambers 
2017; Bubsbarat 2018).  While non-Thai citizens are not absolved from lese-majeste laws there are certain 
latitudes of privilege assumed.  This heightened strategy to mitigate political dissent reached never seen 
levels when King Bhumibol died on October 16, 2016.   
Originally a major concern when designing this research project revolved around the challenge of 
language barriers as my Thai language skills are at low-mid proficiency levels.  In my funding proposals, 
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I identified significant financial resources to translators and translation services.  However, once my 
project was adjusted to be centered on discourse analysis, this challenge became less of a concern.  As a 
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) whose working language is English, a 
clear majority of Thailand’s national policies are translated into English.  I also relied on NGOs and other 
researchers' translations of source materials and texts that were used in my analysis.  For example, the 
Martial Law Act B.E 2457, Emergency Decree on Public Administration in State of Emergency B.E. 
2548 and Internal Security Act B.E. 2551 were all translated into English by The National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC).  I am sure there are other source materials and texts that could be included for 
analysis but are not because of language barriers in the collection of data.  I am confident in the overall 
collection of my data for analysis.              
Though these research challenges and limitations exist, there are opportunities to further engage 
research on the geographies of non-lethal weapons in future interdisciplinary research.  This project lays 
the foundation for increasing geographical inquiry into the intersection of state-sanctioned violence, 
classifying bodies and spaces as threats, risks, or insecure, and the rising prioritizing of science and 
technology in the service of state security agendas.  For example, an apt area of study that can emerge 
from this project is a comparative analysis of multiple case studies across a spectrum of political, social, 
and spatial contexts.  Overall, my methodology and my conceptual framework are well positioned to 
answer my research questions within the scope of this research project and afford an opportunity to build 















Chapter 5 Analysis of Non-Lethal Weapons in Contested Space 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine the geographies of non-lethal weapons in contested space, focusing on 
their capacity to extend state sanctioned violence, contribute to the identification of bodies and spaces as 
threats, and their role in the prioritization of science and technology in the service of state security 
agendas to address my primary research questions:  
1) How do non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways 
that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence?   
2) How are non-lethal weapons stabilized within global police-military-network policy frameworks 
that shape state interventionary power in security and contested spaces?  
 
I analyze the ways master and counter framings of non-lethal weapons produce discursive 
structures around security, (non-)lethality, and technoscience that shape the geographies of non-lethal 
weapons undertaken through forms of technological transformation and political violence.  As discussed 
in the following sections, an analysis of the technoscientific and political/ideological framings of non-
lethal weapons makes visible the ways that the co-production of knowledge, practice, and materiality 
mobilize ideas and meanings of (non-)lethality in multiple ways.  An analysis of the dynamics of 
technoscientific and political/ideological framing and counter-framing of non-lethal weapons becomes a 
useful method for understanding how modern state security frameworks are imbued with legitimacy and 
accountability to intervene in contested space, often with violent and deadly results.  While I examine 
technoscientific framing and political/ideological framing discretely below the overlap of each in 
producing the geographies of non-lethal weapons is undeniable.  Master frames, regardless if they are 
technoscientific or political/ideological, continually makes things possible.  Overall, in this analysis 
chapter, I interrogate the spatial imaginaries that inform technoscientific and political/ideological frames 
of non-lethal weapons that are assembled to legitimize and normalize violence in contested space.      
As such, this chapter encompasses my analysis in my effort to better understand the complex 
geographies of non-lethal weapons.  It is composed of six main sections with multiple supporting sub-
sections.  After this brief introduction, I identify ten primary findings of my analysis of source materials. 
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These primary findings are determined from my analysis of technoscientific and political/ideological 
frames analyzed and discussed in the subsequent sections.  In the next section, I evaluate technoscientific 
framings of non-lethal weapons and how they assist in changing the dynamics of policing contested 
spaces and bodies.  This is followed by my analysis of technical-tactical biases embedded in 
technoscientific frames of non-lethal weapons that shape the ways technoscientific expertise, (non-
)lethality, and security are co-produced.  The subsequent section explores the spatial consequences of 
technoscientific frames of non-lethal weapons.  Next, I interrogate the ways non-lethal weapons are 
stabilized within global police-military policy frameworks by addressing political/ideological framings of 
non-lethal weapons.  This is followed by an analysis of humanitarian ideals of non-lethal state 
intervention.  In the subsequent section, I examine the spatial effects and symbolic consequences of 
political/ideological frames of non-lethal weapons.  Finally, I offer some concluding thoughts on my 
analysis of technoscientific and political/ideological frames of non-lethal weapons and the geographies of 
non-lethal weapons.  
Primary Findings  
I determine that both technoscientific and political/ideological master frames of non-lethal 
weapons depoliticize discussions and debates of non-lethal weapons.  The depoliticization of non-lethal 
weapons is mobilized by expert knowledge and techniques of deliberation that disconnect and replace 
dissensual contestation with technocratic security norms and ideological imperatives from which 
legitimacy and authority are drawn.  Conversely, counter technoscientific and counter 
political/ideological frames attempt to (re)politicize discussion and debates of non-lethal weapons by 
displacing master frames.  However, as my analysis will show, the disruptive potential of counter frames 
of non-lethal weapons is fragile as the hegemony of ‘common sense’ understandings of insecurity, threat, 
disorder, and (non-)lethality are difficult to confront.  As such, ten primary findings are identified below:  
1) Through technoscientific and political/ideological master frames of non-lethal weapons, official 
policy discourses institutionalize and normalize specific understandings of non-lethal weapons 
that serve to depoliticize their role in the state’s tenuous monopoly of violence in the use of force 
against civilians in contested space. 
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2) Official and wider policy discourses both institute and control the controversies, intelligibilities 
and portability, and cultural practices of the science and technology of non-lethal weapons which 
serve to legitimize and stabilize non-lethal weapons within global police-military-network policy 
frameworks. 
3) Official and wider political discourses not only dominate discussions and debates of non-lethal 
weapons through technoscientific master framing but also significantly constrain the emergence 
of counter-frames because of the ways the state and security mechanisms exert their supremacy in 
identifying spaces and bodies as “threats” and “insecure”.   
4) Alternative political discourses are often beholden to the same data and analysis of official and 
wider political discourses that mitigate their ability to contest master frames providing alternative 
understandings of non-lethal weapons.    
5) As the prioritization of science and technology in security agendas becomes increasingly 
entrenched, technical-tactical biases mitigate issues of concern regarding non-lethal weapons and 
situate them within expertise and expert authority to depoliticize what would otherwise be highly 
contentious and politicized phenomena. 
6) As global security governance and humanitarianism develop co-constitutively over place and 
time, a securitized humanitarianism facilities actions to extend state sanctioned violence in the 
(re)production of place and space through humanitarian ideals of non-lethal intervention and 
order-enforcement. 
7) Official, wider, and political discourses employ political/ideological master frames to depoliticize 
state intervention by perpetuating fearful imaginative geographies of “insecure”, “disordered” and 
“ungoverned” bodies and spaces that need to be benevolently disciplined. 
8) The legitimacy of non-lethal weapons, bolstered by both technoscientific and political/ideological 
master frames, in state interventions in contested spaces produces wider programs of state 
political action regarding the use of force against civilians. These actions weaken responsible 
deliberation and cooperation surrounding policies and practices of (non-)lethality and security.   
9) Non-lethal weapons provide a means by which increasingly interventionary security regimes can 
exercise violence to quell political and social dissent under the pretenses of “ethical” and 
“humane” interventions in contested spaces.  
10) Master and counter framings of non-lethal weapons produce discursive structures around security, 
(non-)lethality, and technoscience that shape the geographies of non-lethal weapons with very 
real material, spatial, and embodied consequences and they need to be examined with greater 
nuance.  
 
Overall, my research indicates that non-lethal weapons significantly transform the state’s ability 
to embrace its tenuous monopoly on exercising violence as part of its portfolio of security mechanisms 
where use of force is presented and practiced as a legitimate way of policing contested spaces and bodies. 
Technoscientific Framing of Non-Lethal Weapons  
My aim in this section is to identify and explain the consequences of technoscientific framing of 
non-lethal weapons.  The primary discursive structures of official discourses, wider political discourses, 
and alternative political discourses expose the ways non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing 
contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and 
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violence as a technoscientific governmentality emerges in the social and spatial ordering of everyday life.  
Consequentially, my analysis indicates three primary findings:   
1) Through technoscientific framing, official discourses and wider political discourses utilize 
technoscientific expertise to fix the parameters of discussion and debate as well as the parameters 
of who counts as legitimate authorities and experts.  
2) Through technoscientific framing, official discourses and wider political discourses 
institutionalize and normalize technocratic logics and technoscientific expertise regarding 
capability gaps in the continuum of force and contend that non-lethal weapons fill that gap.  
3) Through technoscientific framing, alternative political discourses contest the emergence and 
stabilization of the deployment of non-lethal weapons in the use of force against civilians. 
However, the contestation is beholden to the same technical expertise and technocratic logics 
used in master frames and is limited in the ways state and security mechanisms control 
knowledge.  
 
The emergence and stabilization of technoscientific frames are dependent upon technoscientific 
determinisms of non-lethal weaponry as developed and deployed in solely scientific, technical, and 
tactical terms, not terms that would raise social, ethical, or political questions of their own.  In other 
words, technoscientific frames invoke scientific and technological expertise to depoliticize discussions 
and debates of non-lethal weapons in state interventions.  I argue that the ways (non-)lethality, 
technoscience, and security constitute a technoscientific governmentality transform the ways non-lethal 
weapons produce certain forms of power and security that (re)shape state interventionary power and 
political subjectivity. The technical calibration and metrics of (non-)lethality becomes an accountable way 
the state achieves its security means masking the networks and relations that underpin the politics of 
security and state violence embedded in everyday production of space.  From the analysis of my source 
materials, one key dimension of technoscientific framings is identified and discussed in ensuing 
subsections:  
1) Technical-tactical biases: Expertise about non-lethal weapons mediates through different 
forms of knowledge—scientific and technological, political, cultural, legal, etc.—however it 
is critical to understand the privilege of technoscientific and security expertise that inform the 
knowledge co-production of (non-)lethality in security.  The co-production of knowledge 
regarding non-lethal weapons is negotiated through what I call technical-tactical biases that 
are discussed in the next section.    
 
Technoscientific frames focus on scientific models, technological solutions, numerical 
objectification, and technological fixes perpetuated by security experts that determine how 
93 
 
technoscientific knowledge and technologies of social and political order (i.e., non-lethal weapons) are 
rendered meaningful in policing contested spaces.  Knowing (non-)lethality in security, then, has to do 
with the ways technocratic ideals and technical specifications institute the “norms-producing/law making 
capacity” of the (non-)lethal distinction in everyday security-civilian relations stabilized within the matrix 
of state power (Martin 2018, p. 137).  Technoscientific framings of non-lethal weapons in official 
discourses and wider political discourses provide a veil of obscuration that depoliticizes non-lethal 
weapons and the state violence embedded in non-lethal interventions.  This is not to insinuate that 
technoscientific framings are “flawed”, as counter-frames tend to argue, but rather, work exactly as they 
are designed to do.  
Technical-Tactical Biases: Whose Expertise Matters?   
Technoscientific frames of non-lethal weapons show how technoscientific governance create the 
specific conditions under which (non-)lethality in security emerge, exist, and change.  More specifically, 
technoscientific frames influence decision-making processes from their original design to the final 
deployment of non-lethal weapons as they are structured by technoscientific and security experts and 
expertise.  While the role of technoscientific experts and expertise in security is contentious and contested 
(see Chapter 2) there are security realities to expertise that are legitimized and stabilized in the 
relationship between technoscience, policy, and society more broadly in the global police-military-
network (Pfister and Horvath 2014).   
My analysis indicates that the global police-military network is a transnational space and 
instrument where knowledge and expertise about non-lethality in security are co-produced, mobilized, 
and stabilized in particular ways.  This expertise is governed within institutionalized and structured 
boundaries that derive authority and legitimacy that shape “knowledge orders” of non-lethal weapons 
(Jung et al. 2014).  As I discuss in Chapter 2, the practices of producing, organizing, managing, and 
ordering knowledge are of significant concern in state security agendas.  The global police-military-
network is an assemblage of actors, institutions, and mechanisms that manages highly politicized, 
competing, and contested knowledge orders for security policy-making and implementation in contested 
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space.  As such, the global police-military network serves both as an institutional actor and facilitating 
mechanism in the co-production of knowledge orders of non-lethal weaponry.  Additionally, I contend 
that knowledge orders of non-lethal weaponry are significantly shaped and defined by what I call 
technical-tactical biases.   
Technical-tactical biases are preconceived norms-producing discursive structures and forces that 
are entrenched in specialist knowledge and technical expertise within technoscientific, security, and 
policy epistemic communities.  These biases function through distinguishing relevant security, military, 
and science and technology experts, who largely agree among themselves, from so-called non-experts, 
who do not get a chance to participate or do so only marginally (Dewulf 2013).  Technical-tactical biases 
inform normative claims about expertise that prioritizes traditional values of science and technology 
promoting technological fixes and scientific solutions to complex security concerns.  They are entrenched 
in and enshrine conceptualizations of scientific objectivity and neutrality, technological models, firm 
evidence, numerical objectification, and classificatory practices, etc.  Moreover, technical-tactical biases 
work to make expertise appear impartial and apolitical by setting limits on the phenomena they seek to 
represent or illustrate as well as delimits the criterions for inclusion and exclusion of who serves as 
legitimate authorities and experts (Gieryn 1999). 
Technoscientific frames rely on technical-tactical biases and their importance in shaping how 
modern state security frameworks are imbued with legitimacy and accountability to intervene in contested 
space.  This does not imply that security frameworks are driven solely by technology, but it is important 
to understand the ways in which technology is used to construct and understand security realities.  There 
are four significant stages of technical-tactical biases within the securitized knowledge order drawn from 
my source materials that relate to the stabilization of non-lethal weapons in security agendas (see Table 
5.1).  I will provide a concise analysis of each in the subsequent subsections.  While distinct, the four 
stages work co-constitutively:  1) knowledge co-production: creating technoscientific expertise; 2) 
ordering technoscientific expertise; 3) communicating technoscientific expertise; and 4) (de)stabilization 








1. Practices dedicated to the production of expertise that values scientific 
objectivity, technological solutions and fixes, and numerical 
objectification. 
2. Produce data and facts through certainty, validity, credibility, and 
authority of expertise. 
Ordering technoscientific 
expertise  
1. Define and frame the criteria for how expertise is used.  
2. Institutionalize and sequester the mechanisms that control, manage, 
regulate, and order knowledge produced. 
Communicating 
technoscientific expertise 
1. Create hegemonic visions/logics and generate common sense/taken-for-
granted knowledge regimes.   




1. Discursive practices in which expertise and its inherent authority are 
distinguished, (de)stabilized and/or (de)legitimized, and supplement 
knowledge order.  
2. Implementation of knowledge orders. 
 
Technoscientific Modeling of “Significant Injury”: Technical-Tactical Biases and the Body   
Technoscientific expertise facilitates greater technical and scientific knowledge making and 
modeling related to non-lethal weapons that assists to technologize the (non-)lethal distinction.  In other 
words, the technical calibrations and tactical metrics of injury (and death) can be meticulously calculated 
so that the materiality of (non-)lethality makes wider programs of state interventionary power possible.  
These calculations center the human body.  However, technical-tactical biases render the body as a blank 
slate in which to ascribe a range of statistics and numerical modeling.  The limits of and thresholds 
between injury and “significant” injury and between life and death can be determined with a body devoid 
of agency.  Technoscientific modeling transforms the human body into skeletal structure with 206 bones 
pliable to 4,000 newtons of force, human flesh into a .05 to 4mm thick protective layer, and human organs 
which sustain life into five vital biological systems with specific objective functions essential to survival.  
Non-lethal weapons are intended to stress the human body without permeant/significant injury.  
Determining “significant injury” is deeply embedded in technoscientific knowledge co-production.    
Across source materials, the prioritization of science and technology in working to quantify the 
thresholds of injury and lethality becomes a significant way technoscientific expertise of non-lethal 
weapons is co-produced.  For example, blunt-impact munitions/weapons are designed to induce pain and 
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muscle paroxysm at the site of impact but must have upper-limits for the impact parameters to govern 
lethal effects (Widder et al. 1997).  The upper-limits of impact parameters are determined through a range 
of complex calculations and formulas to ensure lethality is limited.  One such formula is the Risk of 
Significant Injury (RSI) formula: RSI = P(injury occurs) x P(injury is significant | injury occurred).  This 
formula is determined by “multiplying the probability that a specific injury will occur by the probability 
that the injury will be significant if it occurs” (King et al. 2018, p. 1).  As a quantitative model that 
specifies the attributes of an injury, RSI estimates allow non-lethal weapons developers to “accurately 
quantify their weapons’ risk of causing a significant injury” (King et al. 2018, p. 1).   
A deeper examination into what “significant injury” means in the RSI formula exposes further 
technical and numerical calculations of bodily injury using the Viscous Model (CVmax [C= maximum of 
the instantaneous product of the fractional chest compression, times rate of compression, V]) which 
predicts the likelihood of injury to soft tissue from compression due to blunt impact (Widder et al. 1997).  
The science of these mathematical models attempts to quantify the acceptability of injury and violence 
against bodies by concentrating on technoscientific expertise.  To situate this in bodily context, “Stingball 
Grenades” (SDI 2018) propel rubber pellets with a bursting charge of flash powder in a 50-foot circular 
pattern at energies that can reach 200 joules—121 joules over the minimum energy it takes to cause 
ballistic injury—before impacting the body.  The first impact caused by the energy is displacement and 
compression of surface tissues which essentially “crushes organs and applies shearing forces to arteries, 
veins, bones, and connective tissues” (Widder et al. 1997, p. 5).  The second, and often, more significant 
impact to the body occurs as time dependence is added to the calculation of injury.  Energy sets off a 
“pressure pulse” increasing the displacement and compression of tissue that is accentuated in areas of the 
body with low volume tissue (lungs, stomach, and intestines) and leads to the collapse and fracturing of 
bones (Widder et al. 1998, p. 5).  The statistical analysis of blunt-force impact is fastidiously calculated 
and scientifically verified to ensure impact projectiles do not penetrate the tissue, thereby avoiding the 




At first glance, the models and formulas above, which are well-established in expert 
technoscientific and medical epistemic communities, seem to validate the non-lethal criteria for blunt-
impact munitions/weapons in an apolitical way.  The data and statistical models above rationalize 
technoscientific expertise based in conceived accountability, objectivity, and fact.  Technoscientific 
modeling and numerical objectification appears “innocent in terms of politics” and creates legitimatized 
authority of which to define the parameters of discussion and debate (Erkkilä & Piironen 2013, p. 347).  
However, taking the time to critically examine this knowledge order illustrates how technoscientific 
modeling and numerical statistics plays a role in delimiting the capacity of weapons to govern life and 
death.  Models, formulas, numbers, and statistics allow those experts imbued with the authority to possess 
them to “‘grasp’ abstract phenomena and see their scope and limits” (Erkkilä & Piironen 2013, p. 347).  
In this case, it is the very limits of violence perpetrated against a body rendering it amenable to the 
possibility of death.  This serves as an apt example of how technical-tactical biases function to 
depoliticize the (non-)lethality distinction in weapon design by relegating contestation in favor of 
technical and scientific determinisms in the co-production of knowledge.   
Technoscientific Compartmentalization of Knowledge: Technical-Tactical Biases and Black Boxes   
The ordering of technoscientific expertise serves to define and frame criteria for expertise and 
institutionalize and sequester the mechanisms that control, manage, and regulate knowledge production.  
Examining technical-tactical biases in this stage considers how technoscientific expertise regarding non-
lethal weapons is nurtured and sustained by the compartmentalization of knowledge and is largely 
concealed by closed knowledge comminutes (so-called “black boxes”).  My analysis indicates that the 
compartmentalization of scientific and technical knowledge from other forms of knowledge (legal, 
political, etc.) has significantly impacted non-lethal weapon development and deployment.  The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) illustrates the standard model of how technical-tactical biases order 
technoscientific knowledge through the compartmentalization of knowledge regarding non-lethal 




Research, development, and assessment of non-lethal weapons have occurred incrementally over 
two decades within NATO.  Using advanced text searching through NATO’s over 62,000 documents in 
its online archive that cover high level governance by reference code, specific title, and multiple 
keywords, there are over 60 documents that reference non-lethal weapons.  However, there are only seven 
official reports, four technical and three policy, that directly relate to non-lethal weapons development 
and policy.  The primary undertaking of non-lethal weapon development fell to the NATO Research and 
Technical Organization (RTO) and two of its seven Technical Panels that are “made up of national 
representatives as well as generally recognized ‘world class’ scientists” 
(https://www.nato.int/structur/rto/rto.htm).  The RTO encompasses over 3,000 scientists conducting and 
promoting cooperative scientific research and technical information exchange across 28 NATO states and 
38 NATO partners.  As the science track of NATO, it is fair to assume that the RTO privileges 
technoscientific expertise favoring methodological modeling, firm data, and numerical objectification 
focusing on “high quality of technical output” within the parameters of its mandate (Coops 2008, p. 4).  
However, as discussed below the limitations of the RTO’s technoscientific mandate significantly impacts 
overall research results on non-lethal weapons.    
The RTO’s four technical reports on non-lethal weapons shed light on how technoscientific 
expertise stabilizes technical-tactical biases in decision making and implementation processes.  The brief 
summaries of the RTO’s technical reports clearly indicate prioritization of the scientific method and the 
importance of technoscientific data, or lack thereof (see Table 5.2 for brief summaries of the RTO’s 
reports).  
Table 5.2 





Proposed a basic mathematical methodology for assessing the effectiveness 
of non-lethal weapons in a specific scenario using several technical inputs, 
like the design characteristics of weapons.  Effectiveness was calculated 
using seven different dimensions: mobility, communications, physical 
function, sensation and interpretation, group cohesion, motivation, and 
identification.  However, the research concluded that “the lack of adequate 
target response data was seen as a significant inhibitor to the implementation 




Weapons and Future Peace 
Enforcement Operations  
Identified five promising areas for continued non-lethal weapons research 
“using a structured approach for organising subject matter expertise (both 
operational and technological)” (SAS-40, p. iii).  While research 
documentation remains classified, the report provides a summary which 
compares “operational requirements” (undefined) on range, onset, and 
duration “versus projected technological capabilities in 2020” (again 
undefined) (SAS-40, p. 47-48).  A simple color-coded chart organizes data 
into a neat visual representation of five technologies that “can be used in 
combination with each other to increase effectiveness and resistance to 
countermeasures and could be made scalable from non-lethal to lethal” (SAS-




and Verification Study  
Partly verified the system effectiveness methodology “with some issues 
remaining but confidence they can be resolved” of their non-lethal weapons 
development, technological and operational parameters for effective 
integration in NATO capabilities (SAS-60).  This report is the first in relation 
to non-lethal weapons that examines the effectiveness of non-lethality itself 
at NATO. 
HFM-073: Human Effects 
of Non-Lethal 
Technologies 
Conducted to address the human effects of non-lethal weapons from the 
target (effectiveness of non-lethality) and the operator.  Specific attention was 
directed at gathering target response data (type, quality, and quantity) 
sustaining the methodology proposed by SAS-035.  Concluded that 
acceptance of non-lethal weapons use by NATO and the public in general is 
dependent upon human effects data.   
 
Throughout the technical reports, scientists insisted on increased attention and study to policy and legal 
concerns, as well as other knowledge areas (environment, medical, etc.) regarding non-lethal weapons: 
“the appearance of these new capabilities raises a number of scientific, legal, ethical, and political 
questions to be considered as part of the process of identifying new potential non-lethal weapon 
technologies deserving development for the future” (SAS-40, p. 12).  
 
RTO findings continuously point to “lack of adequate data” and analysis of non-lethal weapons.  
Importantly, the distinct research conclusions offered by each report contribute to the knowledge order of 
NATO’s overall policy stance towards non-lethal weapons which remains ambivalent at best (Coops 
2008).  Yet, NATO continues to aggressively push integration of non-lethal weapons in doctrine, force 
planning, and force application.   
I argue this is the result of the compartmentalization of knowledge related to non-lethal weapons 
that results in incomplete conceptual understandings with several separate but not intertwined parts.  How 
technoscientific orders are controlled, managed, and regulated has a significant impact on the 
development of non-lethal weapons.  Technical-tactical biases privilege technoscientific expertise but the 
ways they are institutionalized in the ordering of technoscientific knowledge production highly influences 
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their actual use.  For example, the NATO Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW) 
which works to fast-track development of counterterrorism technologies and capabilities, including non-
lethal weapons, does not link to past RTO data or analysis.  In fact, the DAT POW relies on support from 
the Science and Technology Organization (STO) a different scientific branch of NATO.   
NATO and other security institutions vehemently distinguish knowledge orders with a range of 
“divisions”, “committees”, “agencies”, and “research and development branches” that all produce 
expertise that facilities decision making and implementation processes and practices. The fact that 
knowledge co-production is a process and continually in flux among different divisions makes it difficult 
to build a comprehensive knowledge order of non-lethal weapons.  Even more difficult is the fact that a 
significant part of the knowledge co-production is classified and relegated into black boxes where secrecy 
is normalized (see Chapter 2).  
The compartmentalization of knowledge facilitates the ordering of technoscientific knowledge in 
decision-making processes conditioned by technical-tactical biases.  Dividing the intellectual labor in 
non-lethal weapons research strengthens the ability of technoscientific expertise to make normative 
claims promoting technological fixes and scientific solutions to complex security concerns.  As such, 
technical-tactical biases become institutionalized competences to manage unexpected or undefined 
dimensions of knowledge production regarding non-lethal weapons.  More importantly, they are 
structured as technical ‘truths’ that emerge from the many layers of regulated practices and processes in 
knowledge co-production.              
Technical-Tactical Biases as Common Sense   
Premised upon conceived and often contrived factual data given the credibility and validity of 
authority in the expertise offered, technical-tactical biases shape how we understand and represent non-
lethal weapons.  They assist in creating hegemonic visions/logics that generate common sense and taken-
for-granted knowledge regimes.  This often occurs through the creation of new discourses about non-
lethal weapons that reflect specific technoscientific understandings aimed to stabilize non-lethal weapons 
in security agendas.  These understandings share similar characteristics derived from conceptualizations 
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of scientific objectivity, technological solutions, and numerical objectification that render non-lethal 
weapons as solely technical objects facilitating a technological fix to disorderly spaces and bodies.  This 
becomes especially meaningful when official and wider political discourses communicate specific 
representations to obfuscate the violent and injurious realities of non-lethal weapons.  
One of the most problematic representations of non-lethal weaponry in official and wider political 
discourses is the practice whereby security experts re-classify non-lethal weapons as non-lethal 
“technologies” and/or non-lethal “capabilities”.  While a seemingly trivial trend, the implications of 
classificatory schema changes are vastly important for the successful co-production of technical-tactical 
biases utilizing scientific and security ‘facts’ to moderate contestation (Abeysinghe 2013).  From a master 
frame perspective, it is more favorable to label non-lethal weapons as “technologies” or “capabilities” 
than classifying non-lethal weapons as “weapons”:  
“The utility and relevance of non-lethal capabilities in ‘New Normal’ environments is 
appreciated by warfighters who require force application tools for short-of-lethal engagements, 
planners who understand the nexus between minimizing civilian casualties and achieving 
strategic goals, and policy makers who recognize that such restraint assures allies, coalition 
partners and domestic audiences” (DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program 2015, p. 2, emphasis 
added).  
 
“Non-lethal weapons are more than just tactical weapons – they are strategic enablers” (DoD 
2012, p. 2, emphasis added). 
 
“When de-escalation techniques are not effective or appropriate [...] and office is authorized to 
use agency-approved, less lethal force techniques and issued equipment” (National Consensus 
Policy on Use of Force 2017, p. 3, emphasis added) 
 
The above quotes are emblematic of how technical-tactical biases create and communicate 
technoscientific expertise to normalize non-lethal weapons.  This normalization connects the role of 
technology in our daily lives, which has become deeply entrenched in everyday habitual practice (from 
cell phones to credit cards).  The classifying terms “capabilities”, “techniques”, “equipment” and “tools” 
work to connect non-lethal weapons to familiar common sense and everyday discourse.  Discursive 
representations of technologies, tools, and capabilities are generally interpreted through their productive 
capacities to assist and simplify serving as scientific and technical gadgetry. Co-producing regime truths 
around ‘tool-making’ reduces technologies and their complex sociopolitical assemblages to inert non-
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human technological objects.  In other words, it disconnects the agency and roles of non-humans and 
materials in the practices and (re)production of everyday life.  A growing number of geographers 
emphasize and examine the role of the non-human and material in social systems and knowledge co-
production (Whatmore 2002; Wright 2014; Larsen and Johnson 2017).  In this vein, I contend that 
technoscientific master frames depoliticize the science and technology of non-lethal weapons realities 
through the communication of technical-tactical biases in technoscientific expertise that renders their use 
as common sense.  
Accordingly, this discursive practice works to suppress the messiness of thinking through the 
contradictions and ambivalences of non-lethal weapons.  The foundational contradictions of non-lethal 
weapons stem from the difficulties in classifying and assessing a diverse and disordered set of activities 
(Rappert 2003).  Technical-tactical biases in this stage constitute the phenomenon they classify 
concealing controversies in knowledge production of non-lethal weaponry.  They create classifications 
that reaffirm the seemingly neutral and apolitical nature of technoscientific expertise.  The technical and 
tactical design specifications, calibrations, and operational parameters of non-lethal weapons become 
credible and salient “data” and “facts” embedded and stabilized in security mechanisms that normalize the 
valuation of bodies and metrics of (non-)lethality.  In other words, technoscientific framing of non-lethal 
weapons sustains normative designations of violent force materialized through non-lethal weaponry and 
their technical-tactical calibrations that legitimate non-lethal state interventions in contested spaces.  By 
positioning non-lethal weapons in this way, technical-tactical biases set the parameters of the 
conversation and ensuing controversy.  Throughout the source materials, re-classification serves to 
desensitize and normalize as these new discursive structures foster the emergence and stabilization of the 
technoscientific framings of non-lethal weapons. 
Stabilizing and Legitimizing Technoscientific Frames: Technical-Tactical Biases Conclusions  
The outcomes of technical-tactical biases in the ordering of technoscientific expertise relating to 
non-lethal weapons serves to (de)stabilize and/or (de)legitimize their roles and forms the foundation for 
which to implement knowledge orders.  Technical-tactical biases as norms-producing discursive 
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structures and forces are meant to maintain a level of certainty about technoscientific expertise and 
claims.  They work to weave together technological determinisms of non-lethal weapons that result in an 
asocial and apolitical perpetuation of their existence.  Thus, technical-tactical biases structure 
technoscientific expertise so that the relations of innovation and technological design produce knowledge 
orders never intending to ask how non-lethal weapons are created, why they are created, by whom, and 
what norms or values non-lethal weapons embody and materialize?  As such, non-lethal weapons become 
stabilized within global police-military-network policy frameworks that shape state interventionary power 
in security and contested spaces through technologically determined depoliticization by technoscientific 
master frames.        
Alternative political discourses contest the stabilization and legitimization of non-lethal weapons 
in the use of force against civilians.  This affords an opportunity to point out the cracks in the façade of 
technoscientific master frames.  However, my analysis indicates that alternative political discourses are 
beholden to the same technical expertise and technocratic logics used in master frames.  I believe that this 
is due to the highly regulated and tightly controlled knowledge orders of non-lethal weapons.  In fact, 
many alternative political discourses continue to rely on the same technical-tactical biases embedded in 
technoscientific master frames to promote their views on non-lethal weapons which are often inconsistent.  
For example, Amnesty International sustains one of the most important contesting discourses of the use of 
force against civilians yet it “acknowledges the importance of developing non-lethal or ‘less than lethal’ 
force options to decrease the risk of death or injury” (Amnesty International 2015).  Amnesty 
International argues that non-lethal weapons, if used, should be limited to situations in “accordance with 
UN standards” without attesting to the fact that UN standards on non-lethal weapons are deeply 
entrenched in technical-tactical biases and often perpetuate the very same standards Amnesty 
International critiques (UN Report on Less than Lethal Weapons 2015).   
Overall, the emergence and stabilization of technoscientific frames are dependent upon 
technoscientific determinisms of non-lethal weaponry that are supported by technical-tactical biases 
within technoscientific expertise.  These technical-tactical biases mitigate issues of concern regarding 
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non-lethal weapons and situate them within expertise and expert authority in order to depoliticize what 
would otherwise be highly contentious and politicized phenomena.  Official and wider political discourses 
not only dominate discussions and debates of non-lethal weapons through technical-tactical biases which 
build concrete technoscientific frames but also significantly constrain the emergence of counter-frames 
because of the ways the state and security mechanisms exert their supremacy in identifying spaces as 
“insecure” and bodies as “threats”.  Technoscientific master frames define insecurity and threats in very 
particular ways that limit viable counter frames.  This process is progressively determined through the 
conceived objectivity and neutrality of science and technology in the service of state security agendas 
with very real spatial consequences.    
“Threat” Assessment: Spatializing Technoscientific Frames of Non-Lethal Weapons 
In this section, I examine the spatial consequences of technoscientific frames of non-lethal 
weapons.  I am concerned with illustrating how epistemic authority and expertise created by technical-
tactical biases are spatialized through a shared vision of threat and practice of security in non-lethal 
interventions in contested space.  There is a particular geography to constructing threat and security in 
contested space underpinned by an increasing technoscientific understanding of the use of force.  More 
specifically, my research contends that the production of threat and deployment of security are dependent 
upon a technoscientific paradigm of threat assessment and scalable capabilities to address threats, 
materialized through non-lethal weapons through the spatial practices of containment and distance.  The 
spatial arrangements formed in relation to these particular understandings of threat and security change 
the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state 
interventionary power and violence, in other words, a legitimization of a militarization of non-lethal state 
interventionary power.   
Threat assessment is conceptualized here as the hyper-rationalized practice of determining the 
credibility and gravity, with quantified indicators of abnormality, of a potential threat as well as the 
likelihood that this threat will materialize.  The ongoing operation of multiple, simultaneous, and often 
conflicting means of classifying and assessing threat illustrates complex socio-political regimes and 
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technoscientific orders of verification that emphasizes distrust, expertise and evidence, and probabilities 
(Maguire and Fussey 2016).  The objectification and internalization/externalization of threat and threat 
assessment emerge as key to modern calculations of (in)security.  As technocratic ideals of security 
proliferate in the global police-military-network, threat assessment is increasingly understood through the 
lens of technocratic managerial practice.  As such, threat assessments are progressively technologically-
based, methodical, and indiscriminately applied and stabilized by technoscientific frames and their 
technical-tactical biases.   
Significantly, as threat assessment becomes more technoscientific in conceptualization, the highly 
discretionary and discriminate nature of threat assessment is rendered invisible by perceived objective 
standards and neutrality.  However, I vehemently contend the increasing technoscientific nature of threat 
assessment is conditioned by socio-political and historical forces—colonization, capitalism, imperialism, 
globalization (to name a few)—that institute the circumstances for which the productive capacities of 
order, discipline, and state violence are spatially understood and unevenly applied.  Determining and 
acting upon threats within contested space reproduces racist, classist, gendered, sexist, homophobic, 
transphobic, ableist, ageist, and geopolitical discrimination and violence.  A critical geography of non-
lethal weapons must acknowledge the unremitting nature and lived experience of these violent practices 
even as the state and security mechanisms perpetuate technoscientific frames in apolitical, asocial, and 
aspatial ways.          
Mapping ‘threats’ in contested space then emerges from greater technoscientific logics of state 
intervention.  Innovative technologies (from information technology to weapon systems with scalable 
effects), knowledge co-production and expertise, and decision making and implementation constitute a 
security regime focused on creating a continuum of force—from non-lethal to lethal force—to identify 
and intervene to impede a wide range of threats.  The degrees or stages of this continuum of force 
exercised in a conceived logical progression affords the opportunity for the state to extend the 
interoperability of the use of force to dislocate bodies and secure contested spaces.  While most scholars 
are interested in threat assessment and the weaponization of the continuum of force and its lethal 
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consequences, like Hall-Kindervater’s (2017) work on “lethal surveillance” (i.e., Predator drones), I am 
more concerned with the ways the militarization and weaponization of the continuum force fosters life 
through non-lethal weapons.  In other words, the ways no-lethal weapons stabilize the non-lethal/lethal 
distinction of response options within the continuum of force that non-lethal weapons continue to expand.  
Any weapon deployed to ensure security that is conceived to not kill is promoted as fostering life.  Put 
simply, threat assessments function to perpetuate a technoscientific rationality of the use of force as part 
of the state’s project to discipline bodies and control space through new forms of militarized (non)lethal 
interventionary power in an effort to legitimize a range of weapons designed not to kill.  I argue that 
understanding non-lethal weapons through this technological rationality broadens the spatial relations of 
non-lethal state intervention in contested space. 
The underlying growth of non-lethal weapons in the continuum of force is dependent upon the 
growing assumption that state security apparatuses must fill a capability gap between “shouting and 
shooting” to address threats (LeVine & Rutigliano 2015, p. 242). Therefore, non-lethal weapons are 
designed and operated to fill conceived capability gaps.  Treating the violence(s) experienced between 
shouting and shooting as filling gaps becomes an apolitical and technocratic exercise that renders the vast 
array of injurious and deadly weaponry employed as legitimate.  Legitimacy of the continuum of force is 
wielded to erect a formidable system of violence evaluated as objective, creating standards against which 
all forms of threats are constituted thus determining what action to take.  Non-lethal weapons are 
stabilized in the continuum of force as force multipliers with “greater operational range, scalable to a 
variety of needs, to provide a defense against potential threats” (DoD 2013, p. 5).  It is without doubt that 
non-lethal weapons add a diverse arsenal that has expanded the degrees/stages and range of the 
continuum of force.  More importantly though, non-lethal weapons have increased both the legitimacy 
and violence of the continuum of force that is exercised against bodies in contested space by evoking the 
non-lethal/lethal distinction.  As such, non-lethal weapons are used to legitimize state power and violence 
by fostering life of the individual being disciplined rather than taking it.  The stabilization of non-lethal 
weapons in the continuum of force has created new forms of (non)lethal interventionary power.  Perhaps, 
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more insidious though, are the ways (non)lethal interventionary power is militarized, discursively and 
materially, that sustains and necessitates geographic imaginations of threat at multiple scales.       
Novel forms of militarized (non)lethal interventionary power perpetuate uneven geographies of 
violence in contested space.  The violence and harms of non-lethal state intervention are not experienced 
evenly, as the spatial relations in contested space are dynamic and unpredictable and the embodied effects 
of non-lethal weapons are incredibly diverse and often unknown.  My analysis suggests that 
technoscientific calculations of threat assessment in determining the justification of violent intervention in 
contested space constitute the spatial tactics and practices of containment and distance.  Once identified 
as a threat and rendered a security risk, bodies and spaces are amenable to violent intervention to contain 
mobility and the seizure of contested space through space-taking politics.  Non-lethal weapons are vital to 
these spatial tactics and practices of dislocating bodies and securing space.    
The spatial practices of containment and distance are fundamentally employed to control and 
order space, people, and their movement as space-taking politics (re)produce contested space (Martin and 
Mitchelson 2009).  Bearing in mind that the spatial practices of containment and distance occur in 
everyday practice in mundane ways (e.g. traffic barriers), containment and distancing in contested space 
is purposefully coercive and violent shaping spatial arrangements in favor of state power and violence.  
To contain the conceived threats of space-taking politics the state and security apparatuses demarcate, 
border, and attempt to isolate contested space from the outside world.  Isolation is intended to limit the 
visibility of both the acts of space-taking politics and the interventionary practices of the state.  
Significantly, controlling the frames of visibility affords an opportunity to draw homogenized 
representations of participants, who are hidden from view, as collective threats to social and spatial order.  
Containment and distance are distinct and temporal logics and spatial practices that fundamentally 
attempt to fix space and identities in the technoscientific calculus of threat assessment.  Even with the 
advent and strategic use of communication technologies, like cell phones, to increase the visibility of 
space-taking politics and state intervention the deployment of non-lethal weapons often make visible 
benevolent non-lethal actions conceived to be minimizing injuries and preventing death.  Overall, a 
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technoscientific governmentality emerges that shapes, and is shaped by, state interventionary power 
relations within contested space. 
  The first wave of containment in state intervention in contested space involves demarcating and 
bordering space using security barricades, like fencing or security personal lines known as ‘echelons’.  
Often borders are established around contested space with significant distance from the site of space-
taking politics.  Maintaining distance allows security forces to construct the basis of their legitimacy as 
“keeping the peace”, but also serves to ensure that non-lethal weapons deployed are within appropriate 
range to enforce compliance while minimizing significant injuries.  Contrary to popular beliefs, 
participants in space-taking politics are rarely “completely surrounded”.  Echelons are often organized to 
ensure “escape routes” as the primary goal of initial practices of containment is to project force and to 
intimidate participants to disperse, through visual and auditory coercion.  A significant number of field 
manuals and research on crowd control management denote these forms of intimidation as “passive” or 
“preventative” (see Archer 1994; Bonn & Barker 2000; Kenny et al. 2001).  However, a geographic 
approach understands that containment is never passive.  Containment of contested space acts as a series 
of practices and processes that operate through continuous spatial re-arrangements of coercive power, 
threat assessment, and violence.    
Once a specific threshold of threat is transgressed in the threat assessment calculus (often 
unknown and undefined), higher levels of the continuum of force are operationalized by state forces to 
secure contested space and dislocate bodies.  As this occurs, the spatial practices of containment and 
distance activate a range of indiscriminate (violent) practices that become important and productive to 
securing contested space and legitimizing the state’s exercise of violence and power.  Deployment of 
medium (15 to 30 meters) to long range (50 to 100 meters) tear gas grenades, flash-bang mortars, and 
blunt-impact munitions (bean bags and/or rubber bullets) accompany the spatial tactic of ‘kettling’—a 
method of corralling into more confined spaces.  Tactical echelon units rapidly close escape routes and 
begin to minimize the distance between the front line and space-taking politics participants further 
containing space-taking politics and limiting its visibility.  Crowd control tactical shields protect the front 
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echelon from projectiles and or participants themselves.  As the tactic of kettling continues and distance 
collapses, participants are subjected to short range (5-7 meters) and contact distance (0-2 meters) non-
lethal weapons, like batons, shields, individual pepper spray, and conducted energy weapons.  As kettling 
further restricts and contains space-taking politics in contested space, the distance that once separated 
security forces from space-taking politics participants is reversed as echelons start to capture contested 
space. 
The operational parameters of non-lethal weapons have become essential to the spatial practices 
of containment and distance in rearranging contested space and reifying the legitimacy state power and 
violence.  Non-lethal weapons are deployed by the state to discipline bodies and order contested space 
through conceived objective and neutral calculus of threat assessment.  Moreover, technoscientific frames 
of non-lethal weapons emphasize technical-tactical biases that reaffirm non-lethal state intervention as 
benevolent, acceptable, and ultimately legitimate.  Non-lethal weapons are recognized as technical 
solutions to indeterminable political problems in contested space and in the process, depoliticize the 
violence of their deployment.  In practices of security, a technoscientific governance assists in working 
through the ways that non-lethal weapons produce certain forms of power and security that (re)shape state 
interventionary power and political subjectivity.  Dominant understandings of technoscientific framings 
of non-lethal weapons become a means through which state sanctioned violence is extended and accepted.  
As technoscientific logics and practices increasingly underpin threat assessments, the spatial 
consequences of technical-tactical biases produce uneven geographies of violence in contested space.  
The increasing acceptability non-lethal state interventions has allowed for a conceptually swollen 
continuum of force causing use of force option gaps and a growing number of non-lethal weapons 
designed to fill these conceived capability caps.   
Of course, the spatial tactics and practices of containment and distance do not operate in isolation, 
but rather are embedded in the broader, systemic militarization of society and blurring of policing and 
warfare, state and war machine, and the civilian and military.  Technoscientific frames serve to separate 
non-lethal weapons and non-lethal state intervention in contested space from these broader socio-political 
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processes and practices.  Non-lethal state interventions are increasingly stabilized within hegemonic 
visions of scientific objectivity and neutrality viewed as optimal asocial, apolitical, and spatial orderings 
of contested space.  The increasing integration of technoscience and security governance (re)define our 
political and social futures through security hegemony and omnipresence and significantly shapes spatial 
relations in everyday life.  Overall, in my analysis two considerations become crucial when thinking 
through use of force in non-lethal state interventions: a belief that a continuum of force, as an operational 
techno-administrative proficiency, depoliticizes questions of legitimacy in exercises of the use of force 
and violence, and a belief in the conceived logics and practices of a militarized (non-)lethal 
interventionary power that corrects problematic social and spatial orders.     
Political/Ideological Framing of Non-Lethal Weapons   
The purpose of this section is to identify and explain the consequences of political/ideological 
framing of non-lethal weapons.  Official discourses, wider political discourses, and alternative political 
discourses employ humanitarian logics reconfigured through militarized/securitized lenses to legitimate 
and facilitate violence of non-lethal interventions, although with variation.  The preservation of 
legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence are discursively co-produced as security and 
policy experts and expertise advance a more ethical and humane way to wage violence with non-lethal 
weapons in the social and spatial ordering of everyday life.  My analysis indicates four primary findings 
that show how political/ideological framings of non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing 
contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and 
violence. These findings are as follows:  
1) As global security governance and humanitarianism develops co-constitutively over place and 
time. A securitized humanitarianism facilities actions to extend state sanctioned violence in the 
(re)production of place and space through humanitarian ideals of non-lethal intervention and 
order-enforcement. 
2) Political/ideological master frames of non-lethal weapons serve to conceal their violent 
implications through benevolent discursive structures guided by humanitarian ideals of non-lethal 
intervention.  
3) Political/ideological master frames of non-lethal weapons perpetuate fearful imaginative 
geographies of “insecure”, “disordered” and “ungoverned” bodies and spaces.  
4) Through political/ideological framing, alternative political discourses contest the emergence and 
stabilization of the deployment of non-lethal weapons in the use of force against civilians by 
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interrogating the philosophical abstraction of the principles of morality and ethical appraisals in 
non-lethal state intervention.  
 
Political/ideological framings emerge from the ambiguous and amorphous ethical and moral 
dimensions of state power in a calculus of (non-)lethal distinction that foregrounds the state’s 
responsibility to provide order while quelling legitimate concerns about the state’s tenuous monopoly of 
violence.  I argue that official discourses and wider political discourses use the sensibility and conceived 
morality of non-lethality in use of force options bound to a growing global humanitarianism in security 
logics.  As a result, discourses depoliticize non-lethal weapons in a way that makes it difficult to criticize 
or confront as the other position in the (false) binary of the (non-)lethal distinction are lethal options.  In 
other words, the perceived reduction of the acceptability of lethality and injury in the deployment of non-
lethal weapons legitimizes the state’s expanding use of force options in the growing global police-
military-network.  My analysis shows that non-lethal weapons continue the long tradition in security and 
policing bodies and spaces whereby the state aggressively pursues forms of moral and social order 
through disciplinary exercises of state power and violence (Foucault 1974a, 1997, 1991, 1994).     
The political/ideological master framing of non-lethal weapons deployment in non-lethal state 
intervention emerges from an expanded understanding of humanitarianism as a logic of governance that 
supports the (non-)lethal distinction.  A full examination of humanitarianism is outside the purview of this 
project (see Barnett 2011; Fassin 2012), but the spatial dimensions of humanitarianism and security are 
increasingly thought through together in geography (Gregory 2010; Bryon 2015).  While humanitarianism 
is typically thought to be apolitical as it is constituted through the principles and practices of ‘neutrality’, 
‘impartiality’, ‘humanity’, and ‘independence’, in reality, these principles and practices are far from 
apolitical (McCormack and Gilbert 2018).  It is common to conceptualize humanitarianism as sitting in 
opposition to security.  However, under greater scrutiny security and humanitarianism share many of the 
same logics and practices (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, 2018).  Humanitarianism has developed into pervasive 
and contentious global ideology, and as such, has come to constitute a dominant and productive framing 
for the transformation of security policy and practice across the world (Hyndman 2000; McCormack and 
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Gilbert 2018).  As such, the intense entanglement of humanitarianism and security is significant to 
understanding how non-lethal weapons are stabilized in the global police-military-network.    
My concern is not to (re)evaluate humanitarianism in all its complexities but rather to analyze the 
ways humanitarian ideals and discourses underpin political/ideological framing of (non-)lethality in 
security related to non-lethal weapons.  Political/ideological frames of non-lethal weapons draw on 
conceived ‘benign’ forms of power embedded in humanitarianism.  These humanitarian ideals of non-
lethal intervention serve to order morality and ethics of violence and mitigate against imagined 
geographies of “insecure”, “disordered” and “ungoverned” spaces and bodies.  My analysis indicates that 
political/ideological frames of non-lethal intervention depoliticize the contestation of non-lethal weapons 
through the ways humanitarian ideals, materialized through non-lethal weapons, are understood as setting 
limits on state violence and securing disordered and ungoverned bodies and spaces.  The evolving 
entanglement of humanitarianism and securitization facilitates a legitimization and naturalization of non-
lethal violence that orders spaces and bodies.       
Humanitarian Ideals of Non-Lethal State Intervention and Non-Lethal Weapons 
In this section, I argue that non-lethal weapons deployment in contested space emerges from the 
contradictory demands of securitized humanitarian ideals in non-lethal state intervention.  The demands 
of humanitarian ideals, materialized through non-lethal weaponry, extend the range of state violence and 
contribute to the ordering of contested space through the normalization and instrumentalization of 
humanitarian ideals in exercises of state power (Calhoun 2008).  On the one hand, normative or value 
laden humanitarian logics, are concerned with the undertaking of making life and determining the limits 
of violence.  As such, non-lethal weapons are designed and employed to ensure that the calibration of 
force mitigates the potential lethality of state exercises of violence.  On the other hand, the 
instrumentalization of humanitarianism serves to discipline spaces and bodies in contested space through 
various conceived ‘benign’ forms of power and violence.  As such, the usefulness of non-lethal weapons 
in enforcing order in contested space is determined by their capacity to enact a controlled violence 
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limiting ‘excessive’ violence.  Significantly, in defining and limiting excessive violence, all other forms 
of violence become legitimate (Bourke 2014).     
Limiting violence and preventing undue suffering are two foundational ideals within the complex 
genealogy of humanitarianism.  The normalization of humanitarian ideals determines and defines what 
the best possible violence, or “optimal violence”, in non-lethal state intervention is and the 
instrumentalization of humanitarian ideals operationalizes optimal violence to enforce order (Doel 2017, 
p. 19).  As Doel (2017) states, “Optimal violence – optimized violence – is efficient and effective 
violence.  It can be modulated and leveraged over time and space in a measured response to the ups and 
downs of the situation as it unfolds” (p. 19).  This process of the pursuing of ethical clarity of optimal 
violence and calculating its efficacy is materialized in non-lethal weapons.  In other words, non-lethal 
weapons are perfectly adapted to the logics of optimal violence.  Therefore, in my analysis of source 
materials, I determine that humanitarian ideals of non-lethal state intervention become consequential to 
the geographies of non-lethal weapons in two significant ways:   
1) As grounds for legitimacy, humanitarian ideals evoked in official and wider political discourses 
of non-lethal state intervention normalize violence against civilians as the spatial dimensions of a 
securitized humanitarianism co-opt moral invocations and ethical determinations of ordering and 
securing bodies and contested spaces.  As such, non-lethal weapons sustain a “humane” and 
“ethical” sensibility stabilized by the global police-military-network that masks the intimate 
relations of optimal violence and power underpinning state intervention policy and practice.  
2) Humanitarian ideals of non-lethal state intervention that emerge from master political/ideological 
framings of non-lethal weapons limit the responses of counter political/ideological framings to 
critique and challenge non-lethal weapon policy and practice by taking the so-called “moral high 
ground”.    
 
Fundamentally, humanitarian ideals confront the state’s primary tenet of sovereignty—the right to 
kill—in the most immediate ways reframing how life and death are regulated by the state.  
Correspondingly, the normalization of humanitarian logics concerns the valuation of life which 
essentially shifts the state’s ability to make life and death (Weizman 2012).  I argue that the normalization 
of humanitarian ideals in non-lethal state intervention relies on the state’s capacity to exercise its tenuous 
monopoly of violence delineating the modes and scales of optimal forms of violence.  In doing so, the 
state gets to define what (optimal) ‘legitimate’ and (excessive) ‘illegitimate’ forms of violence look like 
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and involve.  This process has significant implications for states’ agency in controlling when, where, and 
how to use violence in contested space.  Thus, the normalization of humanitarian ideals in non-lethal state 
intervention “allows the optimal quantity and quality of violence to be continually applied to sustain the 
desired objective indefinitely”—and this objective is securing contested spaces and disciplining bodies 
(Doel 2017, p. 19).     
Determining the optimal quality of violence places moral principles and ethical appraisals of the 
worth of human life at the center of non-lethal state intervention.  This process complicates analysis and 
discussion of non-lethal intervention as morals and ethics beget philosophical abstraction; whose morals 
and ethics and who gets to decide how these morals and ethics are understood and applied?  For example, 
in official discourses and wider political discourses these questions are often considered through evoking 
the “moral high ground”;  
“the United States can now announce and demonstrate to the world a new national policy of 
Nonlethality. [...] By doing so, we can take the moral high ground internationally and manage 
global change so that our far flung interests are protected” (Morris 2009, p. 2, emphasis added).  
 
“Moreover, they [non-lethal weapons] are essential to maintaining the moral high ground in an 
otherwise chaotic and strife-ridden world” (Herbert 1999, p. 88, emphasis added)    
 
“Winning in this environment is about seizing and holding the moral high ground” (Kenny et. at. 
2001, p. 31, emphasis added).  
 
However, what or where is the moral high ground? How and by whom is it determined? Once 
there (if it is a place) what does it mean? I cannot answer these questions and I do not believe anyone can, 
but critically thinking about these questions I acknowledge the ways the state abstracts their capacity to 
define and exercise optimal violence.  Invocations of moral discourses functions to stabilize non-lethality 
in security whereby ethical and humane ways to wage violence through non-lethal weapons become 
depoliticized and consequently justifiable and acceptable.   
To further unpack the normalization of humanitarian ideals in non-lethal state interventions, it is 
worth revisiting the conventional definition of non-lethal weapons.  As stated in Chapter 1, non-lethal 
weapons are a class of weapons, devices, and munitions explicitly designed and intended to incapacitate 
targeted persons or materials without death or permanent injury/significant and/or to disable equipment 
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with minimal damage to the surrounding environment (Davidson 2009; DoD 2013, emphasis added).  The 
definition highlights the intent of non-lethal weapons’ design and deployment over their effects.  The 
intentionality of violence is modulated through the convergence of security/military and humanitarian 
ideals whereby non-lethal weapons both embody and enact optimal violence.  This allows 
political/ideological master frames to argue that non-lethal weapons are necessary to “save lives”, a 
refrain repeatedly used in official and wider political discourses, because without non-lethal weapons in 
the use of force continuum the chances of death increases.  Whether this is true or not is difficult to prove 
with limitations to current non-lethal weapons and use of force research.  The actual violence of non-
lethal weapons (optimally determined) and the effects of that violence are hidden by conceived 
benevolence of humanitarian ideals within political/ideological master frames.  Overall, 
political/ideological master frames construct regimes of truth that frame non-lethal weapons and their 
destructive potentialities as morally justified and ethically acceptable because within the conceived binary 
of the (non-)lethal distinction the only other options are lethal weapons.  However, as alternative 
political/ideological frames point out that is not entirely true; “Far from, ‘restraining the application of 
means capable of causing death or injury to persons’, certain items of equipment are inherently more 
injurious than others and increase, not decrease, the risk of injury” (Amnesty International 2015).    
  Challenging the normalization of humanitarian ideals in non-lethal state intervention is one of the 
most effective ways alternative political discourses contest the hegemony of political/ideological master 
frames.  They expose that while humanitarian concerns for life enters the realm of philosophical 
abstraction, it is made concrete through the calibration, determination, and (uneven) practices of securing 
life and space through optimal violence.  Accordingly, alternative political discourses point out that while 
humanitarian ideals set limits on state power and violence, they simultaneously solidify state control and 
power in making/taking life prioritizing security and order.  This securitized co-optation of humanitarian 
logics is operationalized in the instrumentalization of humanitarian ideals whereby the valuation of life 
targets the body as an object that can be observed, measured, and acted upon violently as well as 
recognizes space as in need of a securitized order.  The restoration of order becomes the primary way in 
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which the instrumentalization of humanitarian ideals serves to manage and discipline spaces and bodies in 
contested space.   
The instrumentalization of humanitarian ideals operationalizes optimal violence to enforce order 
that aims to mitigate fearful and imaginative geographies of “insecure”, “disordered”, and “ungoverned” 
bodies and spaces (Gregory 2004; Mitchell 2010; McCormack 2018).  These imaginative geographies—
in the guise of popular security axioms—promote new forms of governmentality (technoscientific and 
humanitarian) and enact optimized forms of violence to take on the challenge of producing order.  To 
clarify, “producing order” is by no means banal, but is deeply entrenched in the unremitting production of 
violence in everyday life that works to distinguish between “lives worth living and lives unworthy of life” 
(Tyner 2012, p. 36).  Also, the practice of producing order in this context works to perpetuate space as 
void and/or simply a backdrop not an active medium through which social and spatial relations are 
(re)produced and transformed (Lefebvre 1991).       
Expressly, securitized co-optation of humanitarian ideals transforms how optimal violence is 
enacted towards morally excluded bodies and in spaces conceived of as devoid of moral deference.  The 
instrumentalization of humanitarian ideals orders morality and guards against insecurity structured by and 
through a normalized optimal violence of non-lethal state intervention.  As a result, optimal state violence 
is difficult to delegitimize as meaningless and excessive; “State violence is being increasingly (popularly) 
approved of and institutionalized as a way of getting things done, or even as a way of bringing about 
justice” (Hornberger 2011, p. 178). Political/ideological master frames sustain non-lethal weapons at the 
center of this analysis.  As grounds for legitimacy, securitized humanitarian ideals co-opt moral 
invocations and ethical determinations of ordering and securing bodies and contested space that is 
stabilized in official and wider political discourses of non-lethal state intervention.  This practice 
normalizes and operationalizes optimal violence against bodies in contested space.  As such, non-lethal 
weapons sustain a “humane” and “ethical” responsiveness stabilized by the global police-military-
network.  This essentially masks the intimate relations of optimal violence and power underpinning state 
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intervention policy and practice.  A brief analysis of conducted energy devices/weapons (CEDs) will shed 
light on how humanitarian ideals in non-lethal intervention are materialized through non-lethal weapons.   
CEDs, colloquially known as “TASERs” (manufactured by Axon formally TASER International), 
exemplify how intimate relations of optimal violence and power underpinning state intervention policy 
and practice are obscured within political/ideological master frames.  CEDs have become one of the most 
visible non-lethal weapons in the U.S. and abroad.  Within the U.S. alone, over 10,000 law-enforcement 
agencies have purchased TASERs and deploy them as integral capabilities in their use of force options in 
some capacity (White & Ready 2009).  According to Axon, TASERs have been deployed in the field 
across the world 4,014,119 times with 99.75% of those deployments resulting in “no serious injury” 
claiming 216,762 “lives saved” (Axon 2019).  The precision of these staggering claims is bolstered by a 
range of studies that “place the effectiveness rate of the TASER somewhere between 80% and 94%” 
(White & Ready 2009, p. 870).  Effectiveness is defined in terms of intended physiological effect ending 
subject’s resistance and the capacity to reduce the chances for injuries to subjects as well as the enforcers.  
While these numbers are reminiscent of my discussion of technical-tactical bias above and should be 
viewed with the deepest of suspicion, CEDs are sustained in official and wider political discourses as 
essential to “protecting” and “saving lives”.  In fact, Axon’s motto for their law enforcement products and 
training is “We believe protecting life without taking life is a future within our grasp” (Axon 2019). 
Official, wider, and even alternative political discourses continue to legitimize the deployment of 
CEDs in the use of force options as alternatives to lethal firearms and thus “represents a reasonable 
medical alternative to physical force (National Institute of Justice 2011), and could even save lives under 
certain circumstances” (Sousa et al. 2010).  Importantly, I do not dismiss the research that indicates the 
“relative safety” of CEDs considering that TASERs have been deployed more than two million times in 
the U.S. alone (White & Ready 2007, 2010).   However, I am concerned with the ways expertise of CEDs 
is highly limited and does not address greater embodied effects of CEDs particularly related to brain 
injury (see Kane & White 2016).  I am even more concerned with the ways political/ideological frames 
are used to depoliticize discussions and debates of CEDs by perpetuating humanitarian ideals of their 
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deployment.  To argue against their use is often viewed as arguing in favor of operationalizing the next 
often lethal stages in the continuum of force.  CEDs are part of a complex and amorphous continuum of 
force and are often used in conjunction with other force options that ultimately can result in significant 
injury and death.   
Regardless of the perceived “safety” of CEDs, upwards of 50,000-volts and 2.1mA currents of 
electricity is generated to incapacitate volitional control of one’s body and creates short-term cognitive 
impairment such as “substantial reduction in auditory recall and abilities to assimilate new information 
through auditory processes” (Kane & White 2016, p. 79).  The more political/ideological frames sustain 
CEDs and their conceived capacity to “save lives” the more entrenched in moral frameworks and ethical 
assessments they become limiting discussion and debate about the value of life; “The very idea of saving 
lives, for example, is dependent on counting lives” (Calhoun 2008, p. 82).  Lives saved discourses as a 
significant part of humanitarian ideals are dependent on rendering diverse lived experiences, relations, 
and bodies amenable to injury (and death).  How many lives does it take for CEDs to be considered 
lethal?  How many significant injuries does it take for lives to no longer be saved?  I do not have the 
answers to these questions but they are worth asking even if political/ideological frames make it difficult 
to do so.    
My research contends that there is significant infrastructure within the global police-military-
network that supports a securitized humanitarianism that reconfigures spatial and social ordering by 
working to delimit and moderate violence in contested space.  This securitized co-optation of 
humanitarian logics and ideals allows for the justification of intervention and violence reframed as non-
lethal that “entails a paradox as it necessarily undermines what it ostensibly asserts” (Zehfuss 2012, p. 
874).  Throughout source materials, the tension of this paradox and the contradictory demands of non-
lethal weapons is a critical intersection of analytical inquiry.  Building on this point, I argue that a 
securitized humanitarianism governs life through relations of (non-)lethality in contested space but also 
claims legitimacy to support the life of the state itself.  Overall, non-lethal weapons are co-constitutive of 
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both the normalization and instrumentalization of humanitarian ideals in non-lethal state intervention that 
seek order through optimal violence.   
Order-Enforcement: Spatializing Political/Ideological Frames of Non-Lethal Weapons  
In this section, I examine the spatial effects and symbolic consequences of political/ideological 
frames of non-lethal weapons detailed above.  I argue that the (potential) violent implications of non-
lethal weapons are bound to a conceived rational commitment to enforcing order in the (re)production of 
space and society.  To accomplish this, I advance the concept of order-enforcement.  Order-enforcement 
is understood as a determined logic of coercion that aims to define the limits of security governance in 
contested space exploiting the (non-)lethal distinction and a spatial practice in exercising optimal violence 
to enforce order.  Specifically, order enforcement works to quell and remove ‘disorderly’ and ‘deviant’ 
bodies and secure space based on the state’s desired order whether it is economic, social, political, and 
spatial.  The spatial arrangements determined by and through order-enforcement have significant 
consequences in relation to space-taking politics and non-lethal state intervention.   
I contend that order-enforcement supports a growing rationality in which space is organized and 
bodies are disciplined through an optimized non-lethal violence materialized through non-lethal weapons.  
Drawing on my source materials, I propose that order-enforcement in contested space is characterized by 
three defining commitments (See table 5.3): 1) to link space-taking politics to geographically bounded 
“insecure”, “disordered”, and “ungoverned” space in need of stronger state intervention; 2) to disrupt and 
disperse crowds from contested space to make them more legible and therefore more governable; and 3) 
to preserve ordered space with increased invocation and implementation of security and surveillance to 
mitigate re-seizure of contested space.  
Table 5.3 
Commitment Characteristics Practices 
To link space-taking politics to 
geographically bounded 
“insecure”, “disordered”, and 
“ungoverned” space in need of 
stronger state intervention. 
Marginalization 
Exclusion 
“Us” versus “Them” 
 
Spatial politics of fear  
Invoke “the Other” 
 
To disrupt and disperse crowds 
from contested space to make 
Invoke crowds and crowded places 
Disruption  
Tear gas 
Non-lethal munitions  
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Non-Lethal markers (paint 
munitions)  
To preserve ordered space with 
increased invocation and 
implementation of security and 
surveillance to mitigate re-
seizure of contested space. 
Surveillance  
Borders/(B)ordering  




Increase security forces 
presence 
 
For the state to link space-taking politics to geographically bounded insecure, disordered, and 
ungoverned space in need of stronger state intervention, the state pathologizes space-taking politics. As 
space-taking politics intends to re-order, disrupt, and re-signify contested space challenging hegemonic 
norms and dominant systems of authority, the state’s response aims to delegitimize their practice(s).  The 
multiple ways the state pathologizes space-taking politics as threat to social, political, and spatial order is 
constitutive of a mix of social fear, moral conviction, and repressive threat association.  These (micro-) 
geopolitical narratives assist in generating notions of fear and insecurity in perceived ungoverned space 
enacted among “deviant” bodies who occupy such space.  The state’s capacity to stimulate fear through 
dominant control and manipulation of social and political discourse muddles sensible debate and polarizes 
space-taking politics.  Additionally, fear exercised in contested space delimits ‘safe’ space and marks 
bodies that ‘belong’ from those that do not: 
“fear is a term that is controlled via processes of legitimisation, exclusion and prescribed 
interpretation.  It is a word which in wider political terms is licensed to those whose fears are 
‘legitimised’ by dominant political and media structures.  At the same time, it is denied to those 
in the ranks of ‘deviant’ or ‘transgressive’ (Shirlow & Pain 2003, p. 15). 
 
The repressive and productive force of this calculus of biopower, a disciplining of bodies and 
regulation of population, informs a powerful “us” versus “them” dynamic (Foucault 2003).  Like 
conventional understandings of geographies of exclusion “informed by the generalized other”, practices 
of exclusion exercised to dissuade and render space-taking politics ineffectual in contested space relies on 
the fear-conditioned tropes of insecurity and disorder (Silbey 2002, p. 11).  In other words, it constitutes a 
spatial politics of fear.  Throughout contested space fear is politically constructed and spatially constituted 
to reinforce divisions between individuals, communities, and most importantly between the hegemonic 
power of the state and its political subjects.  To reduce fear and secure contested space, the state pursues 
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interventionary strategies and practices whereby the state can test the thresholds of accountability, 
acceptability, and legitimacy of optimal violence(s).  This politics of fear literally maps power relations 
informed by the state’s desire for order and its capacity to exercise violence to ensure it.  Moreover, 
actions taken to assuage imaginative geographies of fear are integral for understanding how violence is 
normalized and legitimized.     
This state project marks the emergence of more nefarious processes of spatial control whereby 
order and security are satisfied through the normalization of fear and exclusion in contested space.  This 
requires framing bodies as deviant and contested space as insecure, disordered, and ungoverned.  As the 
state attempts to reconcile these challenges, social and spatial order is enforced by disciplining and 
controlling disordered bodies and contested space.  Significantly, order-enforcement requires a substantial 
balancing act so that the fear constituted by state intervention and violence is less than the politics of fear 
ascribed to space-taking politics.  It is important to point out that fear and exclusion in relation to space-
taking politics in contested space is constructed in ways tempered by the (non)lethal distinction as 
significant injury and death do not serve the state’s political interests (in most cases).  Fear and exclusion 
in contested space makes stronger demands for state intervention which I argue facilitates non-lethal 
weapons stabilization within global police-military-network policy frameworks that shape state 
interventionary power in security and contested spaces.  
I assert that the state’s commitment to link space-taking politics to geographically bounded 
insecure, disordered, and ungoverned space is an inextricable linking of optimal state violence to the 
project of order-enforcement.  Space-taking politics is a challenge to hegemonic control of space.  It 
offers opportunities to alter contentious politics and space in innovative and imaginative ways through 
social and spatial interaction.  Yet, the relations and interactions within space-taking politics has 
transformed as the proliferation of non-lethal intervention in contested spaces attempt to govern the 
unknowable and unpredictable to enforce order by disrupting and dispersing participants of space-taking 
politics.  Non-lethal weapons are central to this practice as will be discussed below.  Order-enforcement 
becomes a means by which the state normalizes its claim of legitimacy to intervene in contested space 
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and maintain security and stability.  Put simply, spatial arrangements and patterns of a politics of fear and 
exclusion plays a central role in the state’s practice of linking space-taking politics to ungoverned and 
insecure space.   
The second defining commitment of order-enforcement is to disrupt and disperse ‘crowds’ from 
contested space to make them more legible and therefore more governable.  Space-taking politics in 
contested space exemplifies the putative anxiety of security governance: disorder, unpredictability, and 
the “revolutionary potential of crowds” (Correia & Wall 2018).  Therefore, the state exercises non-lethal 
intervention to disrupt and dislocate crowds from contested spaces.  By highlighting the significance of 
the discursive forces of “the crowd”, “crowd control” and “crowded spaces” and their material 
consequences with a brief examination of tear gas (CS gas, CR gas, CN gas, pepper spray, mace, etc.) 
below, I argue that the state normalizes these practices so that the use of non-lethal weapons has become 
banal and mundane practice in re-capturing and ordering contested space, except by those who experience 
them directly.   
Building on Aradau’s (2015) influential work on crowds and crowded spaces, I am concerned 
with how the state invokes “the crowd” in relation to space-taking politics as a discursive practice and 
spatial technique to make bodies more legible and contested space more governable.  Thinking through 
crowds in this way affords an opportunity to understand how the crowd and crowded spaces recalibrates 
security governance and legitimates non-lethal intervention in contested space as dominant discourses 
advance generic representations of crowds.  These generic representations invoke irrationality, fear, 
uncertainty, and violence as inherent to crowds and their behaviors.   
Regardless of the diversity of participants of space-taking politics—their subjectivities, desires, 
attitudes, and goals—they are rendered into a monolithic entity – “the crowd” – by both master and 
counter frames across source materials.  Controlling the crowd then becomes the primary goal of order-
enforcement.  Order-enforcement of crowds is colloquially known as “crowd-control” (or riot control), 
however this label is not sufficient to describe the actual practices enacted against crowds that have 
violent discursive and embodied consequences.  The discourses of crowd control work to aestheticize a 
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range of security practices from emergency planning to counter terrorism that perpetually identify bodies 
as threats and space as insecure.  This process facilitates a depoliticization of the technologies, (i.e., non-
weapon systems) that are consequently labeled “crowd/riot control capabilities” used to enforce crowd 
control (read as order), often violently.   
Throughout security discourse and practice, crowds are inherently imbued with violent 
potentiality regardless of context.  This view perpetuates common stereotypes such as: crowds are 
homogenous entities—all participants are the same; crowd participants are unanimous in motives; crowds 
assume a sense of anonymity and; crowds are distinguished by violence (Kenny et al. 2001).  Preserved 
by scholarship drawing on the work of Le Bon (1996 [1895]), Park (1930), and Blumer (1939) these 
stereotypes continue to proliferate in security discourses and practice (re)producing pathologizing 
imageries of irrationality and criminality.  For example, throughout source materials, calls to identify 
‘crowd type’ and the perpetuation of common crowd stereotypes reify dangerous interpretations and 
representations of space-taking politics (Kenny et al. 2001).  However, scholarship and research on 
crowds and crowded places across the social sciences have largely disproved these stereotypes (Kenny et 
al. 2001; Aradau 2015).  Reducing the socio-political and spatial complexity of crowds, “[...] has 
depoliticizing effects, as crowds are either tamed through preparedness exercises and spatio-temporal 
ordering, or they are subordinated to the status quo of existing social relations” (Aradau 2015, p. 157).  
Significantly, dominant discourses of the crowd serve to devalue space-taking politics and its intended 
social, political, and spatial impacts.  
Often space-taking politics aims to disrupt and challenge dominant authority and social norms, 
which is why the state works so hard to pathologize its processes and practices.  Invoking the crowd 
becomes another discursive means by which order-enforcement is operationalized to dislocate deviant 
bodies and secure contested space in the name of security.  Rather than conceptualizing crowds as a social 
process of spatial disorder as dominant discourses tend to do, I understand crowds as a spatial process of 
social order.  I do not intend to ignore the actual violence and destruction enacted by participants in 
crowds in thinking through crowds in this way (e.g., the England Riots of 2011).  I aim to critically 
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engage the diverse, dynamic, and open interpretations of crowds beyond violence inherently ascribed by 
dominant discourses.  A more nuanced approach to understanding crowds considers how dominant 
discourses of the crowd activate non-lethal state interventions in contested space legitimized by 
political/ideological frames of non-lethal weapons. 
The geographies of non-lethal weapons are integral to the order-enforcement of crowds and 
crowded spaces to disrupt space-taking politics and displace bodies from contested space.  I argue that 
non-lethal weapons provide the state and security mechanisms the capabilities to enforce and produce 
order under the pretenses of a well-supported benevolence of crowd control that hides the dynamics of 
optimal violence.  Controlling and dispersing crowds is one of the leading core capabilities embedded in 
current non-lethal weapon design and employment.  The most relevant and significant example of this 
practice is the co-production, design, and deployment of lachrymator agents (a.k.a. tear gas) in contested 
space.  Tear gas encompasses a range of chemical agents that are aerosolized solid compounds or 
evaporated liquid compounds (not actually gas) designed to irritate eyes, throat, noes, skin, and lungs with 
the intent to incapacitate and/or dislocate bodies from contested space.  Moreover, tear gas provides an 
apt example of order-enforcement through non-lethal optimized violence.   
Tear gas is one of the most well documented and understood examples of the blurring between 
policing/warfare and non-lethality/lethality and emerges from long-embattled historical trajectory of 
chemical weapons deploying extreme violence and death particularly in colonial pacification/subjugation 
and modern warfare (Feigenbaum 2017; de Larrinaga 2016).  Historically, after World War I (WWI), the 
use of chemical weapons was viewed as abhorrent (unless used against the colonial “Other”) and the 1925 
Geneva Gas Protocol and 1993 follow-up banned their use in warfare.  However, the convention permits 
the use of tear gas for “law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes” (Quoted in Correia & 
Wall 2018, loc. 407). In other words, chemical weapons are viewed as illegitimate for military purposes 
but as legitimate for policing and security to keep order domestically against crowds.  The use of tear gas 
to disrupt space-taking politics and incapacitate and dislocate bodies from contested space has become a 
“routine global phenomenon and the rationalities behind its deployment and use are considered as 
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indisputable” (de Larrinaga 2016, p. 524).  Tear gas has fundamentally changed the dynamics of policing 
contested bodies and space as it produces and enforces order by shifting frames of visibility.   
The spatial practices of containment and distance become essential to the deployment of tear gas 
as its effects are dependent upon the ventilation conditions of the built environment, exposure time, 
distance of point of origin, environmental conditions, etc., which impact the visibility of contested space 
and optimal violence practiced in ordering space and dislocating bodies.  On one hand, tear gas severely 
limits visibility from a distance.  From a distance tear gas envelops contested space in a shroud of opaque 
cloud like matter mitigating visibility of the practices transpiring in contested space, whether by space-
taking participants or security forces.  Often participants emerge covering their faces and coughing but 
appear to not be injured significantly or in pain.  On the other hand, direct proximity to tear gas limits 
visibility in an embodied way by irritating eyes making it difficult to see (among other things).  The 
embodied effects of tear gas are in fact quite painful, including severe burns and blistering of the skin at 
close range, and can lead to significant injury and in some cases death from both the pressurized grenade 
launches which act as blunt-force projectiles (blunt-force trauma) and the tear gas itself (pulmonary 
damage and permanent blinding).  So, while the deployment of tear gas appears to be humane and less 
lethal than alternatives in the continuum of force tear gas produces and enforces order through optimized 
violence. 
Overall, the state and security mechanisms invoke “the crowd” to connect unpredictability and 
uncertainty to order, violence to visibility, and non-lethal weapons to order-enforcement.  Throughout 
these processes states and security mechanisms build the legitimacy to intervene in contested space 
exercising non-lethal optimal violence materialized through the use of non-lethal weapons.  The end 
results of this commitment of order-enforcement generally results in the complete dispersal and 
dislocation of space-taking politics and the seizure of contested space by the state and security forces. 
The final commitment of order-enforcement is to preserve ordered space with increased 
invocation and implementation of security and surveillance to mitigate re-seizure of contested space.  
Drawing on the political geographies of surveillance (Klauswer 2013a), I argue that order-enforcement in 
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contested space is a driving force behind the current propagation and intensification of surveillance and 
monitoring of bodies and space that enhances their visibility and securitizes access.  To preserve order of 
once contested space, the state pursues practices intended to increase the visibility of bodies in space and 
securitize space employing a technoscientific omniscient and omnipresent practice of order-enforcement.  
As Staples (2014) argues, “We seem to be entering a state of permanent visibility where our bodies and 
out behaviors are being monitored, tracked, or watched continuously, anonymously, and systematically” 
(p. 5).  The systematic surveilling of bodies in space that has become routine in everyday life appropriates 
and produces space through techniques and practices of control and power (Klauswer 2013a).  As an 
omnipresence that orders a securitized “sense-making in the everyday”, surveillance has become 
normalized and legitimized across scales and space (Åhäll 2016, p. 155).   
One of the primary goals of surveillance is to make bodies and spaces more legible as legibility 
provides the capacity for micro and macro spatial practices of dominant social order determined by the 
state to be enforced (Scott 1998).  Over time the practices of surveillance have become vastly more 
sophisticated employing more complex practices of monitoring, counting, assessing, ordering, and 
disciplining.  Beyond the common representation of video surveillance, like closed-circuit television 
(CCTV cameras), the wide and sweeping practices of surveillance, including DNA databases, biometric 
recognition, body indexes, RFID chips, electronic ticket systems, GPS, and other so-called location 
technologies, proliferates at an unprecedented rate with vast uncertainty.  While generally considered to 
be a result or product of non-lethal state intervention, I conceptualize surveillance as part of the ongoing 
order-enforcement of contested space through non-lethal state intervention.  The spatial logics of 
surveillance serve order-enforcement in two key contradictory and co-dependent ways.   
First, surveillance reinforces the spatial practices of containment and exclusion by identifying 
bodies that are conceived as not to belong and restricting their access and dislocating them.  These spatial 
practices and logics essentially serve to fix bodies and space based on securitized conceptualizations of 
“us” versus “them” through control and filtering techniques (Bauman 1998, 2000).  This results in an 
uneven geography of access to space which always has the potential to evolve into contested space 
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through space-taking politics or other forms of spatial and social order disruption.  Perhaps even more 
nefarious are the spatially articulated forms of internalized (self-)exclusion and bordering as a way for 
surveilling logics to manage and order space that reify security logics of threat and insecurity (Klauswer 
2013b).  The spatial logics of surveillance in this sense are repressive in the ways bodies are ordered, 
extending the capabilities of the state to intervene in space to discipline conceived deviant bodies and 
secure space.   
Second, the spatial logics of surveillance promote greater mobilities and circulation flows 
although always ones moderated by forms of security governance.  This productive view of surveillance 
wrestles with how to secure space while also providing quick access and mobility for those bodies 
conceived to belong.  The demand for security and mobility increasingly bolsters surveillance and the 
legitimization of increased efforts to gather and analyze information by both individuals and the state.  
The interface of the increasingly repressive and productive spatial practices and logics of surveillance 
selects, encloses, and hierarchically manages and orders space (Klauswer 2013b).  Moreover, these 
processes of selection and differentiation produce uneven social and spatial orders in space while trying to 
anticipate threats, risks, and insecurities.    
Fundamentally, violence of the state is the violence of building and enforcing order.  Non-lethal 
interventions’ primary function is to restore order to the conceived disorderly scenes of contested space.  
The (re)production of space is a process that is “always in a constant state of flux between those who seek 
to deprive it and those who seek to expand it” (Springer 2015, p. 6).  As space-taking politics attempts to 
expand the (re)production of space through alternative means the state seeks to deprive it through 
securitized norms.  Non-lethal weapons produce order under the pretenses of justifiable order-
enforcement without appearing to cause significant injury or death and in doing so produces uneven 
social and spatial orders.  Non-lethal state interventions weaponize non-lethality to intimidate, to coerce, 
to discipline, to exact pain and suffering, and in some cases to kill.  The geographies of non-lethal state 
intervention encompass heterogeneous practices of order-enforcement that stabilize non-lethal weapons in 
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global police-military-network frameworks and changes the dynamics of policing contested spaces and 
bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence. 
Chapter Conclusion: (Re)Politicizing Non-Lethal Weapons 
This analysis shows the significant socio-political and spatial consequences of depoliticizing non-
lethal weapons and non-lethal state interventions.  Analyzing the spatial practices, emergent forms of state 
power and violence, and discourses of (non)lethality and security within non-lethal state interventions 
opens new directions for the study of the geographies of non-lethal weapons.  To re-politicize non-lethal 
weapons, it is essential to understand the embeddedness of technical-tactical biases in technoscientific 
expertise and the entrenched nature of political/ideological framing of non-lethal weapons as thoroughly 
political and spatial.  The discursive structures perpetuated by technoscientific and political/ideological 
frames of non-lethal weapons illustrate that the complex co-production of security, technoscience, and 
(non)lethality is vast, multiple, competing, and often contradictory while the ‘security realities’ they 
produce are actually quite stable.  Significantly, these security realities are embodied as the optimal 
violence determined is enacted on the actual bodies whose bones can break, skin can tear, and whose 
blood can be spilled.   
    Uneven geographies of power and violence lie at the intersection of security, (non-)lethality, and 
technoscience as evidenced in the knowledge co-production and deployment of non-lethal weapons in 
contested space.  The ways non-lethal weapons are conceived in security through technoscientific and 
political/ideological master and counter-frames is inseparable in how they are enacted in practice and 
embodied in everyday life, the contingency and indeterminacy of which directly relates to understanding 
diverse life-chances and unequal access to and in contested space.  Non-lethality in security prioritizes the 
state’s tenet of sovereignty to make of life in lieu of its primary tenant of taking life but does so unevenly 
and often violently.  This analysis of the dynamics of technoscientific and political/ideological framing 
and counter-framing of non-lethal weapons is a useful means for understanding how modern state security 
frameworks are imbued with legitimacy and accountability to intervene in contested space, often with 




My analysis focuses on technoscientific and political/ideological frames of non-lethal and their 
spatial representations, materialities, and consequences to illuminate the conceptual and material 
intersections between the geopolitical and the intimate, state power and space-taking politics, and state 
violence and everyday life.  Whether it was the pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong, Moscow, 
and Khartoum, or the anti-capitalist Yellow Vest protests across France, the study of the geographies of 
non-lethal weapons advances the ways we understand policing bodies and spaces that produce uneven 
spatial and social relations.  Investigating the complex co-production of (non-)lethality, security, and 
technoscience informs spatial understandings of how these relations are disputed, negotiated, and 
reworked by promoting more nuanced methods of understanding political violence and spatial relations in 






























This chapter grounds my analysis from Chapter 5 with an empirical case study in Bangkok, 
Thailand.  In Bangkok, the legitimization of non-lethal weapons in security governance stabilizes the false 
binary logic of the (non-)lethal distinction.  The current Thai military junta has successfully manipulated 
this false binary logic to exercise violence to quell political and social dissent in the name of order and 
security.  I explore the ways the Thai security apparatus perpetuate ethical assessments and technological 
assumptions about non-lethal weaponry stabilizing moral discourses and technical frameworks.  These 
discourses and frameworks are generally conceived as unquestionable and unchallengeable by wider and 
alternative political discourses in order to depoliticize discussion and debate of non-lethal weapons 
deployment in contested space.  I prioritize data from official policy documents and legislation and 
fieldwork (i.e., observation) to investigate the ways the Thai security apparatus stabilize technoscientific 
and ideological discourses of non-lethal intervention in the exercise of optimal violence and order-
enforcement across Bangkok.   
I believe that Bangkok serves as an ideal case study to examine non-lethal weapons and state 
interventionary power in contested space.  The normalization and exercise of (non-)lethal intervention 
policy and practice in contested space in Bangkok is ongoing and indicative of current contentious space-
taking politics across the globe.  Bangkok offers a means of investigating the complexities and spatial 
imaginaries that inform technoscientific and political/ideological frames of non-lethal weapons that are 
assembled to legitimize and normalize optimal violence in contested space.  I maintain that the ways the 
Thai security apparatus understand and operationalize (non-)lethality, technoscience, and security 
constitute a technoscientific governmentality in Bangkok that transforms the ways state optimal violence 
and security (re)shape state interventionary power and political subjectivity.  As such, I aim to re-
politicize the normalization and legitimacy of non-lethal state intervention in contested space and on-
going order-enforcement across Bangkok.  In practice, re-politicizing security realities of non-lethal 
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weapons requires problematizing the sites and conditions of Thai security expertise and authority and how 
they shape political arrangements of power.  It is my contention that the policing of contested bodies and 
spaces across Bangkok is organized around spatially based coercive force and non-lethal violence that 
reveals the “representational heart” of Thai state-making and statecraft (Haanstaad 2013, p. 183).       
This chapter is composed of four sections with multiple subsections.  Following this introduction, 
I briefly detail the Thai security apparatus and its two core security forces, the Royal Thai Armed Forces 
(RTArF) and the Royal Thai Police (RTP).  This context foregrounds a brief explanation of why I believe 
Bangkok serves as an ideal case study to examine the geographies of non-lethal weapons and state 
interventionary power.   Subsequently, I discuss The Red Shirt Revolution (2010) and Operation Occupy 
Bangkok (2013-2014), two major events in Bangkok that underpin my research project, where state 
violence and power, space-taking politics, and (non-)lethal intervention intersect.  Next, I examine the 
ways technoscientific and political/ideological frames of non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of 
policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of Thai state interventionary 
power and violence.  I accomplish this by demonstrating the ways the Thai security apparatus exercises 
threat assessment and order-enforcement in Bangkok to manage, discipline, and order contested bodies 
and space stabilizing non-lethal weapons in their security frameworks.  In the final section, I discuss why 
this case study matters in making the case for the critical geographies of non-lethal weapons.      
Overall, this case study illustrates the importance of my analysis in determining the ways non-
lethal weaponry and security in Bangkok foregrounds experts who co-produce security knowledge and 
expertise that is exercised to depoliticize and perpetuate apolitical security realities of non-lethal state 
intervention.  Also, this case study illustrates the ongoing political project of the National Council for 
Peace and Order’s (NCPO) increasingly violent practices of threat assessment and order-enforcement of 
contested space across Bangkok to preserve state power.  In other words, this case study affords an 
opportunity to examine how non-lethal weapons and non-lethal state intervention plays out in real life.  
To the extent that the overlap of non-lethal intervention and everyday life in Bangkok is a state project, I 
explore how policies and practices of non-lethal intervention are a result of two related factors: 1) As a 
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significant center of the global police-military-network, the Thai security apparatus has stabilized non-
lethal weapons within their continuum of force as part of their order-enforcement project; and 2) Non-
lethal weapons transform the dynamics of policing spaces and bodies in contested space in Bangkok 
shaping the use of Thai state interventionary power to secure contested spaces and bodies through new 
forms of optimal violence exercised to maintain legitimacy. 
Civil-Security Relations in Thailand and the Thai Security Apparatus 
In this section I examine the changing dynamics of civil-security relations in Thailand and 
identify and briefly discuss the Thai security apparatus’ key players in state (non-)lethal intervention.  
This analysis provides the foundation for why I believe Bangkok serves as an ideal case study to explore 
geographies of non-lethal weapons.  Thailand’s civil-security relations are fraught with historical legacies 
of executive dominance and a present “authoritarian variant” whereby security dominates civil-security 
relations without being subject to controls and limits or accountability (Curley et al. 2018 p. 202).  As the 
Thai security apparatus centralizes and consolidates power polarizing civil society actors in Thailand, 
traditional Western understandings of state power, (democratic) governance, and security are destabilized 
(Puangthong 2013).  As such, civil-security relations in Thailand can be understood in the ways the Thai 
security apparatus governs emphasizing “Thai-style democracy” to sustain its political legitimacy.    
First espoused by the authoritarian leader Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in 1957, Thai-style 
democracy recognizes three key principles: plurality of democracy, suitability for Thai culture, and 
flexibility and adaptability (Lohatepanont 2018).  The first principle acknowledges that democracy, as a 
system of governance, is pluralistic and needs not conform to traditional Western notions of democracy.  
This principle is important because various Thai leaders, elected or not, institutionalize different 
definitions of democracy to conform to their desired outcomes.  Often this principle offers justification for 
the exclusion of democratic mechanisms to take shape in Thailand.  For example, in Thailand it is 
common that democratic elections are viewed with suspicion and often overruled by the Thai security 
apparatus or other political institutions like the Constitutional Court of Thailand.  While I was collecting 
data for this research project, the NCPO delayed elections to restore ‘democratic’ rule to Thailand five 
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times.  The August 2017 constitutional referendum, which passed in a fairly democratic vote, called for a 
general election that would result in the dissolution of the NCPO once a cabinet was established.  
However, the NCPO argued that Thailand was “not ready” for general elections and held onto their 
sweeping powers for another three years.  General elections occurred on March 24, 2019 and with the 
swearing in of the ‘new’ government, still under the control of the coup-maker and Prime Minister Prayut 
Chan-o-Cha, the NCPO officially dissolved on July 16, 2019.  Though the NCPO has officially dissolved, 
in practice, the NCPO has institutionalized itself within all areas of the Thai government the current 
manifestation of the NCPO continues to rule the Thai state. 
The second principle of Thai style democracy emphasizes a conservative national identity 
recognizing ‘Thai-ness’ (kwarm pen thai) as a significant component to Thailand’s systems of 
governance.  Thai political culture relies on the core values of unity (kwarm samkee) and order (kwarm 
riebroi).  Thai peoples are considered subjects of the Kingdom rather than citizens and therefore must 
obey and render their loyalty to the Thai trinity— king (phra mahakasat), nation (chat), and religion 
(sasana) (Tongchai 1994; Hewison & Kitirianglarp 2010; Sombatpoonsiri 2017).  Disrespect for authority 
and open disagreement are treated with very little tolerance in Thailand both legally and socially.  The 
Thai security apparatus holds the primary principle that the Thai state can only survive if unity and order 
of the trinity is maintained.  This accounts for the interventionist nature of the Thai security apparatus 
often intervening to restore unity and order.  Throughout this research, the NCPO has (re)activated and 
co-opted hyper Thai nationalist sentiment institutionalizing the Thai trinity as an “inviolable state 
ideology” (Dressel 2018, p. 268).  The ideological manipulation of the Thai trinity by the NCPO worked 
to delegitimize political and social dissent.  Moreover, the NCPO’s successful linking of national unity 
and national security (i.e., order) has proven to be a highly durable practice to claim political legitimacy 
and consolidate state power.  While I was conducting my research, several hundred activists, dissidents, 
and everyday regime critics have been called “national security threats” or “un-Thai” and face serious 
criminal charges such as sedition, computer-related crimes, and lèse-majeté for expressing their views as 
the right to assembly, freedom of expression, and press freedom are revoked.  The NCPO argues that the 
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deterioration of civil liberties and human rights in Thailand is a result of the need to fundamentally 
change the direction of Thailand’s trajectory as a country towards more unity and order.  As current Prime 
Minister Pryauth (2015) exclaimed, “To those who say we lost our democracy, I’d say I am sorry, but we 
cannot afford to waste time we have to change our country.”        
Finally, Thai-style democracy is flexible and adaptable to a range of situations so that it can be 
employed to fit the needs of the political climate and the state-making projects of the regime in control.  
For example, current Prime Minister Prayut exclaimed, “Our country cannot afford any more conflicts.  
We certainly need to have a democracy. But it must be a Thai-niyuom democracy—that is, a Thai-style 
democracy” (Prime Minister Pryauth 2018).  The NCPO’s primary goal in invoking Thai-style democracy 
is to legitimize their military-political unit’s ascension to power after their military coup in 2014 and their 
subsequent legitimization under constitutional referendum in August 2017.  What is clear is the ongoing 
political project of the NCPO generates a reconfiguration of the social and spatial organization of Thai 
society as Thai society is gradually being exposed to the blurring of civilian-security relations and 
experiencing greater forms of political violence.  Overall, Thai-style democracy perpetuates an adaptive 
Thai nationalist political system underpinned by the arbitrary use of state power and violence exercised 
by the Thai security apparatus to secure unity and order.  
Thailand’s security apparatus is diverse and encompasses a wide range of state and non-state 
actors and institutions that invariably shift as civil-security relations continually change over time and 
space.  Civil-security relations broadly defined here recognize the various interactions between security 
and civilian actors related to the power to make and enact political decisions (Croissant et al. 2013; 
Chambers 2015).  I consider how the relations of expertise and authority are deliberated and used to 
legitimize the power to make and enact political decisions as key components to understandings civil-
security relations.  As such, there is significant blurring between the actors, roles, and responsibilities of 
the various parts of the Thai security apparatus particularly as the core security forces (see below) extend 
their legitimized state power.  Preeminent Thai security scholar Paul Chambers (2015) identifies and 
categorizes six principle parts of the Thai security apparatus: 
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1) Core security forces: The Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTArF), the Royal Thai Police (RTP), and 
three key paramilitaries (The Rangers, the Border Patrol Police, and Volunteers). 
2) Executive management actors: Officially command and oversee the core security forces.  This 
includes the Prime Minister’s Office, Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the 
National Security Council (NSC), and the National Intelligence Agency. 
3) Legislative actors: The upper and lower house parliamentary committees who are tasked with 
monitoring the military and police as well as security policy originating from executive 
management actors.    
4) Financial actors: The Finance Ministry and The Bureau of the Budget, which implements 
funding policies for security forces. 
5) Judicial and oversight actors: These are legally responsible for judicial responsibilities relating to 
Thailand’s security apparatus, like the Constitutional Court of Thailand.    
6) Civil society organizations: These are like Thai political parties, who translate various positions 
of the security apparatus in public and policy discourse (pp. 5-8).  
 
              Though each of these six parts plays an important role in the Thai security apparatus, the primary 
focus of this case study is the core security forces, particularly the RTArF and RTP.  I focus on both the 
RTArF and RTP (which I subsequently refer to as “Thai security forces”) because they are the dominant 
institutions of the Thai security apparatus as well as the Thai state currently and were well established 
before other principle parts of the Thai security apparatus.  Also, even though they are distinct security 
institutions, the blurring of personnel, roles, and policy and practice is significant.  While both claim to be 
neutral and apolitical regarding Thai politics, like most scholars of Thai politics, I maintain that they are 
significant political actors with substantial interests in gaining and sustaining power in Thailand, 
particularly since the 2014 military coup.  Moreover, Thai security forces’ powers are rarely checked 
largely because of their willingness to exercise violence to capture and maintain political power often at 
the expense of democratization and Thai civil society.  The current state-making project of the NCPO has 
allowed Thai security forces to erode commitments to tempering the arbitrary use of state power and 
violence and mitigating the capacity of civil-society to thrive.  While Thailand’s security forces are 
considered one of the strongest in Southeast Asia, each has experienced legitimacy crises because of 
“human rights abuses, lack of transparency and accountability, corruption, insulation from elected civilian 
control, and inefficacity” (Chambers 2018, p.5).   
             However, maintaining legitimacy for their governing regime is of significant concern to the 
NCPO.  Thus, within the last decade Thai security forces have undergone noteworthy changes, because 
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ultimately they, particularly the RTArF, understand their role as the dominant Thai state builder.  Brief 
discussions of the RTArF and RTP in the following subsections provide insight into the relations of Thai 
security expertise that shape the ongoing threat assessment and order-enforcement in Bangkok.   
Thai Security Forces: The Royal Thai Armed Forces 
The Thai military has evolved into a powerful, interventionist, and ideologically motivated 
security institution that currently controls the Thai state.  Over the past eight decades, the RTArF has 
become the primary obstacle for consolidating democratization in Thailand, staging 13 successful coups 
(with over 30 attempts), removing several democratically elected and appointed governments (Chambers 
2015).  It is averse to civilian control as it believes it is too powerful and over time has ensured its 
legitimacy to maintain its growing power outside of civilian oversight demonstrating its capacity to enact 
various forms of political violence.  Also, as Sripokangkul & Chambers (2017) argue, “military 
leadership believes that they have the expertise to apply their military structure to politics and economics, 
and are the most competent administrators” (p. 3).  In other words, RTArF leadership believes it is the 
best institution to govern Thailand.  Aligned with traditional Thai power elites and the monarchy, the 
RTArF wields its considerable power to protect the traditional Thai power structure and is known to be 
“unaccountable, untouchable, and uncontrollable” (Sripokangkul & Chambers 2017, p. 3).    
Despite conventional understandings of militaries as securing against external threats, the Thai 
military is primarily focused on internal security.  First and foremost, Thai military ideology rationalizes 
an interventionist agenda to protect the Thai state and the monarchy (Rakson 2010; Sripokangkul & 
Chambers 2017; Chambers 2018).  Since its establishment in 1870, the Thai military primarily works to 
ensure internal security under the control of a central kingship (Isarapakdi 1989).  Even though the Thai 
military ended absolute monarchical rule in a 1932 coup that founded the modern state of Thailand, the 
monarchy returned to a powerful position of influence both ideologically and politically in 1957 under 
military dictator General Sarit Thanarat.  Throughout the next three decades the military and monarchy 
established a formidable alliance that formed the foundation of the principle role of the military today.  As 
protectors of the palace (and protected by the palace), the Thai military achieved a significant level of 
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legitimacy that allowed it to flourish with little interference from civilian oversight and conference.  Often 
referred to as a “monarchised military” the Thai military collaborates with the monarchy to dominate the 
Thai state increasing their political and economic interests (Chambers & Waitoolkiat 2016, p. 426).  
However, the Thai military and monarchy (to a lesser extent because of the Thai trinity) are not 
infallible although they project otherwise.  The military suffered a significant loss of legitimacy following 
the 1992 Black May Massacre when military forces violently clashed with pro-democracy demonstrators 
following yet another monarchised military backed coup.  The incident left dozens of dead, hundreds 
injured, and resulted in over 3,500 arrests and shifted popular support towards a growing democracy and 
civilian control movement in Thailand (Chambers & Waitoolkiat 2016).  Thailand witnessed a growth in 
civil society participation in politics including the drafting and enactment of the 1997 “People’s” 
constitution as well as a retreat of the military from the public political sphere.  Importantly, the military 
and monarchy retained significant political powers and wielded them behind the scenes of the discorded 
and unconsolidated civilian governments often intervening to establish order.  Examples include 
“manoeuvres to change ruling coalitions in 1997, a coup in 2006, the ousting of a government and its 
replacement in 2008 and a coup in 2014 and rule by a junta after that” (Chambers & Waitoolkiat 2016).  
The final three interventions significantly enhanced the military’s power and political legitimacy and set 
the contextual stage of this research (see next section).  Overall, the symbiotic relationship between the 
Thai military and the monarchy bolsters legitimacy and reflects an ideological and practical way authority 
and power is understood and exercised across Thailand.            
For the purposes of this research, the Thai military is the primary institution in developing and 
implementing the policy and practice of (non-)lethal intervention including the deployment of non-lethal 
weapons in contested Bangkok space.  Since the military coup in 2014, Thailand has succumbed to full 
military rule and has successfully created a “military bureaucratic authoritarianism” in Thailand 
(Bamrungsuk 2015).  As such, source materials collected related to the Thai military encompass a range 
of official texts from the NCPO, high ranked members of the Thai military, and military members 
occupying civil servant postings and emerge and stabilize as the master frames.  I also collected a range 
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of wider and alternative political discourses that both maintain and contest the hegemony of the official 
Thai military master frames.  My research contends that the ongoing threat assessment and order-
enforcement of contested space in Bangkok is indicative of the Thai military’s political domination of 
Thai politics and society.        
Thai Security Forces: Royal Thai Police  
The RTP are often overlooked in an analysis of core security forces in Thailand because of the 
power of the Thai military.  However, as the political influence of the RTP changes over time and space, 
it is important to understand their role in Thai state intervention in contested space in Bangkok.  The RTP 
has consolidated into a powerful force that vies for political power alongside and sometimes against the 
Thai military and is closely linked to Thai political and cultural life (Haastand 2008).  The historical 
contexts of Thai policing are complex and intricate and center on displays of order and coercive force 
(See Suwanwecho 1996).  As Haastand (2013) so succinctly puts it,  
“The Thai state and its police developed in conjunction with perceived threats to state order, 
where each new enemy or act of disorder justified further centralization, bureaucratization and 
state incursion.  Within the context of these chaotic threats, the Thai police were central agents in 
the creation of state order (p. 89). 
 
I focus on the role of the RTP in exercising optimal violence in threat assessment and order 
enforcement of contested space across Bangkok.  The RTP is the principal player of the Thai security 
apparatus for the subversion of state power into everyday life (Haastand 2008, 2013; McCargo 2015).  
Unlike the Thai military, the policies and practices of the RTP are highly visible in everyday life, and as 
such their (political) legitimacy is consistently tested and contested.  It should be noted that the RTP is 
considered to suffer from significant corruption practices as “Thai police policies and statutes, which 
allow, if not perpetuate, corruption within the Thai police force” continue to shape their power in ordering 
Thai society and space (McClincy 2012, p. 183).   
The development and organization of the RTP over time have been significantly impacted by the 
strategic security relationship between the U.S. and Thailand.  Since the early 1950s and with the start of 
the new U.S.-Thai security relationship, the RTP has significantly benefited from financial resources, 
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materials and equipment, and knowledge transfers in three distinct but not mutually exclusive 
security/policing eras.  Throughout these eras, Thailand’s police force increasingly militarized, a process 
that continues today.  First, between 1950 and 1975 the U.S.’s primary objective was to combat the 
spread of communism to Thailand.  The U.S. bolstered ‘anti-communist’ leaders, regardless of their anti-
democratic practices, from both external and internal threats.  Encouraging the suppression of 
communism led to an increasingly repressive and corrupt internal security and social control policy and 
practice exercised by the RTP.  The RTP trained by the U.S. in counter-insurgency practices (often by the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]) operated with impunity across Thailand and importantly grew in 
numbers that rivaled the Thai military.  During this security/policing era, the RTP and RTArF grew 
increasingly suspicious of each other’s political ambitions and struggled for political power.  Ultimately, 
the RTArf dominated.  As communist counter-insurgency practices ended in Thailand, the RTP was 
forced to adopt and integrate into “professionalized reform models” perpetuated by the U.S. and the West 
to defend its extremely violent practices throughout the era (Haanstad 2008, p.84).   
This professionalization reform was subsequently followed by a security/policing era in Thailand 
that focused on integrating the RTP into the “international law enforcement community” where 
homogenization of operational parameters and conformity to Western policing institutions emerged 
through the international, so-called “War on Drugs”.  Similar to suppressing the communist threat to and 
in Thailand, U.S.-Thai security relations focused on providing assistance to the RTP to overwhelm the 
illicit use, exchange, and transnational movement of drugs.  In fact, during 1973-1981, under the U.S.’s 
International Narcotics Control Program, the RTP received more assistance than any other country except 
for Burma, Mexico, and Colombia. It also hosted the largest contingent of U.S Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) Agents outside the U.S. (Haanstad 2008).  As part of an over billion dollar U.S. 
assistance package following the Thai financial crisis of 1997, an International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA) was established in Bangkok to continue training in drug eradication efforts (among 
other transnational crimes).  The ILEA continue to play a significant role in integrating the RTP into the 
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global police-military-network today.  Also, Thailand continues to serve as a principle player in the “War 
on Drugs” today.       
Finally, the RTP has significantly benefited from the U.S.-Thai security relationship in regard to 
financial assistance, materials and equipment, and knowledge transfers related to the so-called “Global 
War on Terror” (Haanstad 2008).  As the U.S.’s principal strategic partner in Southeast Asia, Thailand 
serves as one of the most important allies in the war on terror.  The RTP’s role greatly expanded under 
Thailand’s global police-military-network positioning in the war on terror security/policing era.  On one 
hand, the RTP’s “violent excess, unchecked governmental corruption, and security obsessions” emerging 
from their conceptualized role in the war on terror consolidated their power and influence under former 
Police Lieutenant Colonel and Prime Minister Taksin Shinawatra (Haanstad 2008, p. 8).  On the other 
hand, the state violence of the RTP during this security/police era undermined the leadership of former 
Prime Minister Taksin as it was a primary reason for his removal from office by military coup in 2006.  
Overall, the principle objectives of the U.S. security/policing policy in Thailand have been to maintain 
regional stability, protect U.S. economic interests, and secure Thailand’s commitment to U.S. security 
interests in the region and more broadly across the globe.   
For the purposes of this project, the RTP is the primary everyday enforcer of non-lethal 
intervention, including the deployment of non-lethal weapons in contested Bangkok space.  As such, 
source materials collected related to the RTP encompass a range of official texts from the RTP, like RTP 
policy statements, that serve the NCPO’s master frames.  Source materials were also collected relating to 
a range of wider and alternative political discourses that both maintain and contest the hegemony of the 
master frames.  Challenging master frames serving to legitimize the expanding continuum of force is 
easier to do when aimed at the RTP versus the Thai military.  As such, my research contends that the 
ongoing threat assessment and order enforcement of contested space in Bangkok implemented by the 
NCPO is enforced at the scale of the everyday by the RTP but is highly contested as Thai society 
continually questions the RTP’s legitimacy.       
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Overall, I contend that the Thai security apparatus serves as an excellent example through which 
to understand how non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in 
ways that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence; and how non-lethal 
weapons are stabilized within global police-military-network policy frameworks that shape state 
interventionary power in security and contested spaces.  I believe this argument holds true for three 
primary reasons.  First, Bangkok holds a privileged position in the globalized police-military-network, 
serving as “central locus” for international security regimes in Southeast Asia, in particular, as part of a 
U.S.-Thai security cooperation regime (Haanstad 2013, p. 194).  Second, as the social, cultural, and 
economic capital of Thailand, Bangkok is not only the center of Thai politics but also the center of space-
taking politics and contested space.  Third, the RTArF and RTP have a deep effect on wider Thai society, 
shaping the ways state power and violence create socio-spatial relations across Thailand and across 
Southeast Asia more broadly.  
Neocleous (2000) argues that “The history of police is the history of state power” but in 
Thailand’s case, the histories of the Thai military and police are the present of state power (p. xi).  The 
fundamental nature of Thai polity is underpinned by Thai security forces’ increasingly violent control of 
the Thai state and their need to provide order.  Thai-style democracy and its current sophisticated 
authoritarian variant deepens Thailand’s institutionalization of security norms that render deviant bodies 
and contested spaces as threats to the Thai state and Thai unity in general.  As such, the following 
sections details examples of space-taking politics that provide insight into the evolving policies and 
practices of (non-)lethal intervention in contested space in Bangkok.     
Bangkok’s Space-Taking Politics 
In this section I examine the spatial-temporal relations of two significant mobilizations of space-
taking politics across Bangkok: The Red Shirt Revolution 2010 and Operation Occupy Bangkok 2014.  
Contextually, while political unrest and violence can be traced to the rise of ‘modern’ Thailand with 
multiple transitions of power (again, 13 successful military coups since 1932) the temporal focus of this 
research encompasses the historical contexts and socio-political relations of unrest and violence stemming 
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from an over two-decade political crisis starting in 2006.  While a full historical overview of Thailand’s 
political crises is outside the purview of this dissertation (see Unger & Mahakanjana 2016), the Red Shirt 
Revolution in the Spring of 2010 and Operation Occupy Bangkok in January of 2014 publicize the 
putative anxiety of the Thai state: the unpredictable disorder of space-taking protest.  They culminate in 
two apt and conflicting examples of the transformative violence of (non-)lethal interventionary power in 
contested space.  On the one hand, the Red Shirt Revolution is an example of the Thai state wielding 
lethal violence against civilians participating in space-taking politics, with devastating results.  On the 
other hand, Operation Occupy Bangkok serves as an example of the Thai state exercising non-lethal 
interventionary power to maintain their legitimacy and enforce order across Bangkok that continues 
today.  During this period of political chaos and instability, the two most significant forces in Thailand 
became mass political movements and their space-taking politics and the Thai security apparatus.  As I 
address in Chapter 4, my proximity to both these events have shaped the way I design, conduct, and write 
my research.  The political and social climate in Bangkok has significantly changed throughout this 
research as Thai citizens’ liberties have been eroded, political parties have ceased to function, mass 
demonstration has become illegal, censorship of the media is at all-time highs, and order-enforcement of 
space continues to rise.   
The center of these space-taking political crises revolves around the controversial tenure of Prime 
Minister Taksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), who was removed by military coup and self-exiled after shifting 
power away from traditional power elites, an event that initiated the conflictual color-coded polarization 
of Thai society between two primary factions: The Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts (Chachavalpongpun 
2013).  The Yellow Shirts submit their loyalty to the traditionalists of Thai power elite—the royal family, 
the military, senior government officials, and the wealthy business class.  Their primary goal is to 
preserve social and political status quo whereby power remains firmly bound to Thai elites (known as the 
armat).  More importantly though, the Yellow Shirts sustain these politics because they are first and 
foremost royalists believing the monarchy, an inviolable pillar of the Thai state, must be protected 
(Ferrara 2011; Dressel 2018).  In contrast, the Red Shirts encompass a diverse range of Thai peoples 
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mostly from the lower and middle classes across Thailand who have not benefited as much from the 
status quo and radical development bringing increased capital flows into Thailand.  The Red Shirts desire 
to shift political power away from Thai elites, bolster electoral democracy to contest the traditional elite 
domination of Thai politics, and to serve the underprivileged and marginalized peoples of Thailand 
(known as the phrai).  The intense polarization of Thai society between the Red Shirts and the Yellow 
Shirts changed the political trajectory of Thailand for the foreseeable future with very real social and 
spatial consequences.  
When I first started this project, the color-coded polarization of Thai society was still visibly 
significant, however, over the past five years the Red Shirt movement has suffered a significant 
slowdown in support due to a range of effects.  First, the Red Shirts have incurred a relentless campaign 
to delegitimize their politics (and lives) by being labeled “systemic threats” by Thai elites who wield their 
power to enforce ‘Yellow Shirt order’ and eliminate the Red Shirt threat through legal means (use of 
force and law) and illegal means (intimidation, violence, and extrajudicial detainment and killings) 
(Chachavalpongpun 2013).  Second, the Red Shirt movement encompasses a range of coalitions, pro-
Thaksin, anti-elite, anti-monarchy, and pro-democracy, that all have different agendas and strategies 
preventing a unified movement organized enough to take political control in Thailand.  Third, the 
NCPO’s skillful manipulation of dominant nationalist discourses surrounding their coup in May 2014 and 
subsequent legitimization frames Red Shirt motives as destabilizing the Thai trinity thus questioning their 
“Thai-ness” which has significant social consequences in Thailand (Pasuk Phongpaichit & Baker 2002, p. 
107).  Finally, the death of King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX, 1946-2017) re-animated widespread 
popular support for the royal family thus making it dangerous, both legally under lèse-majeté laws and 
socially, to be associated with the anti-monarchy sentiments of some Red Shirts.  As I conclude this 
project, the color-coded conflicts of Thai politics are less visible, but the polarization of Thai society 
endures as the NCPO continues to consolidate and centralize its power in increasingly authoritarian and 
violent ways.     
The Red Shirt Revolution  
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The color-coded conflict and polarization of Thai society reached its zenith during the violence of 
the Red Shirt Revolution in 2010.  The Red Shirt Revolution is considered one of the most transformative 
events in modern Thai history and continues to shape the social and political landscape of Thailand to this 
day.  After the 2006 military coup, which removed Prime Minster Taksin (sympathetic to the Red Shirts) 
from office in an attempt to restore Thai elites to power, the coup-makers’ hand-picked Abhisit Vejjajiva 
ascended to the post of Prime Minister.  The Abhisit’s administration systematically worked to 
delegitimize Red Shirt politics (and lives) to consolidate and centralized power and “imposed an array of 
repressive measures to maintain its illegitimate grip and quash the democratic movement” (Amsterdam & 
Peroff 2010, p. 2).  For example, the Thai government restricted access to thousands of websites, blocked 
opposition news outlets, and charged a record number of people under lèse-majeté laws.  In retaliation, 
Red Shirt coalitions took to the country side to bolster support against the more urban Yellow Shirt order 
being enforced.  As the Red Shirts gained more notoriety and political momentum due to these repressive 
policies and practices, the Abhisit government continued to crack down more vehemently.  On March 8, 
2010, Nattawut Saikua, a Red Shirt opposition leader, announced intentions for a “great demonstration in 
Bangkok” emphasizing its peaceful purpose while a more radical coalition of Red Shirts, Daeng Siam 
(Red Siam) called for a “peaceful democratic revolution” (Taylor 2012).  On March 12, 2010, over 
100,000 Red Shirt protesters descended on Bangkok demanding new democratic elections and 
governance in an act of space-taking protest (Amsterdam & Peroff 2010).  While ‘revolution’ was not 
defined, visuals emerging from Bangkok showed Red Shirt protesters establishing protest camps across 
key spaces in Bangkok (notably Lumphini Park and Ratchaprasong intersection) and aggressively 
fortifying their positions.   
 The world watched this space-taking politics that led close to a million Thai people into the 
streets across Bangkok and thousands more in other urban and rural areas across Thailand.  The entire city 
of Bangkok not only served as a physically contested space but also served as a symbol of the contested 
nature of the Thai state.  One month into the space-taking protests Prime Minster Abhisit declared a state 
of emergency and operationalized 67,000 military soldiers and 25,000 police officers to intervene with 
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violent and deadly force (Sripokangkul & Chambers 2017, p. 12).  On April 10, the first violent 
intervention occurred as security forces attempted to remove Red Shirt occupiers at Phan Fa Bridge (an 
important thoroughfare) that resulted in the deaths of 27 civilians (Amsterdam & Peroff 2010).  Over the 
next 42 days, violent clashes between Thai security forces and civilians, including so-called paramilitary 
units of the Red Shirts dressed in black (see Chachavalpongpun 2013), left at least 90 people dead, more 
than 2,000 injured, and over 50 (alleged) leaders of the Red Shirt Revolution charged with “terrorism” 
facing potential death sentences.  In the aftermath, the Thai state perpetuated dominant security narratives 
supporting the extreme violence and lethal force exercised by security forces arguing the Red Shirt 
Revolution was a threat to national security, violent, and unlawful.  Even as evidence amassed showing 
security forces using live-fire against peaceful protesters (among other violent crimes), the Thai state 
maintained that its operations were within accordance with “international standards” regarding the use of 
force.  Now retired Army Chief Anupong Paochinda claimed, the military “never intended to harm 
people” (The Nation 2010). However, as Amsterdam & Peroff (2010) argue,   
“Contrary to the “international standards” the government is eager to invoke, its dispersal 
operations made little use of “non-lethal incapacitating weapons.” No care whatsoever appears to 
have been taken to “minimize the risk of endangering uninvolved persons” and to “preserve 
human life” (p. 48).  
 
While the official Thai state’s investigation into the events of the Red Shirt Revolution did not 
find security forces in violation of Thai law or international law initially (the Bangkok Criminal Court 
opened an inquest in 2013 which was dismissed by a special military prosecutor), numerous independent 
investigations conducted by a range of organizations (i.e., Human Rights Watch 2011; The Truth for 
Reconciliation Commission of Thailand 2012; Thailand Research Fund 2011) determined that “The high 
death toll and injuries resulted from excessive and unnecessary lethal force on the part of security forces” 
(Human Rights Watch 2011, p. 5).  In wider and alternative political discourses, the Thai security 
apparatus underwent a significant de-legitimization within Thailand as visuals and testimonies of security 
forces extreme violence circulated widely across Thailand through social media and first-hand accounts.  
Distrust of the Thai security apparatus is typically high as security forces are known for their corruption 
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practices, excessive use of force, and discretionary violence wielded with impunity but the violence of the 
Red Shirt Revolution significantly agitated the Thai populace (Haanstad 2013).  In fact, when elections 
were held a year later, Yingluck Shinawatra (former Prime Minister Taksin’s sister) led the Red Shirt- 
allied Pheu Thai Party to a landslide victory.  
Overall, the Red Shirt Revolution exposed the Thai state’s violent disposition towards deviant 
and transgressive bodies and politics.  To dislocate bodies and secure contested space, the state exercised 
its sovereign right to kill without hesitation.  The Red Shirts were identified as significant threats to the 
Thai state and people and their space-taking politics were linked to geographically bounded “insecure”, 
“disordered”, and “ungoverned” space in need of stronger state intervention.  The “us” versus “them” 
dynamic between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts constituted a politics of fear that allowed security 
forces to exercise violent and lethal force.  The Thai state significantly surpassed the thresholds of 
accountability, acceptability, and legitimacy of their capacity to exercise violence using lethal force in 
comparison to international standards (Amsterdam & Peroff 2010).  To re-build legitimacy and better 
policing capacity, Thailand hosted and participated in the Non-Lethal Weapons Executive Seminar 
(NOLES) in 2011, a multilateral security cooperation event for non-lethal weapons operated by U.S. 
Marine Corps Forces Pacific.  During the event, Thai security forces underwent non-lethal weapons 
training and were given classes and practical application sessions on communication skills and security 
intervention dynamics.  Also, there were significant efforts to restructure how Thai security forces engage 
in interventions in contested space (Sombatpoonsiri 2017).  I argue that this capacity building project was 
part of an effort to change the ways the Thai security apparatus intervenes in contested space exercising 
optimal violence at the encouragement of the international community, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter.      
Operation Occupy Bangkok 
Two years later, Thailand collapsed into another political crisis as the Red Shirt- backed Prime 
Minister Yingluck’s political party proposed an Amnesty Bill that would allow former Prime Minister 
Thaksin to return to Thailand and provide blanket amnesty for events of the Red Shirt Revolution.  This 
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event sparked outrage among Yellow Shirt supporters (and some Red Shirts), who mobilized at the end of 
2013 mimicking the same space-taking politics employed by the Red Shirts in 2010 (Thongchai 2014).  
To force the Pheu Thai Party out of power, Yellow Shirt protesters occupied key spaces in Bangkok in an 
effort to paralyze Bangkok’s governability.  The start of this political crisis re-publicized the putative 
anxiety of the Thai state: the unpredictable disorder of space-taking protest.  Moreover, the nature of the 
Thai governing system was at stake as the Yellow Shirt coalition were united around the “common goal 
of toppling Yingkluck and the rejection of majoritarian democracy” (Kongkirati 2016, p. 474).  Violent 
clashes between Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt factions destabilized Bangkok in November with little 
interference from Thai security forces.  The RTP and RTArF were reticent to intervene as both had 
significant ties to opposing sides.  In the end, the RTP were the primary Thai security force to intervene in 
contested space during and the RTArF remained “neutral” and thus maintained its legitimacy.  
On December 1, Yellow Shirt protesters violently forced their way into the Metropolitan Police 
Headquarters and Government House directly confronting the RTP.  After two days of violent clashes 
with protesters, the RTP removed barricades and themselves to allow protesters to occupy the 
Government House (Post Today 2013).  This move by the RTP indicated a shift in security force 
responses to space-taking politics in Bangkok from more repressive and violent approaches to more 
accommodating and noninterventionist approaches (Sombatpoonsiri 2017).  As a result of this shift in 
Thai security forces’ policy and practice, Prime Minister Yingluck was forced to dissolve parliament and 
call for new elections to be held in February.  In other words, the government collapsed.  However, rather 
than diffuse the situation, the call for new elections fueled the Yellow Shirt space-taking politics as they 
knew that democratic elections would not result in their favor as a small but extremely powerful political 
minority.  Instead, they vowed to block the elections from happening and continue their space-taking 
protest across Bangkok and effectively shut the city down.   
In January 2014, following weeks of fierce protests and demonstrations, “Operation Occupy 
Bangkok” drew tens of thousands of Thai civilians into the streets of Bangkok, effectively shutting down 
the city.  This expansion of space-taking politics stressed the credibility and legitimacy of the Thai 
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security forces, in particular the RTP, as action to confront protesters would be viewed as supporting a 
perceived corrupt and delegitimized government and inaction could lead to extreme levels of violence.  In 
fact, pre-election violence occurred in unprecedented levels across Thailand with attempted political 
assignations of key party leaders, bombings outside leaders’ residences, and bombings within occupied 
protest spaces (Kongkriati 2016). As Kongkriati (2016) states,  
“The 2014 election saw the highest degree of violence in Thailand’s history. According to 
statistics collected by the author from the day of the parliamentary dissolution on December 9, 
2013 until the day the Constitutional Court invalidated the election on March 21, 2013, there 
were a total of 260 violent incidents, resulting in 30 deaths and 459 injuries” (p. 481). 
 
Because of the extreme violence taking place, the Thai government declared an emergency decree 
in Bangkok and surrounding provinces.  During this time, the RTP was forced into the uncomfortable 
position of attempting to maintain security and order while also trying very hard to not be too closely 
linked with the government which was becoming less legitimate by the day.   
Elections in February escalated the violence, and election disruption was significant across the 
country particularly in the South (where the majority support the Red Shirts).  A significantly lower-than-
average voter turnout led to a constitutional crisis and the Constitutional Court of Thailand was asked to 
weigh in on the legitimacy of the election and its results.  In the end, the February election results were 
not accepted and forced the Constitutional Court to invalidate the results on March 21, 2014. That action 
essentially validated the election violence, which continued to escalate.  Without a fully functioning 
government, negotiations occurred over the next few weeks with ongoing space-taking politics drawing 
even more demonstrators from both the Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt camps.  Eventually, in early May of 
2014, the Constitutional Court ordered Prime Minister Yingluck out of office, and the Thai military 
seized power.  The military coup officially occurred seamlessly on May 22, 2014.  The NCPO was given 
assent by King Bhumibol under General Prayuth Chan-ocha as Prime Minister to rule by marital law and 
executive order.   
Unlike the state-perpetrated violence of the Red Shirt Revolution, the Thai security apparatus 
showed inconceivable restraint with its intervention in contested space during the space-taking politics of 
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the 2013-2014 Thai political crisis (Sombatpoonsiri 2017).  Operation Occupy Bangkok tested the Thai 
security apparatus in two significant ways.  On one hand, Thai security apparatuses were expected to 
maintain security and order for the very government that mass mobilized space-taking politics was 
attempting to overthrow.  This expectation strained the legitimacy and credibility of the Thai security 
forces, because any excessive violence against anti-government Yellow Shirt protesters would assist in 
validating claims of oppressive governance by Prime Minister Yingluck.  Moreover, the RTP were 
criticized for being too close to the Taksin supporting regime.  On the other hand, Thai security forces had 
a significant political stake in the outcome of Operation Occupy Bangkok.  The Thai security apparatus is 
closely linked with the Yellow Shirt movement, although under Taksin the RTP flourished, and favored a 
return to traditional Thai elite rule.  As Sombatpoonsiri (2017) states, “Ultimately, the Thai police [and 
military] were propelled to choose between two difficult choices: maintaining law and order or offending 
the ‘great mass of people’” (p. 100).   
Rather than attempting to restrict and repress Thai people’s right to demonstrate like in the past, 
Thai security forces accepted the right to demonstration and viewed their operational procedures as 
merely intervening to protect lives during Operation Occupation Bangkok (Sombatpoonsiri 2017).  Such 
shifts in policing/security policy and practice afforded a more “hands-off” approach when de-escalation 
could not be achieved and offensive action would lead to extreme violence.  Overall, Thai security forces 
responses to the 2013-2014 space-taking politics indicates an engaged learning curve from their 
intervention during the 2010 Red Shirt Revolution whereby restructured crowd-control units exercised 
improved training methods and deployment of non-lethal weapons versus lethal weapons as well as 
implemented new institutionalized norms to de-escalate confrontation within contested space.  While this 
shift is a significant improvement in comparison to the lethal violence employed in 2010, such changes 
are not sufficient to celebrate.  Thai security forces and their new-found forms of non-lethal 
interventionary power significantly transform the state’s ability to embrace optimal violence as part of its 
portfolio of security mechanisms where use of force is presented and practiced as a legitimate way of 
policing contested spaces and bodies. 
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Threat Assessment and Order-Enforcement in Bangkok 
In this section, I demonstrate the ways the Thai security apparatus exercises threat assessment and 
order-enforcement in Bangkok invoking technoscientific and political/ideological frames of non-lethal 
weapons to manage, discipline, and order contested bodies and spaces in Bangkok.  Also, I illustrate the 
ways they stabilize non-lethal weapons in their security frameworks and legitimize non-lethal state 
intervention.  In other words, I examine how non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing 
contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of Thai state interventionary power and 
violence.  The temporal focus of the following analysis starts with the political crisis in 2013-2014 
(Operation Occupy Bangkok) and continues through my fieldwork in December 2015 and January 2016 
in Bangkok.  Examining specific examples of threat assessment and order-enforcement throughout this 
period exposes the ways the Thai state has successfully weaponized non-lethality in its on-going state-
making project. 
I argue that official discourses of the Thai state and its security apparatus institutionalize and 
normalize specific understandings of non-lethal weapons through technoscientific and 
political/ideological master frames to depoliticize their role in the state’s monopoly of violence in the use 
of force against civilians in Bangkok’s contested spaces.  Drawing on my source materials, the Thai state 
and security apparatus operationalized the following key official texts (Table 6.1) to transform the ways 
bodies and spaces are disciplined and ordered across Bangkok:    
Table 6.1 
Official Policy Text  Characteristics  
The Internal Security Act (ISA) Provides the Internal Security Operations 
Command (ISOC), headed by the Prime Minister, 
powers to monitor, investigate, and evaluate 
information related to internal security.  Also, 
significantly impacts the right to public assembly. 
Emergency Decree (January 2014) Allows Prime Minister to declare an emergency 
situation that grants significant powers to limit 
civil liberties.  
Martial Law Act of 1914 Permits both the King and Thai military to declare 
martial law in times of war or unrest, granting 
sweeping powers to restrict Thai citizens’ rights.  
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Section 28 of the 2017 Constitution Prohibits “torture, brutal acts or punishment by 
cruel or inhumane means”.  Also, protects 
vulnerable peoples from violence or unfair 
treatment. 
Section 44 of the 2017 Constitution  Provides the “liberty to assemble peacefully and 
without arms” but stipulates restrictions “for the 
purpose of maintaining security of the State, 
public safety, public order or good morals, or for 
protecting the rights or liberties of other persons”.  
Draft National Police Act (2018) Currently out for consultation the Draft National 
Police Act (2018) does not address police use of 
force against Thai peoples but does empower the 
RTP to use “reasonable” force during arrest.  
 
These master frames co-produced with other official discourses (i.e., statements, policy briefs, 
reports etc.) perpetuate technoscientific logics and expertise, like institutionalizing technical-tactical 
biases in classificatory schema, and humanitarian ideals of non-lethal weapons to bolster support for their 
non-lethal interventions across Bangkok.  Thai security forces depoliticized non-lethal weapons (although 
not entirely successfully with the use of tear gas) by arguing that as strategic “tools”, non-lethal weapons 
are used to counter the excessive lethal violence experienced during the 2010 Red Shirt Revolution.  
Maintaining the humanitarian ideals’ narrative worked to the Thai security forces’ benefit.  For example, 
it was ordered that all police and military personnel exercise the “utmost restraint” in dealing with 
protesters to avoid exercise violence charges (Sombatpoonsiri 2017).  At times, Thai security forces 
withdrew from key contested spaces or allowed demonstrators to capture contested space claiming that 
confrontation would lead to further violence which was not within the operational parameters of the Thai 
security forces (Matichon 2014).  This was obviously a significant policy reversal from the operational 
parameters of Thai security forces during the Red Shirt Revolution.  Moreover, the materiality, 
embodiment, and practices of these (micro-) geopolitical discourses co-produce spatial arrangements of 
power whereby optimal violence is exercised by the state to enforce order in contested space at the 
detriment of space-taking politics as it attempts to disrupt dominant spatial arrangements of power. 
I contend that the Thai state’s co-production of “threats” and deployment of security to enforce 
order is dependent upon a technoscientific paradigm of threat assessment and scalable capabilities to 
address threats, materialized through non-lethal weapons through the spatial practices of containment and 
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distance.  These spatial arrangements engaged by Thai security forces in contested space legitimize state 
interventionary power and violence while also preserving their own legitimacy.  Rather than enact direct, 
confrontational tactics like what was exercised during the deadly Red Shirt Revolution, Thai security 
forces enacted a more hands-off approach employing the spatial tactics and practices of containment and 
distance.  As such, a more nuanced examination of Thai security forces’ spatial strategies within 
contested space during the 2013-2014 space-taking politics indicates an escalation of force practice 
deploying non-lethal weapons to protect and control key spaces across Bangkok.  The spatial tactics and 
practices of containment and distance played a significant role in the threat assessment of Yellow Shirt 
demonstrators and the justification to exercise the use of force by Thai security forces during the 2013-
2014 space-taking politics.  Thai security forces had a sophisticated practice to categorize demonstrators 
as threats and security risks, making those demonstrators amenable to violent intervention to contain their 
mobility and the seizure of contested space.  Non-lethal weapons were vital to these spatial tactics and 
practices of dislocating bodies and securing space.   
Across the city, Thai security forces identified key government sites, like the Government House, 
and security infrastructure spaces, like the Metropolitan Police Headquarters, to protect and maintain 
control during the political crisis.  Once identified, they constructed a series of three containment 
barricade zones with significant distance between each barricade (Sombatpoonsiri 2017).  Barricades 
served as a threshold for which the continuum of force could progress towards lethal violence once 
crossed as each zone indicated a higher threat assessment level.  Once demonstrators crossed the first 
barricade into zone one, negotiations and tactical communication was employed to de-escalate.  This first 
containment zone was the easiest to breach and occupy for demonstrators as no force was applied only 
coercive communication techniques.  If demonstrators moved forward and crossed the second barricade 
into zone two, tactical deployment of non-lethal weapons, mostly tear gas and water cannons, was 
exercised to disperse the oncoming Yellow Shirt “crowd” of demonstrators and control visibility.  The use 
of these medium to long range non-lethal weapons aimed to keep distance between Thai security forces 
and demonstrators to reduce the chances of significant injury occurring.  However, as discussed in 
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Chapter 5, tear gas as well as other medium range non-lethal weapons are forms optimal violence that 
have significant injurious effects.  Those who reached and passed the final barricade into zone three were 
met with rubber bullets and close range non-lethal weapons (i.e., batons).  The intensity of violent 
confrontation in zone three evolved rapidly and in certain circumstances led to the use of lethal force 
(Matichon 2013).  Containment and distance acts as a series of spatial practices and processes that operate 
through continuous spatial re-arrangements of coercive power, threat assessment, and violence that 
reshape state interventionary power across Bangkok.  Accordingly, official discourses argued that the 
three barricades zones allowed more distance between demonstrators and security forces assisting to 
mitigate chance of violent confrontation and significant injury or death (Sombatpoonsiri 2017; Kongkirati 
2016).      
As I stated in Chapter 5, the operational parameters of non-lethal weapons have become essential 
to the spatial practices of containment and distance in rearranging contested space and reifying the 
legitimacy state power and violence.  Non-lethal weapons were deployed by Thai security forces to 
discipline bodies and order contested space through conceived objective and neutral calculus of threat 
assessment as indicated by their spatial strategies of containment and distance (barricade zones).  
Moreover, the threat assessment calculus within contested space by Thai security forces reaffirmed the 
technoscientific framing of non-lethal weapons as they were operationalized as tools with technical and 
tactical design specifications, calibrations, and operational parameters that stabilizes the continuum of 
force and normalizes the valuation of bodies and metrics of (non-)lethality.  Non-lethal weapons were 
deployed as solely technical solutions to the indeterminable political problem of the Yellow Shirt space-
taking politics in contested space.  In the process of their deployment, a depoliticizion of the actual 
violence that occurred emerged.  As such, the deployment of non-lethal weapons reaffirmed non-lethal 
state intervention as benevolent, acceptable, and ultimately legitimate for Thai security forces during a 
time when their legitimacy was highly stressed.   
I maintain that a technoscientific governance employed by the Thai state assists in working 
through the ways that non-lethal weapons produce certain forms of power and security that (re)shape state 
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interventionary power and political subjectivity during Operation Occupy Bangkok that continues today.  
The technoscientific logics and practices that underpin Thai threat assessments, exposed the spatial 
consequences of technical-tactical biases embedded in technoscientific frames and produced uneven 
geographies of violence in contested space across Bangkok.  The increasing acceptability non-lethal state 
interventions in Thailand has allowed for a conceptually swollen continuum of force causing use of force 
option gaps and a growing number of non-lethal weapons designed to fill these conceived capability caps.  
This novel form of non-lethal state intervention in Bangkok has been colloquially referred to as 
“protective suppression” (bongkan brapram) (Haanstand 2012).  Protective suppression is the foundation 
for order-enforcement in Bangkok that is on-going. 
As I stated in Chapter 5, order-enforcement is a determined logic of coercion that aims to define 
the limits of security governance in contested space exploiting the (non-)lethal distinction and a spatial 
practice in exercising optimal violence to enforce order.  Specifically, for my case study, it is 
operationalized by the NCPO to quell and remove ‘disorderly’ and ‘deviant’ bodies and secure space 
based on the Thai state’s desired unity (kwarm samkee) and order (kwarm riebroi).  At the beginning of 
my research, the NCPO was still in the process of consolidating and centralizing its power through hyper 
nationalist rhetoric and a national security underpinned by an increasing militarization of all areas of Thai 
society and space.  The NCPO’s efforts to legitimize its power through re-establishing national unity and 
ensuring national security operationalized an order-enforcement that significantly restrained Thai 
subjects’ liberties.   
First, the NCPO linked anti-coup and pro-Red Shirts’ space-taking politics to geographically 
bounded “insecure”, “disordered”, and “ungoverned” space in need of stronger state intervention.  Ruling 
by emergency decree and martial law established under the ISA the NCPO suspended the right to public 
assembly.  Therefore, any attempts to participate in space-taking politics, a staple of Thai political 
expression, were met with significant state intervention.  Framed through the lens of protecting national 
security, the NCPO removed the capacity for space-taking politics to materialize even though a 
significant proportion of Thai peoples were not in favor of the military coup.  The NCPO manipulated 
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discourse to suggest that violent street clashes were leading Thailand towards civil war and to avoid chaos 
and the fall of Thailand space-taking politics cannot occur;  
“If there is still an election in this country, it will create conflicts, and the country will, again, 
experience the endless circle of conflicts, violence, politicians’ corruption, terrorism and the use 
of war weaponry […] This is very dangerous, I have realized […] you can see what we (the 
government) have been trying to do here” (Royal Thai Government 2014).  
 
The few instances post-coup where demonstrations did occur were met with overwhelming non-
lethal interventionary force from Thai security forces which weakened the call for protest.  In fact, the 
NCPO was so successful that previously contested space in Bangkok was avoided by Thai subjects out of 
fear of being associated with anti-NCPO sentiments.  While in Bangkok during my fieldwork, it was clear 
that once highly contested spaces were far less so as the NCPO’s interventionist power became so 
concrete.  The NCPO effectively delegitimized the practice of space-taking protest by stimulating a 
politics of fear across Thailand.  The NCPO needed to create unity and order and did so through their 
willingness to exercise non-lethal interventionary power.  To enforce these new social and spatial 
restrictions, the NCPO constructed a robust system of checkpoints, police monitoring stations, and they 
deputized all RTArF members to carry out typical RTP functions.  A specific example from my fieldwork 
will be discussed below.       
Simultaneously, the NCPO worked to delegitimize counter-coup movements by labeling political 
opponents as “un-Thai” or “national security threats” creating a strong “us” versus “them” dynamic.  This 
was especially significant as the NCPO initiated very public and intrusive investigations into Red Shirt 
leaders who could potentially challenge their ultimate authority.  The NCPO used state run media to 
perpetuate dominant discourses which delegitimized Red Shirt politics and lives as well as indicated that 
social or political dissent would not be tolerated.  The NCPO was unapologetic about its approach even as 
human rights groups and civil society organizations across the world raised concerns about their policies 
and practices: “Those accusing me of breaching human rights, they need to understand that we are 
operating in unusual circumstances” (Prime Minister Prayuth 2015).  The NCPO sustained its political 
legitimacy and dominance through the reproduction of a co-opted Thai national identity, highlighting 
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order and harmony using protective suppression measures in two significant ways.  First, the NCPO 
promised to bring back “happiness” and “national harmony” back to Thailand (Sombatpoonsiri 2017).  
For example, many festivals were organized which provided free food, goods, and entertainment to Thai 
peoples across the country but particularly in places that had high levels of discontent with the current 
regime.  Second, Thai happiness was linked to the Thai trinity and this required “the removal of dispute 
and dissidence from public space,” which is of most concern to this analysis (Sombatpoonsiri 2017, p. 
141). 
      Correspondingly, the NCPO introduced two policies of order-enforcement, “attitude adjustment” 
and “reconciliation”, to inhibit the potential for dissidence from “agitators” (Prachatai 2014).  On the 
surface, attitude adjustment and reconciliation appears to sound benevolent.  However, as policies of 
order-enforcement, a more in-depth examination exposes nefarious and violent practices to deter non-
conformation to the social and spatial order of the NCPO.  Implementing attitude adjustment and 
reconciliation relied on peer-to-peer policing but also on the range of legislation listed above (Table 6.1) 
to subject Thai peoples to intrusive state surveillance, intervention, and discipline in their everyday lives.  
Thai subjects were subject to detention and possible jail time for violations of these order-enforcement 
policies.  For example, a Thai subject could be detained for seven days without a warrant under the terms 
of Martial Law for performing “poor attitude behaviors” (i.e., political dissent or opposition to the 
NCPO).  For example, small protest activity across Bangkok was quickly stopped using overwhelming 
force and participants were swiftly detained.  The NCPO forced detainees to sign a “document prohibiting 
their future participation in any political activity and/or requiring them to obtain permission from the 
army prior to traveling abroad” (Sombatpoonsiri 2017, p. 141; Prachatai 2015).  In detention, detainees 
were often subject to threats, harassment, and alleged physical assaults.  Also, potential identified threats 
to attitude adjustment were placed on “visit lists” and visited by security forces at their homes or offices 
for re-education (iLaw 2016).  At the time of my fieldwork in December 2015 and January 2016, over 
800 Thai subjects were in detainment.   
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Reconciliation programs throughout the country aimed to re-educate Thai subjects on Thai norms 
and targeted areas with strong Red Shirt support (Sripokangkul 2015).  Invoking the Thai trinity, the 
NCPO worked to strengthen (re)indoctrination practices and devotion to Thai unity.  A royal succession 
was imminent, and the NCPO took significant steps to shore up the legitimacy of the monarchy and in 
particular the heir-apparent and now King Maha Vajiralongkorn.  NCPO leadership fundamentally 
believed that shifting and fragmented loyalties of the Thai people, a direct result of pluralistic Thai 
democracy, was the root cause of conflict.  Therefore, the NCPO focused on (re)igniting and fortifying 
support for the monarchy using state media, recanalization programs, and aggressively increasing charges 
under the lesè majstè laws.  Reconciliation programs heavily relied on nationalist discourses and history 
lessons which identify the king and RTArF as “saviors” of Thailand; “How was it that we kept a hold on 
our country and avoided being colonized by another country? It was because our king protected our 
nation” (Issan Record 2014).  The success of reconciliation programs depended upon the area’s complete 
cooperation with the NCPO’s educators and, ultimately, complete subjugation to NCPO politics.  Overall, 
these two polices of order-enforcement linked dissent and opposition to insecurity and instability and 
attempted to make Thai subjects more legible and therefore more governable.   
While in Bangkok, I was surprised to discover how quickly the NCPO implemented these order-
enforcement policies to mitigate the revival of space-taking politics.  At the time of my preparation to go 
to Bangkok for my field work, space-taking politics continued to occur though at a smaller scale 
surrounding the coup and the on-going debates about the military written constitution that was being 
forced through.  I had expected and planned to conduct participant observation and engage with 
participants of space-taking politics within highly contested space in Bangkok (Lumphini Park and 
Ratchaprasong intersection). However, by the time I had arrived a year later, NCPO and Thai security 
forces had successfully prevented any on-going space-taking politics through revoking the right to 
assemble, increased security in previously contested space, and coercive discourses and practices 
discouraging dissent.  It was highly visible that spatially based coercive interventionary force and order 
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enforcement by the Thai security apparatus was at the heart of the NCPO’s state making project.  As such, 
my arrival in Bangkok coincided with the final commitment to order-enforcement.  
The final commitment of order-enforcement is to preserve ordered space with increased 
invocation and implementation of security and surveillance to mitigate re-seizure of contested space.  My 
fieldwork experience and observations in December 2015 and January 2016 provide a foundation on 
which to understand the ongoing securitization through surveillance across Bangkok.  Since 2010 and 
bolstered after the NCPO seized power in 2014, the securitization of Bangkok depends heavily on various 
forms of surveillance techniques.  Spaces across Bangkok were identified and declared “at-risk zones” for 
space-taking protest, political attacks, and bombings.  In fact, 77 Bangkok spaces were “designated for 
‘secret surveillance’ by the Centre for Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) to patrolled by 
teams of troops and police” (Haanstad 2012, p. 287).  Further surveillance measures have been taken as 
47,000 CCTV cameras have been linked across the city including thousands of private cameras (Trimek 
2016).  Essentially the Thai security apparatus has constructed a centralized surveillance system 
embedding a significant number of decentralized surveillance networks.  Beyond CCTV cameras, Thai 
security forces have also established hundreds of new checkpoints and security structures—everything 
from small one person buildings to larger multi-person edifices across key intersections and public spaces 
in Bangkok.  These new architectures of security are used to conduct “unspecified ‘psychological 
operations’ in order to keep people ‘safe and sound’” (Haanstad 2012, pp. 287-288).  The vast majority of 
this infrastructure is located in what was once contested space (Lumphini Park and Ratchaprasong 
intersection).  The very visible architecture of security dominates these spaces as the figures and 
fieldwork anecdotes below demonstrate.  
I visited Ratchaprasong intersection a total of six times during my time in Bangkok to observe 
security practices and everyday mobilities.  Ratchaprasong intersection is home to the second largest mall 
in Southeast Asia, CentralWorld, as well as many other shopping centers which connects to a network of 
major hotels.  It also is home to the Hindu/Buddhist Erawan Shrine, a popular tourist site as well as the 
site of the August 2015 bombing that killed 20 people and injured over 120.  Having arrived in Bangkok 
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just a few months after the Earwan Shrine bombing, I was highly alert to the increased security presence 
at Ratchaprasong intersection as well as the more mobile nature of the space.  On previous visits to 
Bangkok Ratchaprasong intersection was a space where both tourists and Thai peoples would gather and 
occupy in leisurely ways over time, particularly to grab Thai iced coffee or food at the many vendors that 
once occupied the place but have since moved elsewhere.  However, in December 2015, the clear 
majority of people walked briskly through the intersection without stopping to their next destination.  
New gates/fencing, new CCTV surveillance cameras surrounded the place as well as a new RTP police 
structure was built that projected a powerful fortress mentality around the site.  The skywalk over 
Ratchaprasong intersection also had police barricades/fencing which prevented people from overlooking 
the intersection.  I had expected to spend more time at Ratchaprasong intersection, but because the of new 
security infrastructure, it was difficult to do so.  The new securitized built environment promoted 
circulation and mobility rather than occupation which made it difficult to spend long periods of time 
observing the once contested space.   
The ongoing practices of threat assessment at Ratchaprasong intersection clearly indicated that 
the once highly contested space needed significant securitization.  In calculating potential threats at 
Ratchaprasong intersection, the Thai security apparatus use progressively technologically-based, 
methodical, and indiscriminately applied practices.  These new forms of hyper-securitized state 
intervention that increasingly integrate technoscience and security governance (re)define our political and 
social futures through security hegemony and omnipresence and significantly shapes spatial relations in 
everyday life.  The panopticism in a space that was generally unregulated creates a new multilayer 
experience of securitization that diminishes one’s desire to occupy Ratchaprasong intersection space.  The 
multiplication of surveilling securitized gazes creates a greater capacity of the Thai state to monitor, 
control, and discipline bodies in ever more accessible ways.  It also has the potential to dislocate and 
marginalize access to Ratchaprasong intersection as deviant bodies conceived not to belong are very 
quickly removed.  
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The vigorous security and surveillance network I experienced at Lumpimi Park in central 
Bangkok is indicative of the on-going order-enforcement of the NCPO as well.  During the Red Shirt 
Revolution and Operation Occupy Bangkok, Lumpimi Park occupied a central location for space-taking 
politics.  Its edges intersect two key intersections and thoroughfares in Bangkok (Silom and Sathon) as 
well as the Lumpimi Police Station that were primary contested spaces occupied by demonstrator where 
clashes with security forces occurred.  For example, in 2010 the police booth (Figure 1) at the intersection 
of Sathon and Lumpimi Park was damaged by Red Shirts trying to get into the park to get to the main 
protest site (Ratchaprasong) and were fired upon by Thai security forces after a M79 grenade exploded.  
Also, during the 2013-2014 Yellow Shirt demonstrations, Lumpimi Park was one of the main protest 
sites.  During my fieldwork, I visited Lumpimi Park a total of 11 times so I could investigate all its 
entrances and pathways.  While there, I was subject to multiple security check points at entrances to the 
park (Figure 2) as well as robust CCTV surveillance.  Also, throughout the park there are 20 small one-
person security booths (Figure 3) that create a spatial network with very high visibility of park visitors 
along with mobile security units (walking and bicycles).  While I was there, I was even forcefully asked 



























  Figure 3. Security booth and CCTV cameras at Lumpimi Park. 
The spatial logics of security and surveillance at Lumpimi Park serve order-enforcement in two 
significant ways.  First, Thai security forces use the security and surveillance network to identify bodies 
that are conceived as not belonging and restricting their access and removing them from the park.  In 
particular, persons perceived to be involved in “lewd behavior” (brawling, theft, sex work, drug activities) 
are confronted and quickly removed or arrested (NNT 2018). Targeting these behaviors results in an 
uneven geography of access to space in Lumpimi Park which always has the potential to evolve into 
contested space through space-taking politics or other forms of spatial and social order disruption.  
Second, these practices of order-enforcement promote greater mobilities and circulation flows for persons 
conceived to belong in Lumpimi Park.  As the central park of Bangkok’s 32 public parks, Lumpimi Park 
receives hundreds of tourists a day.  As a Western, white, male I received very little attention from 
security during my time (besides being reprimanded for taking photos of security infrastructure).  In fact, 
on one occasion, as a guard was checking the bags of Thai students I waited behind them expecting to 
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follow suit only to be waved around without pause.  The productive spatial practices and logics of 
surveillance selects, encloses, and hierarchically manages and orders space privileging certain bodies 
(Klauswer 2013b).  These processes of selection and differentiation produce uneven social and spatial 
orders in space while trying to anticipate threats, risks, and insecurities.    
Conclusion  
Subsequent years of political unrest and violence peaking with the 2014 military coup, are 
indicative of how specific spatial arrangements of security are suited to particular forms of power across 
Bangkok.  Space-taking politics has defined the socio-political climate and spatial relations of Bangkok 
over the past decade and has transformed Thailand’s security realities.  Pointedly, these security realities 
are embodied as the optimal violence determined is enacted on the actual bodies whose bones can break, 
skin can tear, and whose blood can be spilled.  As I stated before, the ways non-lethal weapons are 
conceived in security through technoscientific and political/ideological master and counter-frames is 
inseparable in how they are enacted in practice and embodied in everyday life through threat assessment 
and order-enforcement.  To the extent that the overlap of security technologies (non-lethal weapons) and 
everyday life in Bangkok is a state project, I explore the how policies and practices of non-lethal 
intervention are a result of how non-lethal weapons offer transformative dynamics to policing spaces and 
bodies while simultaneously being stabilized within the Thai security policy and practice frameworks that 
shape state interventionary power in securing contested spaces across Bangkok.  This case study focuses 
on how technoscientific and political/ideological frames of non-lethal are instituted in threat assessment 
and order-enforcement in Bangkok, Thailand.  Moreover, this case-study serves as a starting point in 
which to engage other case studies to demonstrate the generalizability of my research.  It describes the 
multiple spatial representations, materialities, and consequences of these practices to illuminate the 
conceptual and material intersections between the geopolitical and the intimate, state power and space-





Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
Introduction  
This final chapter proceeds in three sections.  Following this brief introduction, I discuss general 
conclusions of my primary research findings that address my research questions on how non-lethal 
weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the 
legitimacy of state interventionary power and violence and how non-lethal weapons become stabilized 
within global police-military-network policy frameworks that shape state interventionary power in 
securing contested spaces.  Subsequently, I consider the broader implications of this research project.  In 
the final section, I forecast future trajectories for the study of non-lethal weapons in Geography and draw 
my discussion of the geographies of non-lethal weapons to an end. 
Non-lethal weapons are increasingly deployed against a rising number of bodies in contested 
space across the world.  As a research project at the intersection of political geography and STS, this 
dissertation illustrates state-sanctioned violence, the identification of bodies and spaces as threats, and the 
prioritization of science and technology in the service of state security agendas.  It illuminates the ways 
non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies that demonstrate how 
the exercise of power and knowledge create uneven geographies of violence.  It is my belief that 
employing an integrated STS and political geography conceptual framework makes possible greater 
understandings around the contingency and indeterminacy of what is known and how it is known in 
relation to the geographies on non-lethal weapons.  Geographic literature on the logics of (in)security is 
vigorous, but less attention has been paid to (non)lethality and its operation within contested spaces, 
contentious politics, and exercises of state disciplinary power.  This dissertation fills this gap in literature 
by engaging state interventionary and disciplinary power that connects optimal violence to order, coercion 
to (non-)lethality, and state power to contested space.  It addresses the paucity in the geographic literature 
on the politics of non-lethality and its materializations, through non-lethal weaponry, that proliferate 




Importantly, this project imagines and promotes political mobilizations and space-taking politics that are 
aimed at reflexive, anticipatory, and responsible participation and cooperation in contested spaces.  A 
politics of this kind subverts hegemonic security-logic and promotes alternative possibilities for what a 
“sense of security” entails (Durodié 2006, p. 193).  As space-taking politics spreads at unseen scale that 
can be traced through many spaces and socio-spatial contexts, civil-security relations are continually 
stressed as the state attempts to reconcile the agility, adaptability, and revolutionary potential of these 
movements.  This research project asserts that non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing 
contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and 
violence while becoming stabilized in the global police-military-network.  My research is situated to 
understand the day-to-day technoscientific and state policies and practices that underwrite the (re)making 
of the conceptual boundaries of the state and individual bodies in relation to the deployment of 
transformative technologies like non-lethal weapons. 
General Conclusions 
My research addresses an opening in scholarship on the state’s sovereign right to exercise 
violence and take life, highlighting the ways through which the state regulates life and death by making 
life, albeit through optimal violence and order-enforcement.  The fundamental observation of “how is life 
and death regulated and by whom?” raises many questions for me as I pursue greater understanding on 
the geographies of security and violence (Denyer Willis 2015, p. 5).  Often geographic research 
rigorously focuses on the logics of (in)security and lethal violence giving less attention non-lethal 
violence and the continuum it forms.  As I stated in Chapter 2, research on political violence in geography 
tends to focus on “spectacle”, the extraordinary, and/or moments of violent aberration (see Gregory & 
Pred 2007; Springer & Le Billon 2016).  This project shifts the focus from lethal violence to the ways the 
state exercises non-lethal violence and the ways non-lethality has been stabilized within state 
interventionary power.  I challenge the non-lethal/lethal distinction that has become stabilized within 
modern security frameworks through the state’s claim to a monopoly of exercising violence as well as its 
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monopoly on the decisions of what counts as legitimate and illegitimate violence.  Utilizing my STS co-
productionist conceptual framework and discourse analysis, I contend that non-lethal intervention in 
contested space has been transformed as an optimal violence exercised through threat assessment and 
order-enforcement integrates an expanded conceptualization of non-lethality within security and the 
continuum of force.      
Non-lethality in security is a political idea, a technoscientific materiality, a spatial manifestation, 
and a co-production of sociohistorical forces.  This dissertation locates non-lethality and it recognizes that 
non-lethality has a geography, a geography that challenges the logics and norms, contextual history, and 
material realties of non-lethal weapons and their transforming role in political violence.  I argue that 
technoscientific governance, arranged by the global police-military-network, co-produces new spaces of 
state violence aimed at managing bodies and spaces in which perceptions of threat, unease, and insecurity 
becomes a condition of governing through non-lethality in security.  Non-lethality in security moves 
beyond mere technocratic and/or ethical agendas aimed to strengthen the state’s legitimacy in its social 
contract with its citizens.  It is a product of sociohistorical, technological, and ideological forces that 
strengthen its claim to the state’s domination of exercising violence.  As such, my research contends that 
non-lethal weapons are co-constitutive of a range of technoscientific and political/ideological logics and 
limits that depoliticize their design, development, and deployment to dislocate bodies and secure 
contested space through an often-unnoticed state violence.  Like Maguire and Fussey (2016) state, 
“Security may be a new name for long-standing state violence in many parts of the world, but it is also a 
site of new technoscientific assemblages and forms of expertise that seek to know and manage the near 
future” (p. 42).  Non-lethal weapons are new technoscientific assemblages perpetuated by security 
expertise that attempts to make sense of the (non-)lethal distinction.  
Non-lethal weapons in state interventions have a long historical trajectory, but changing 
dynamics driven by the proliferation and globalizing security agenda have drawn significant debate and 
discussion in understanding non-lethal state intervention in contested space.  Central to these debates and 
discussions are the ways knowledge production surrounding non-lethality in security is often rendered 
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invisible by a diverse range of so-called experts who maintain authority.  The ways experts design and 
pursue innovation regarding non-lethal weapons is essential to understanding the ways non-lethal 
weapons are stabilized within the global police-military-network and their transformative power in 
shaping the dynamics of policing contested spaces and bodies.  This project purposefully subverts 
conventional understandings of non-lethal weapons.  It offers a critical analysis of expert bodies working 
through highly debated and contested knowledge in relation to security and science and technology policy 
making and implementation.  I provide a lens through which to understand how the production of 
knowledge becomes salient, credible, and legitimate for non-lethal state interventions in contested spaces.  
As such, the varied relations of security, technoscience, and non-lethal weaponry can be recognized and 
more thoroughly understood through the co-production of the many dynamic, complex, and contradictory 
knowledge(s) and material embodiments. 
I argue that non-lethal weapons make new forms of state interventionary and disciplinary power 
possible and engender political violence as new technoscientific and security realities become acceptable.  
As such, the range of conditions of non-lethal weapons deployment is better understood through this 
dissertation.  Accordingly, I determine that experts employ a range of technoscientific and 
political/ideological master frames of non-lethal weapons to depoliticize discussions and debates of non-
lethal weapons.  The depoliticization of non-lethal weapons is marshaled by expert knowledge and 
techniques of deliberation that uncouple and substitute dissensual contestation with technocratic security 
norms and ideological imperatives from which legitimacy and authority is drawn.  Conversely, counter 
technoscientific and political/ideological frames attempt to (re)politicize discussion and debates of non-
lethal weapons by displacing master frames.  However, as my analysis indicates, the hegemony of 
‘common sense’ understandings of insecurity, threat, disorder, and (non-)lethality are difficult to confront.  
That being said, I offer many starting points in which to mitigate the strength of common sense 
understandings of non-lethal weapons in my analysis.     
While I address my primary findings in detail in Chapter 5, I think it is important to highlight two 
significant general findings about the ways non-lethal weapons legitimize and stabilize optimal violence 
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in exercises of state power.  First, technoscientific and political/ideological master frames co-produce the 
legitimacy of non-lethal weapons that the state strategically employs to produce wider programs of state 
action regarding the use of force against civilians.  Consequentially, these actions weaken responsible 
deliberation and cooperation surrounding policies and practices of (non-)lethality and security.  
Technoscientific and political/ideological master frames separate non-lethal weapons and non-lethal state 
intervention in contested space from broader socio-political relations in the deliberation process and 
privileges security and science and technology experts and expertise.  As such, my research suggests that 
non-lethal state interventions and non-lethal weapons are increasingly stabilized within hegemonic 
visions of scientific objectivity and within humanitarian ideals viewed as optimal asocial, apolitical, and 
spatial orderings of contested space.  These transformations in security governance (re)define our 
everyday socio-political and spatial futures through a security hegemony and omnipresence and draw on 
conceived ‘benign’ forms of state power, and ultimately, state violence.     
Second, non-lethal weapons produce, and are produced by, discursive structures around security, 
(non-)lethality, and technoscience that shape the geographies of non-lethal weapons with very real 
material, spatial, and embodied consequences.  This development is apparent in the ways threat 
assessment and order-enforcement are progressively technologically-based, methodical, and 
(in)discriminately applied in contested space.  Non-lethal weapons provide a means by which increasingly 
interventionary security regimes can exercise violence to quell political and social dissent.  The 
formidable structures that co-produce and sustain the legitimacy of non-lethal weapons justifies and 
promotes future trajectories of optimal violence wielded against bodies.  The meticulous and methodical 
calculations and metrics that support the (non-)lethal distinction lack embodied understanding.  Pain, 
suffering, injury, and death are experienced by actual human beings who are undervalued because they 
are conceived as “deviant” and/or “transgressive”.   
The very limits of the value of human life are being calculated using statistics and metrics with 
little questioning.  Understanding this shift in the valuation of bodies within security governance requires 
an examination of precarity as a mode of life and a fundamental principle in considering the ways our 
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lives are governed (Butler 2006, 2016).  Precarization encompasses more than perceptibly calculable 
threats, fears, and vulnerabilities emanating from and within (in)security.  It denotes the struggle of 
measuring the immeasurable; “precarization means living with the unforeseeable, with contingency” 
(Lorey 2015, p. 98).  As the co-production of (in)security, technoscience, and (non-)lethality continues to 
increase socio-political legibility and order the state extends its nebulous of securitarian forms of power 
(Butler 2016).  Precariousness is both a condition and effect of governing through (in)security as the 
state’s capacity to ‘take life’ and ‘make life’ continues to expand (Lorey 2015). As such, political subjects 
must continually (re)constitute their everyday lives in relation to social-securitized spaces in which the 
state exercises disciplinary, coercive, and violent policies and practices in the name of stability, security, 
and order.   
Overall, non-lethal weapons emerge within and from systems of (non)lethality, legitimacy and 
violence(s) through which metrics of injuring—and killing—are calculated, and determined strategic 
necessities in policing contested spaces and bodies and preserving the legitimacy of state power.  In other 
words, non-lethal weapons shift how security happens.  As I stated in Chapter 1, non-lethal weapons are 
objects in perpetual formation that produce diverse desires and visions that derive from a range of policies 
and practices that maintain the normalcy of binaries of technical and non-technical, political and 
apolitical, and social and asocial.  This project disrupts the normalcy of these binaries and takes a critical 
approach in questioning the taken-for-granted understandings and common sense assumptions of non-
lethal weapons in security.  My research determines that non-lethal weapons significantly transform the 
state’s ability to exercise violence as part of its portfolio of security mechanisms where optimal violence 
in a continuum of force is presented and practiced in threat assessment and order-enforcement as a 
legitimate way of policing contested spaces and bodies.  In sum, the geographies of non-lethal state 
intervention co-produce heterogeneous practices of threat assessment and order-enforcement that stabilize 
non-lethal weapons in global police-military-network frameworks and changes the dynamics of policing 





The recent waves of space-taking politics in Hong Kong, Khartoum, Moscow, and elsewhere 
considerably revive attention to expressions of citizenship and state intervention in contested politics.  My 
research addresses how specific security discourses and materialities of and within contested spaces shape 
interactions not only during the event, but also maintain lasting effects on bodies and spaces (Daphi, 
2017).  The disciplinary techniques of dislocating bodies and securing contested spaces are an elaborate 
display of power and knowledge inscribed on bodies (civilians and security forces), an (dis)ordering of 
space, and are (re)shaping of the accountability and legitimacy of state interventionary policy and practice 
(Staples 2014; Coleman 2016; Woodward 2016; Williams 2016).  Non-lethal weapons allow for new 
forms of state interventionary power to be exercised and accepted.  They disrupt emerging, active, and 
resistant citizenry.  They are stabilized in the globalized police-military-network, making their use seem 
“ethical” and ordinary and produces new scientific, technical, and strategic security realities conceivable 
(Anaïs, 2015).  Concurrently, this research advances the development of technoscientific and security 
theory, methods, and practice in Geography. 
As a scholastic contribution in political violence and civil-security relations, my dissertation 
research pushes disciplinary boundaries in the ways we understand policing bodies and spaces that 
produce uneven spatial and social relations.  I show how policing and security practices of discipline, 
order, and management shape and define spaces and bodies as contested and therefore in need of stronger 
state intervention and governance.  The security mechanisms of state power that underpin security employ 
various geopolitical narratives and discourses aimed to identify and define notions of threats and danger 
but do so in increasingly apolitical, asocial, and technical ways.  Thus, state power is increasingly 
understood through the state’s ability to generate novel forms of governance through security, (non-
)lethality, and technoscience that are spatially articulated and unevenly applied.  This creates the space for 
a stronger interface between STS and political geography.  It opens innovative paths for geographers to 
extend geographical imaginations and practices by highlighting the social and material dimensions of how 




Also, I engage in dynamic, new theoretical and methodological debates about how state violence 
is unevenly exercised in contested space.  Forwarding a robust discourse analysis methodology that 
employs content analysis and intertextual research models to better understand how these disparities are 
disputed, negotiated, and reworked affords an opportunity to better locate non-lethal weapons, security, 
and technoscience in geographic research.  This approach both widens and strengthens the avenues in 
which to understand the complex relationality and intersectionality of security that reflects the 
interconnectivity of state governance and everyday life (Aradau et al. 2015).  Methods move beyond 
simple data collection per a set of techniques and exist as practices in and upon security regimes 
themselves.  Methods-as-practice considers the messiness and never straightforwardness of research.  
This stance is visible in my experience in the field in Bangkok as discussed in Chapter 6.  This project 
recognizes that knowledge production and its methods are socially and materially complex networks of 
practice and calls on geographers to pay closer attention to this.  
By locating non-lethal weapons within a context of a set of political, historical, and material 
relations between technology, security, and broader regimes of governance, the violence of (non-)lethality 
can enhance current and future infrastructure for STS and geographic research and education.  This 
project explicitly subverts pre-existing assumptions about non-lethal weapons by moving beyond 
technical specifications or solely focusing on the relationship between non-lethal weapons and their 
targets or users by re-theorizing how we understand non-lethal weapons and capturing experiences on the 
ground.  It makes accessible ways to dispute and disrupt dominant narratives and re-politicize of non-
lethal weapons as well as interrogate non-lethality in security.  As such, this project has the potential to 
advance new discovery and understanding of practices of non-lethal interventions across disciplines 
across the social sciences.  
Overall, I set a path for other researchers to engage everyday contexts of state interventionary 
power, emphasizing the use of interdisciplinary, theoretical frameworks and methodologies that are 
practiced in the field linking the ways in which material and discursive dimensions of knowledge 
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production and practices impact and direct action and its possibilities.  Applying the results to other fields 
may hold significant benefits to society.  On one hand, the findings of this project have the potential to 
inform policy that integrates the scientific and technological literacy of academia and industry with public 
engagement and governance practices that can form new models for decision-making overcoming the 
challenges of security in contested spaces as well as reducing the risk of negative impacts of non-lethal 
weapons deployment.  On the other hand, this project calls for a reevaluation of institutional 
commitments to accelerating non-lethal weapons and innovations by asking for new decision-making and 
partnership models in formulating new standards and guidelines, expertise, and codes of practice.  
Overall, in making the case for geographies of non-lethal weapons, this project sits at an intersection of 
scholarship, policy, and practice that can determine alternative paths forward for the design, development, 
and deployment of non-lethal weapons.    
The Future of the Geographies of Non-Lethal Weapons  
The central objective of my research is to examine the broader impacts of the ways the state 
exercises non-lethal intervention to accomplish certain spatial, social, and political ends.  I believe that 
making the case for critical geographies of non-lethal weapons is the first step in demystifying the shifting 
ambiguities of (non-)lethality and (in)security in non-lethal state interventions in contested spaces.  This 
project forwards new understandings of the ways non-lethal weapons change the dynamics of policing 
contested spaces and bodies in ways that preserve the legitimacy of state interventionary power and 
violence.  Emphasizing the robust use of STS and geographical theory and methods links the discursive 
and material dimensions of knowledge production and practice with the ways they impact non-lethal state 
interventions in contested space.  This conceptual and methodological framework can be used and 
adapted across the social sciences to further interrogate the complexities of geographies of non-lethal 
weapons.  Importantly, I believe that analyses should be grounded with empirical case studies to expose 
the lived everyday experiences and embodied consequences of non-lethal state interventionary power and 
non-lethal weapons. 
My research is broadly concerned with the ways the state regulates life and death in the 
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reproduction of social and spatial order.  Working through the critical geographies of non-lethal weapons 
over the past few years has meant contending with increasingly hostile political regimes, highly contested 
spaces, and concealed knowledge orders, particularly in Thailand.  Due to the global scope of non-lethal 
weapons proliferation and use, its political relevance, and its highly-contested nature, better 
understandings must continue to move beyond the scopes of this dissertation.  As such, I believe that the 
research presented here highlights the fact that geographic perspectives and knowledge has the greatest 
potential to investigate non-lethal weapons in all their complexities as they continue to shape spatial 
arrangements of power and violence.  In particular, political geographers’ attention to spatial relations and 
geopolitical discourses across scale—from the global level to lived everyday experience—can greatly add 
to a more nuanced understanding of the transformative technologies and political violence non-lethal 
weapons engender.  This project is the starting point of forwarding a critical intervention in understanding 
the geographies of non-lethal weapons that produces, enables, and gives meaning to the productive 
capacities of violence in shaping the spatialities of power in everyday life.  To move forward with critical 
geographies of non-lethal weapons I believe the following three broadly distinct but not mutually 
exclusive research objectives must be addressed: 
1) To understand how and in what ways state sanctioned optimal violence has come to govern 
(in)security under the auspices of governance which stabilize “law and order” rhetoric and the 
rule of law.  
2) Demonstrate how the less-visible and slower violence of non-lethality in security might be made 
more visible in diverse spaces and contexts around the world.  
3) To call attention to the emotions and embodiment of non-lethal optimal violence often rendered 
invisible by dominant narratives to engage more nuanced conceptualizations of violence and the 
continuum it forms.  
 
It is not my intent to explain non-lethal state violence per say but rather to understand it better.  
Security governance has become a normalized and promoted vital part of everyday life.  As such the 
blurring between state war machine and everyday life continues to transpire at even greater degrees than 
previously seen before.  Under the pretenses of greater stability, governance regimes are legitimizing the 
use of repressive and violent actions, hyper-surveillance, and persuasive rhetoric to continually erode 
citizens’ liberties in the name of security and order.  Inevitably, to conclude this dissertation I draw you 
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back to the scene set in Chapter 1 (Setting the Stage): 
The physical and psychological stresses and violence you endured slowly begins to heal 
over time.  While your bones mend, flesh heals, and primary body systems begin to 
restore to normalcy the scars—both visible and invisible—tell a story of the extension of 
weapon technologies in everyday life.  They loudly announce that the human body, your 
body, is subject to various forms of violence (and death) by actual practices of security 
and ordering by the state.  They are reminders of the state’s claim to a monopoly of 
exercising violence as well as its monopoly on the decisions of what counts as legitimate 
and illegitimate violence.  In addition, they represent the changing dynamics of policing 
your body and the spaces you occupy in ways that legitimize and stabilize the use of non-
lethal weapons in state security frameworks.  The immutable power of these weapons 
systems begins to overwhelm again … but you remember that the capacity for state 
violence to sustain a political world can be questioned.  It can be challenged. It can be 
confronted.   
 
Making the case for critical geographies of non-lethal weapons is my own attempt to question, 
challenge, and confront state power and violence.  I seek to (re)imagine and (re)discover the diverse paths 
that legitimize (non-)lethal state interventionary power and violence to better understand state-sanctioned 
violence, the identification of bodies and spaces as threats, and the prioritization of science and 
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